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ABSTRACT 
The compatibility of the blanket ban on assisted suicide in England and Wales with the 
European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) has been considered on a number of 
occasions by both the domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights 
(‘ECtHR’). Following the ECtHR’s decision regarding Diane Pretty’s application, 
challenges to the compatibility of the Suicide Act 1961 with the ECHR have, in the main, 
centred on the right to choose the manner and timing of one’s death as protected by 
Article 8 of the ECHR. Through doctrinal and comparative analysis, this thesis critically 
examines the compatibility of the ban with Article 8 of the ECHR. This analysis reveals 
that the ban is incompatible with Article 8 of the ECHR. This thesis also examines the 
compatibility of the ban with the right to life (Article 2) and the right to freedom from 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3). Recent case law from the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court, together with evidence of the impact of the ban on individuals, 
reveals that the ban violates the right to life of some individuals who are forced to take 
their lives prematurely before their physical condition deteriorates to such an extent that 
they can no longer suicide without assistance. Further, in criminalising assistance, the State 
subjects some individuals to inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of the negative 
obligation in Article 3 and, in failing to protect against the materialisation of that harm, the 
State fails to comply with its positive obligation to protect under Article 3. This thesis 
concludes with an examination of whether the ban is discriminatory in violation of Article 
14, read in conjunction with any or all of Articles 2, 3 and/or 8. The ban has a 
disproportionately adverse effect on individuals who, as a result of their medical condition, 
are physically incapable of suiciding in the same way that individuals without physical 
disabilities can. Further, having distilled a definition of ‘suicide’ for the purpose of the 
Suicide Act 1961, it is apparent that the ban only applies to some cases of suicide and that 
distinction is based on the individual’s medical condition and/or disability, which is a 
prohibited ground of discrimination under Article 14 of the ECHR. The findings that the 
ban violates Articles 2, 3 and 8 alone, and taken together with Article 14 of the ECHR, 
fundamentally alter the narrative surrounding the validity of the Suicide Act 1961 and have 
profound implications for subsequent challenges to the ban and to the formulation of, and 
debate surrounding, amendments to the Suicide Act 1961. 
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I know that I am dying, but I am far from depressed ... I intend to get every 
bit of happiness I can wring from what is left of my life so long as it remains 
a life of quality; but I do not want to live a life without quality.  There will 
come a point when I will know that enough is enough.  I cannot say 
precisely when that time will be ... I just know that, globally, there will be 
some point in time when I will be able to say – “this is it, this is the point 
where life is just not worthwhile.”  When that time comes, I want to be 
able to call my family together, tell them of my decision, say a dignified 
good-bye and obtain final closure – for me and for them. 
My present quality of life is impaired by the fact that I am unable to say for 
certain that I will have the right to ask for physician-assisted dying when 
that “enough is enough” moment arrives.  I live in apprehension that my 
death will be slow, difficult, unpleasant, painful, undignified and 
inconsistent with the values and principles I have tried to live by...1 
This statement by Ms Taylor – who had a terminal neurodegenerative condition – about 
the impact of Canada’s analogous ban on assisted suicide encapsulates the reality of 
hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals residing in England and Wales who have a life-
threatening or life-limiting medical condition that will leave them with little, or no, quality 
of life and which may result in a prolonged, painful and/or undignified death. As Ms 
Taylor’s account demonstrates, it is impossible to overstate the magnitude of the harm that 
prohibiting assisted dying causes individuals living with life-threatening and life-limiting 
conditions who would die with assistance were it lawful. Laws such as the Suicide Act 
1961, which criminalises assisting and encouraging suicide in England and Wales,2 forces 
such individuals to ‘choose’ between equally unsatisfactory options. They can: 
 
1 Statement of Ms Taylor, extracted in the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in Carter v Canada (Attorney 
General) [2015] 1 SCR 331 [12]. 
2 The key provision is section 2, which provides: 
(1) A person (‘D’) commits an offence if— 
(a) D does an act capable of encouraging or assisting the suicide or attempted 
suicide of another person, and 
(b) D's act was intended to encourage or assist suicide or an attempt at suicide. 
(1A) The person referred to in subsection (1)(a) need not be a specific person (or class of 
persons) known to, or identified by, D. 
(1B) D may commit an offence under this section whether or not a suicide, or an attempt at 
suicide, occurs. 
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• Take their lives prematurely, before their physical condition deteriorates to a point 
at which they can no longer suicide3 without assistance;  
• Travel to a permissive jurisdiction, if they have the financial means to do so, to die 
with assistance, either alone or accompanied by loved ones who face the risk of 
prosecution under the Suicide Act 1961 upon their return;  
• Seek assistance in England and Wales, thereby exposing those providing such 
assistance and any persons present at the time of their suicide, to the risk of 
prosecution under the Suicide Act 1961;  
• Do nothing and face a potentially prolonged, painful and/or undignified death.  
Plainly, none of these options is acceptable for the person who would die with assistance 
in the country in which they and their loved ones reside, were it lawful. Each carries a 
multitude of risks beyond prosecution, including the potential for catastrophic injury as a 
result of an unsuccessful attempt to suicide. There is also the psychological harm that each 
of those ‘options’ poses not only to the individual but also to their loved ones. And, it is 
not a small section of society who are so affected. In 2018, the leading cause of death in 
England and Wales was dementia and Alzheimer’s disease (12.8 per cent of registered 
deaths), with ischaemic heart diseases and malignant cancers accounting for a significant 
percentage of deaths in both males and females. Further, estimates suggest that two people 
out of 100,000 will develop motor neurone disease and a third die within a year of 
diagnosis, while more than half die within two years.4  
Of course, not all individuals with cancer, ischaemic heart disease, or a degenerative 
neurological condition would access assistance in dying if it were lawful. However, data 
from permissive jurisdictions reveals that the overwhelming majority of individuals who 
access assistance in dying have cancer and a significant number of patients have 
degenerative neurological conditions. Rates of assisted dying relative to total death rates in 
permissive jurisdictions vary from 0.39 per cent in Oregon to 4 per cent in the Netherlands 
(which have been selected as representative of the most restrictive and the broadest 
assisted dying systems). While one must be cautious when extrapolating data from 
 
3 Throughout this thesis, ‘suicide’ is used both as a verb and a noun. The phrase ‘commit suicide’ and the 
like has intentionally been avoided as the concept of ‘committing’ implies criminality and derives from the 
time when suicide was a criminal offence. 
4 College of Nurses, ‘Motor Neurone Disease: Statistics’ <http://mnd.rcnlearning.org.uk/what-is-motor-
neurone-disease/statistics/> accessed 30 July 2019; Office for National Statistics, ‘Deaths registered in 
England and Wales: 2019’ 
<https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/birthsdeathsandmarriages/deaths/bulletins/
deathsregistrationsummarytables/2018#leading-causes-of-death> accessed 11 August 2019. 
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jurisdictions that are legally, politically and demographically different, that data suggests 
that anywhere from 2112 to 21,664 individuals could access assisted dying were it legal in 
England and Wales.5 Often, it is the potential that thousands of people could access 
assistance in dying which is cited as a reason against permitting assisted dying in England 
and Wales. That interpretation of the data not only assumes that assisted dying is, per se, 
bad – and, in a secular society that respects the autonomy and self-determination of 
capacitous individuals to refuse life-sustaining treatment, such a presumption is invalid – 
it also ignores the reality that at least some, if not the majority, of those individuals are 
forced to endure the harm outlined by Ms Taylor because they are not able to access 
lawfully assistance in dying.  
It is also notable that the blanket ban does not stop people from dying with assistance. 
Over 400 individuals have travelled from England and Wales to Switzerland to die with 
assistance at Dignitas clinics, and that is only counting the data from one of the 
organisations that provides such assistance in one of the permissive jurisdictions.6 There 
is also evidence that hundreds of people have died with assistance in England and Wales. 
Given the alternatives confronting individuals with terminal or life-limiting conditions, it 
is hardly surprising that they would seek to die with assistance notwithstanding the ban. 
The ban on assisted suicide in England and Wales thus adversely impacts a considerable 
number of people and exposes them to harm the likes of which few of us could 
comprehend, while also failing to prevent individuals from accessing assistance both at 
home and in permissive jurisdictions overseas.  
Given the magnitude of this harm, it is imperative that the justifications proffered for 
maintaining the ban are valid. While there is a wealth of academic discourse on the moral, 
ethical and philosophical justifications for and against assisted dying, the legal analysis is 
comparatively slight, especially in terms of the human rights implications of the ban. This 
is so despite the fact that the domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights 
(‘ECtHR’) have considered the English ban in the context of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) on several occasions, most notably in Pretty, Purdy, Nicklinson 
 
5 There were 541,589 deaths in England and Wales in 2018 (the latest figures available). ‘Deaths registered 
in England and Wales: 2018’ (n 4).  
6 The latest figures reveal that 457 British members of Dignitas had been accompanied to a clinic in 
Switzerland where they subsequently die by suicide with assistance. Dignitas, ‘Accompanied suicide of 
members of Dignitas, by year and by country of residence’ (1998-2019) 
<http://dignitas.ch/images/stories/pdf/statistik-ftb-jahr-wohnsitz-1998-2019.pdf> accessed 17 July 2019. 
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and Conway.7 While Pretty is especially notable as it was the first case in which the ECtHR 
held that Article 8 of the ECHR, which protects the right to private life, encompasses a 
right to avoid an undignified death (or, put another way, a right to choose the manner and 
timing of one’s death), the Court held that the ban was compatible with the Article 8 rights 
of Ms Pretty who faced a deterioration akin to that described by Ms Taylor. According to 
the ECtHR, the blanket ban on assisted suicide was necessary to protect individuals 
vulnerable to undue pressure from dying with assistance as a result of such pressure. Both 
the House of Lords and the ECtHR rejected the other bases upon which Ms Pretty 
challenged the ban, including, inter alia, the right to life (Article 2, ECHR), freedom from 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3) and the right to enjoy one’s rights 
free from discrimination (Article 14). In the subsequent decision of Purdy, the House of 
Lords focused on the lack of an offence-specific policy guiding decisions to prosecute 
under s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961. In Nicklinson, a majority of the Supreme Court 
determined – for varying reasons – that it was not possible to consider whether the ban 
was compatible with Article 8 of the ECHR. However, two members of the bench – Lady 
Hale and Lord Kerr – did proceed to examine the ban’s compatibility and determined that 
it violated Article 8 as a blanket prohibition on assisted suicide was a disproportionate 
interference with Mr Nicklinson’s and Mr Lamb’s right to choose the manner and timing 
of their death.  
Notwithstanding the fact that the only two justices of the Supreme Court who have 
considered the ban’s compatibility with Article 8 of the ECHR found that the ban violated 
the right to choose the manner and timing of one’s death, the most recent challenge to the 
ban’s compatibility with the ECHR was rejected by both the High Court and the Court of 
Appeal, with the Supreme Court rejecting the application for leave to appeal.8 While Lady 
Hale and Lord Kerr were in the minority in Nicklinson in terms of examining the ban’s 
compatibility, they were the only justices to do so. It would be reasonable to assume, then, 
that subsequent, lower, courts considering the ban’s compatibility with Article 8 of the 
ECHR would at the least have regard to their reasoning. Yet, neither the High Court nor 
 
7 Pretty v Director of Public Prosecutions and Secretary for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 61, [2002] 1 AC 800; 
Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHHR 1; R (On the application of Purdy) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2009] 
UKHL 45, [2010] 1 AC 345; R (On the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] AC 
657; Nicklinson v United Kingdom (2015) 61 EHRR SE7; R (On the application of Conway) v Secretary of State for 
Justice [2018] 2 WLR 322, [2017] EWHC 2447 (Admin); R (On the application of Conway) v Secretary of State for 
Justice [2018] 3 WLR 925, [2018] EWCA Civ 1431. 
8 R (on the application of Conway) v Secretary of State for Justice (Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, 27 
November 2018) <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/r-on-the-application-of-conway-v-secretary-of-
state-for-justice-court-order.pdf> accessed 6 June 2019. 
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the Court of Appeal in Conway made any meaningful reference to the reasons of either 
Lady Hale or Lord Kerr, and one is left to wonder how a ban which was previously found 
to be incompatible by those justices of the Supreme Court who considered the question is 
now compatible notwithstanding the fact that no amendments have been made to the ban. 
This inconsistency is not only problematic from a jurisprudential point of view, it also has 
calamitous consequences for individuals like Noel Conway who are forced to confront the 
deterioration and ‘choices’ described by Ms Taylor. Indeed, Tony Nicklinson was forced 
to bring about his death by refusing food and hydration and Omid T, who was also 
challenging the ban’s compatibility with the ECHR, was forced to take his life prematurely, 
travelling to Switzerland to obtain assistance in dying while he was still physically capable 
of doing so.  
Given the severity of these consequences, the reasons provided by the courts for 
determining that the ban is compatible with the ECHR must be carefully scrutinised and 
their legal validity confirmed. Yet, limited attention has been directed to this task in the 
scholarly literature. Rather than examine the validity of the courts’ substantive reasons 
concerning Article 8, the academic analysis has focused predominantly on the validity of 
the Supreme Court’s deference to Parliament.9 Further, following the ECtHR’s decision in 
Pretty, and in the absence of any meaningful critique of that Court’s treatment of the 
Article 2 and Article 3 claims, it seems to have been accepted as a given that the ban does 
not engage, let alone violate, either the right to life or the right to freedom from torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment. This narrow focus has not only affected the way in which 
subsequent cases have been argued, it has also impacted upon Parliamentary debate 
concerning potential amendments to the Suicide Act 1961 to lessen the prohibition. There 
is, then, a glaring lacuna in the literature surrounding the validity of the blanket ban on 
assisted suicide in England and Wales from a human rights perspective. The purpose of 
this thesis is to fill that lacuna, a task which has significant implications for the judicial 
review proceedings challenging the ban that have been foreshadowed10 and any proposed 
 
9 See, for instance, Ross Beaton, ‘R.(Nicklinson): The boundaries of proportionality review and the end of 
life’ (2014) 19 Judicial Review 135; Nataly Papadopoulou, ‘From Pretty to Nicklinson: changing judicial 
attitudes to assisted dying’ (2017) 3 European Human Rights Law Review 298; Steve Foster, ‘Still no right to die: 
a study in the constitutional limitations of the UK judiciary’ (2017) 22 Coventry Law Journal 57; Clark Hobson, 
‘Is it now institutionally appropriate for the courts to consider whether the assisted dying ban is human rights 
compatible? Conway v Secretary of State for Justice’ (2018) 26 Medical Law Review 514; Steve Foster, ‘Human 
rights, judicial activism or deference and the case of assisted suicide’ (2019) 24 Coventry Law Journal 69. 
10 Katie Gibbons, ‘Father’s plea to die legally and with dignity’ The Times (London, 2 July 2019) 14; ‘Paul 
Lamb to bring new legal case for the right to die’ (Leigh Day, 7 May 2019) 
<https://www.leighday.co.uk/News/2019/May-2019/Paul-Lamb-to-bring-new-legal-case-for-the-right-
to> accessed 15 July 2019. 
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amendments to the Suicide Act 1961, which seem more likely following the general debate 
recently held in the House of Commons on the functioning of the Suicide Act 1961.11 
2. Research focus 
Following Pretty, it is accepted that Article 8 of the ECHR incorporates a qualified right to 
choose the manner and timing of one’s death and the blanket ban on assisted suicide in 
s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 interferes with that right. Both the ECtHR in Pretty and the 
domestic courts in Conway held that that interference was necessary in order to protect 
individuals vulnerable to undue pressure. The domestic courts in Conway further held that 
the ban was necessary to protect the sanctity of life and the doctor/patient relationship. 
The decisions of Lady Hale and Lord Kerr in Nicklinson cast significant doubt on the 
conclusions of the High Court and Court of Appeal in Conway and necessitate a close 
inspection of the reasons given by the courts for reaching the opposing outcome. Further, 
no attention has been given to the validity of the ECtHR’s rejection in Pretty of the 
applicability of Articles 2 and 3. The purpose of this thesis is to address these shortcomings 
in the jurisprudence and academic literature by critically examining the compatibility of the 
blanket ban on assisted suicide in England and Wales with the ECHR. More specifically, 
the research focus of this thesis is Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (freedom from torture 
or inhuman or degrading treatment) and Article 8 (right to private life) of the ECHR and 
whether the ban violates any or all of those rights in the case of individuals like Noel 
Conway, Omid T and Diane Pretty. In answering these questions, various research 
methodologies will be employed including, in particular, doctrinal and comparative legal 
analysis.  
The objective of this research is to determine whether the blanket ban on assisted suicide 
in England and Wales: 
1. Engages the right to life (Article 2, ECHR) and, if so, whether Article 2 is violated;  
2. Engages the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment 
(Article 3, ECHR) and, if so, whether the ban violates Article 3;  
3. Violates the right to choose the manner and timing of one’s death (Article 8, 
ECHR).  
 
11 HC Deb 4 July 2019, vol 662, cols 1412-51 <https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2019-07-
04/debates/EFD57ADB-AE18-4D6B-9DA8-CCDDF99D1D0A/AssistedDying> accessed 30 July 2019. 
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Having considered the compatibility of the blanket ban on assisted suicide with the 
substantive rights in Articles 2, 3 and 8, this thesis also examines whether the ban is 
discriminatory insofar as it has a disproportionately prejudicial impact upon individuals as 
a result of their medical condition/physical disability in violation of Article 14 read in 
conjunction with any or all of Articles 2, 3 and/or 8 ECHR. This thesis also considers 
whether the ban discriminates between analogous cases on the basis of a person’s 
disability/medical condition in violation of Article 14, taken together with Article 8 of the 
ECHR. Central to this analysis is a determination of the meaning of ‘suicide’ as that term 
is employed in the Suicide Act 1961. Through doctrinal and comparative research 
methodologies, a legal definition of ‘suicide’ will be distilled.  This, in turn, will reveal 
whether the Suicide Act 1961 discriminates against a specific form of suicide based on a 
person’s medical condition/disability in violation of Article 14 of the ECHR, read in 
conjunction with Article 8. A further objective should thus be added to the above list: 
4. Whether the ban is discriminatory in violation of Article 14 of the ECHR, read in 
conjunction with Articles 2, 3 and/or 8.  
3. Value of this research  
The practical effect of the prohibition on assisted suicide has been discussed above. It 
forces some individuals to take their lives prematurely, before their physical condition 
deteriorates to the point at which they can no longer suicide without assistance. Others are 
compelled to obtain assistance unlawfully with the worry that those assisting will be 
prosecuted or to travel to a permissive jurisdiction to die alone or, if loved ones accompany 
them, with the concern that they will be prosecuted. Others still face a potentially 
protracted, painful and undignified death. All too frequently, the debates in Parliament, 
before the courts and in the academic literature concerning the ban’s legitimacy fail to fully 
appreciate the very real and potentially catastrophic impact the ban has on a significant 
number of individuals. To that end, the deterioration and side-effects of treatment 
confronting Lecretia Seales – a woman with a terminal brain tumour who unsuccessfully 
challenged New Zealand’s analogous ban on assisted suicide – is as harrowing as it is 
illuminating: 
First, the administration of steroids to reduce the effect of intracranial oedema has 
a number of very undesirable side effects. One side effect is a massive weight gain. 
Ms Seales has already begun to suffer this side effect. Steroids can also impair a 
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patient’s sleep, induce mood and behavioural changes and predispose patients to 
stomach ulcers and bleeding.  
Second, stopping or reducing steroids is likely to cause Ms Seales to suffer severe 
headaches until she dies. Professor Ashby has explained these headaches “tend to 
be difficult to control by morphine or other pain killers”. 
Third, in any event, a point will be reached when steroids will cease to be effective. 
This in turn is likely to increase intracranial pressure for Ms Seales, which in turn 
is likely to lead to a condition known as “coning”. This occurs when the brain 
“herniates”, or presses down the spinal canal, and puts pressure on the brain stem, 
causing the nervous system functions that control respiration and cardiac function 
to shut down. At this point Ms Seales is likely to be administered “palliative 
sedation”.  
Fourth, palliative sedation can involve the administration of sedatives, 
benzodiazepines, anti-psychotics and/or occasionally barbiturates to maintain the 
comfort and dignity of the patient. At this point Ms Seales will not be able to 
interact with her husband and family.12 
It is difficult to comprehend what competing interests could be sufficiently weighty as to 
justify forcing a person to endure such a deterioration. Yet, in determining that the blanket 
ban is proportionate, that is the conclusion reached by the ECtHR in Pretty and the High 
Court and Court of Appeal in Conway. For so long as the ban remains in force in its current 
iteration, individuals like Noel Conway, Omid T, Diane Pretty and hundreds, if not 
thousands more, continue to face the agonising dilemma outlined above.  
The research and analysis undertaken in this thesis has the potential to fundamentally alter 
the discourse surrounding the Suicide Act 1961 and its compatibility with the ECHR. This 
thesis not only critically examines the validity of the conclusion reached by the domestic 
courts in Conway and the ECtHR in Pretty that the blanket ban is compatible with Article 8 
of the ECHR, it also expands the inquiry to include previously foreclosed avenues of 
analysis, in particular the right to life (Article 2), the right to freedom from torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3) and the right to enjoy those substantive rights 
free from discrimination (Article 14). The research that will be conducted in respect of 
each of those rights is novel; no court has considered the potential that the English ban 
 
12 Seales v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1239 [41]. 
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violates the State’s positive obligation to protect life (under Article 2) or that the State, in 
criminalising assistance, is subjecting individuals to treatment which violates Article 3. The 
same applies to the analysis undertaken in respect of Article 14, the legal definition of 
‘suicide’ as that term is used in the Suicide Act 1961 having never been considered by the 
courts or in the academic literature. Not only will such research be directly relevant to the 
applicability of Article 14 of the ECHR, it will also have significant implications for medical 
law more generally, in particular the legitimacy of the law’s differential treatment of end-
of-life practices, especially the withdrawal/refusal of life-sustaining treatment vis-à-vis 
assisted suicide and euthanasia.  
4. Structure 
While the focus of this thesis is assisted suicide and, to a lesser extent, euthanasia, it is 
impossible to consider such practices in isolation. Rather, it is necessary to locate both 
practices within the existing end-of-life system in England and Wales and to examine how 
English law treats other end-of-life practices, in particular the withdrawal/refusal of life-
sustaining treatment. The status of those latter practices in English law is directly relevant 
to the question of whether the blanket ban on assisted suicide is necessary for the purposes 
of Article 8 of the ECHR (Chapter Four) and the differential treatment of various end-of-
life practices is also pertinent to a determination of whether the Suicide Act 1961 
unlawfully discriminates between forms of suicide, which is considered in Chapter Six. 
Chapter One thus introduces various end-of-life practices and the law regulating same in 
England and Wales. Having established the legal position in England and Wales, the nature 
of the various permissive assisted dying regimes is also discussed, providing a foundation 
for the comparative analysis undertaken in subsequent chapters, in particular Chapter Five.  
Chapters Two, Three and Four each address the first three research objectives outlined 
above. Chapter Two considers the compatibility of the Suicide Act 1961 with the right to 
life in Article 2 of the ECHR. Central to this analysis, which is conducted by way of 
doctrinal methodology, is a determination of whether the ban engages the right to life, a 
proposition resoundingly rejected by both the House of Lords and the ECtHR in Pretty. 
However, Ms Pretty argued that the right to life incorporated the inverse: the right not to 
live. No court has considered whether the ban on assisted suicide violates the general 
positive obligation to protect life which is an accepted aspect of a state’s obligations under 
Article 2. Given the evidence that the ban compels some people to take their lives 
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prematurely, it is argued that the State’s positive obligation to protect is engaged and, 
indeed, violated by the blanket ban on assisted suicide.  
Continuing with a doctrinal methodology, Chapter Three examines the compatibility of 
the Suicide Act 1961 with the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment (Article 3, ECHR). Ms Pretty was also unsuccessful in arguing that the ban 
violated Article 3 before both the House of Lords and the ECtHR, with the courts rejecting 
the contention that the State could be said to have subjected Ms Pretty to any ‘treatment’. 
Having regard to the recent Supreme Court decision concerning the ban on abortion in 
Northern Ireland and its compatibility with Article 3, in particular, the reasons of President 
Hale and Lord Kerr, Chapter Three considers the possibility that the ban, in criminalising 
assistance, does in fact constitute treatment such as to engage Article 3 of the ECHR. That, 
however, is not the end of the Article 3 examination; for a violation to arise, there must be 
treatment which reaches the minimum level of severity. Whether the ban constitutes 
treatment which reaches that threshold for some individuals in England and Wales is 
considered through comparative analysis, with particular reliance placed on the Canadian 
case of Carter,13 together with anecdotal evidence drawn from domestic and ECtHR 
jurisprudence and secondary sources. Whether the ban violates the positive obligation to 
protect individuals from ill-treatment reaching the Article 3 threshold is also considered.  
Chapter Four concerns the ban’s compatibility with Article 8 of the ECHR. As it is 
accepted that Article 8 includes the right to choose the manner and timing of one’s death, 
and the ban interferes with that right, the central focus of this chapter is whether the ban 
is necessary in a democratic society. Through doctrinal and comparative analysis of 
domestic and international case law, this chapter examines the nature and scope of the 
proportionality assessment developed in domestic jurisprudence and applies that test to 
the ban. Each of the three justifications given for the ban by the High Court in Conway are 
considered, with particular regard being had to the legal status – and regulation – of other 
end-of-life practices, in particular the withdrawal/refusal of life-sustaining treatment. 
While the doctrinal analysis undertaken in this chapter suggests that there is no 
requirement for a person challenging the compatibility of the ban to prove that an 
alternative to the blanket ban would function appropriately and meet the concerns raised 
by the State, Chapter Five examines the efficacy of permissive schemes, having regard to 
 
13 Carter v Canada (Attorney General) 2012 BCSC 886 and Carter (Supreme Court) (n 1). 
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the data available from those jurisdictions, to determine whether a less restrictive ban 
would meet the three aims proffered for the ban.  
Having considered the ban’s compatibility with the substantive rights to life (Article 2), 
freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3) and private life 
(Article 8), the final substantive chapter, Chapter Six, explores the potentially 
discriminatory effect of the ban. Central to this examination is the distillation of the 
meaning of ‘suicide’ as that term is used in the Suicide Act 1961. That definition is 
developed through doctrinal analysis of coronial jurisprudence and criminal case law, and 
reveals that other end-of-life practices, in particular the withdrawal/refusal of life-
sustaining treatment, may constitute suicide for the purposes of the Suicide Act 1961. That 
being the case, the question arises as to whether the Suicide Act 1961 discriminates 
between individuals on the basis of their medical condition and/or physical disability, 
which is a prohibited ground of discrimination under Article 14 of the ECHR. 
The principles of autonomy and dignity are central to the analysis undertaken in Chapters 
Two to Six. This is unsurprising given that those principles underpin the ECHR and, 
together with self-determination, guide decisions made in end-of-life situations in England 
and Wales. It is notable that while those principles enable capacitous individuals to make 
decisions concerning their medical treatment even when the inevitable outcome is their 
death (for instance, the refusal of life-sustaining treatment), those same principles, while 
equally applicable, are not afforded the same degree of respect when a capacitous 
individual decides to die by suicide with assistance. The analysis undertaken in Chapters 
Two to Six involves an assessment of the validity of the weight attributed by the State to 
the autonomy, self-determination and dignity of individuals like Diane Pretty, Noel 
Conway and Omid T. In determining whether the ban is compatible with Articles 2, 3 and 
8 of the ECHR, this thesis provides a more comprehensive analysis of the legitimacy of 
the weight attributed to competing interests by the State than has previously been 








THE LEGAL STATUS OF END-OF-LIFE PRACTICES IN ENGLAND AND WALES: A 
COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION  
1. Introduction  
This chapter introduces, and defines, key terms and outlines the legal status of end-of-life 
practices in England and Wales, which is then contextualised within the broader 
international setting, in particular permissive jurisdictions. Several issues that are central to 
the analysis undertaken in subsequent chapters are also considered including, in particular, 
the differential treatment of assisted suicide and euthanasia vis-à-vis the withdrawal/refusal 
of life-sustaining treatment in English law. The role of, and implications for, human rights 
in the regulation of end-of-life practices is also examined with a view to introducing the 
normative framework employed in subsequent chapters. 
2. Terminology  
A multitude of phrases are employed in judicial, legislative and academic writing to describe 
various aspects of ‘assisted dying’ and ‘end of life choices’ including, for instance, ‘assisted 
suicide’, ‘euthanasia’, ‘voluntary euthanasia’, ‘involuntary euthanasia’, ‘passive euthanasia’ 
and ‘palliative sedation’. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the controversial nature of the topic, 
there is no single, undisputed, definition of any of the relevant terms.14 Where, however, 
reference is made to the following terms, the attendant definitions can be taken to apply 
unless stated otherwise: 
• Euthanasia: the phrase (first appearing in contemporary writings in the 17th 
century)15 derives from the Greek eu meaning good and thanatos meaning death. It 
refers to a third party deliberately ending another person’s life.16 Some definitions 
 
14 ‘The way we classify actions is indicative of the way we think about them’ (Tom Beauchamp and Arnold 
Davidson, ‘The Definition of Euthanasia’ (1979) 4 The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 294, 294). Similarly, 
Margaret Sommerville has observed ‘[e]ven with an overriding aim of neutrality and precision, it can be 
difficult to define, accurately and clearly, which interventions or non-interventions constitute euthanasia and 
which do not. But a definition is necessary’ (Margaret Sommerville, Death Talk: The Case Against Euthanasia 
and Physician-Assisted Suicide (2nd edn, McGill-Queen’s University Press 2014), 25. 
15 ‘[Francis] Bacon was the first in history since the Roman historian Seutonius (c. 70-140AD) in The Life of 
Caesars to use the term “euthanasia.” Both Bacon and Suetonius employed the word in its etymological 
meaning, that is, to signify an easy death through the mitigation of pain rather than a death hastened by a 
physician through the administration of poison’ (Ian Dowbiggin, A Concise History of Euthanasia: Life, Death, 
God, and Medicine (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers 2007), 23). 
16 See, for instance, Emily Jackson and John Keown, Debating Euthanasia (Hart Publishing 2012), 2. 
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include reference to an intention to relieve suffering,17 though this is by no means 
a unanimously accepted aspect of euthanasia. Unless specified otherwise, 
‘euthanasia’ refers to a third party doing an act with the intention of ending 
another’s life.  
• Voluntary euthanasia (sometimes referred to as voluntary active euthanasia): is ‘a 
deliberate act intended to terminate a person’s life at his or her own explicit 
request.’18 This phrase is employed to distinguish situations in which a competent 
patient actively requests euthanasia, from situations in which they do not (i.e. 
involuntary and/or passive euthanasia).19 
• Involuntary euthanasia: euthanasia is involuntary when ‘the person killed is capable 
of consenting to her own death, but does not do so, either because she is not asked, 
or because she is asked and chooses to go on living’.20 
• Non-voluntary euthanasia: involves ending another person’s life when that person 
lacks the capacity to consent to, or refuse, it and has made no prior decision in this 
respect.21  
• Passive euthanasia: covers circumstances in which death follows the 
withdrawal/refusal of life-sustaining treatment.22 
 
17 See, for instance, Benjamin White and Lindy Willmott, ‘How Should Australia Regulate Voluntary 
Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide?’ (2012) 20 Journal of Law and Medicine 410, 411. See, also, Penney Lewis, 
Assisted Dying and Legal Change (OUP 2007), 4.  Julian Savulescu defines euthanasia as ‘X intentionally kills Y 
for Y’s benefit’ (Julian Savulescu, ‘Autonomy, Interests, Justice and Active Medical Euthanasia’ in Michael 
Cholbi and Jukka Varelius (eds), New Directions in the Ethics of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia (Springer 2015), 
41). 
18 Anja Terkamo-Moisio, ‘The Traditional Model Does Not Explain Attitudes Toward Euthanasia: A Web-
Based Survey of the General Public in Finland’ (2016) 75 OMEGA – Journal of Death and Dying 266, 267. See, 
also, Pekka Louhiala, Heta Enkovaara, Hannu Halila, Heikki Pälve and Jukka Vänskä, ‘Finnish physicians’ 
attitudes towards active euthanasia have become more positive over the last 10 years’ (2015) 41 Journal of 
Medical Ethics 41, 353: ‘a measure taken with the definite intention to end life at the patient's explicit request 
due to refractory suffering’. 
19 See, for instance, White and Willmott (n 17), 411; Jackson (n 16) 2; Keown (n 16) 87 citing Select 
Committee on Medical Ethics, (HL 1993-94, 21-I) [20]-[26]; Select Committee on the Assisted Dying for the 
Terminally Ill Bill, Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill (HL 2004-5, 86I-II), Vol I, 14 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200405/ldselect/ldasdy/86/8602.htm> accessed 30 July 
2019; Commission on Assisted Dying, The Current Legal Status of Assisted Dying in Inadequate and Incoherent 
(Demos 2011) 37; Lewis (n 17), 5; Savulescu defines active euthanasia as ‘X performs an action which itself 
results in Y’s death’ and voluntary euthanasia as ‘Y requested death himself’ (Savulescu (n 17), 41). 
20 Lewis (n 17) 5 citing Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 1993) 175. See, 
also, Jackson (n 16) 2; White and Willmott (n 17), 411; Andrew Dunnett, Euthanasia: The Heart of the Matter 
(Hodder & Stoughton 1999) 5; Commission on Assisted Dying (n 19) 37; Savulescu (n 17), 41. 
21 See, for instance, Lewis (n 17), 5. According to Savulescu, euthanasia is non-voluntary when ‘Y is incapable 
of expressing a preference’, Savulescu (n 17), 41. 
22 As Jackson identified: ‘“treatment withdrawal” is a less value-laden term’ and is, thus, used more frequently 
than ‘passive euthanasia’ Jackson (n 16), 2. Savulescu defines passive euthanasia as ‘X allows Y to die. X 
withholds life-saving treatment or withdraws life-saving treatment’ (Savulescu (n 17), 41).  See, also, in this 
respect Lewis (n 17), 5; White and Willmott (n 17), 411. 
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• Assisted suicide: what constitutes ‘suicide’ is by no means settled and Chapter Six 
considers the meaning of the term for the purposes of the Suicide Act 1961. In the 
meantime, it is sufficient to note that the phrase ‘assisted suicide’ is generally 
employed to describe situations in which a competent person takes their own life 
(i.e. they do the final act necessary to bring about their death) having received 
assistance in doing so, typically through the provision of the means necessary to 
end their life.23  
• Terminal/palliative sedation: the administering of sedatives with the intention of 
‘reducing the level of consciousness of a terminally ill patient’24 to relieve refractory 
symptoms.25  
3. End-of-life practices in England and Wales  
3.1 Assisting and encouraging suicide  
The Suicide Act 1961 decriminalised suicide but criminalised ‘complicity in another’s 
suicide’ (s 2). In its current iteration, the Act criminalises acts ‘capable of encouraging or 
assisting the suicide or attempted suicide of another person’ (s 2(1)(a)). The mens rea of the 
offence is an intention to encourage or assist another’s suicide or attempted suicide 
(s 2(1)(b)). Notably, pursuant to ss 2(1A) and 2(1B), the person who is assisted or 
encouraged ‘need not be a specific person (or class of persons) known to, or identified, by 
the defendant’ and an offence will occur regardless of whether ‘a suicide, or an attempt at 
suicide, occurs.’  
A number of Bills proposing amendments to the Suicide Act 1961 have been debated by 
both houses of Parliament. Those Bills have variously proposed amendments permitting:  
• A defence for persons who provide assistance and are ‘motivated by a reasonable 
and compassionate concern for another’s welfare’;26 
 
23 See, for instance, White and Willmott (n 17), 411; Jackson (n 16), 2; Lewis (n 17), 5; Commission on 
Assisted Dying (n 19), 37; Savulescu (n 17), 41. 
24 Paulina Taboada, ‘Sedation at the End of Life. Clinical Realities, Trends and Current Debate’, in Paulina 
Taboada (ed.) Sedation at the End-of-life: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Springer 2015), 5. 
25 ‘Refractory symptoms’ are ‘symptoms that cannot be adequately controlled despite aggressive efforts to 
identify a tolerable therapy that does not compromise consciousness’ (Kay De Vries and Marek Plaskota, 
‘Ethical dilemmas faced by hospice nurses when administering palliative sedation to patients with terminal 
cancer’ (2016) 15 Palliative & Supportive Care 148, 148). See, also, Marian Verkek, ‘Towards responsive 
knowing in matters of life and death’ in Christoph Rehmann-Sutter, Heike Gudat, and Kathrin Ohnsorge 
(eds), The Patient’s Wish to Die: Research, Ethics, and Palliative Care (OUP 2015), 140. 
26 Suicide Act 1961 (Amendment) [HL] Bill, HL Deb 11 December 1985, vol 469, cols 288-318, 309 
<https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1985/dec/11/suicide-act-1961-amendment-bill-hl> 
accessed 30 July 2019. 
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• Assistance for individuals suffering unbearably as a result of a terminal illness;27 
• Assistance for individuals with a terminal illness and a life-expectancy of 6 months 
or less.28 
Each attempt to amend the Suicide Act 1961 to provide for some form of assisted dying 
has been unsuccessful and the blanket prohibition remains intact; assisting and 
encouraging suicide is criminal. Similarly, several challenges to the compatibility of the 
blanket ban with the ECHR have failed.29 There are, however, other end-of-life practices 
which are lawful in England and Wales.  
3.2 Palliative sedation and passive euthanasia  
In England and Wales a capacitous patient has ‘an absolute right to choose whether to 
consent to medical treatment, to refuse it or to choose one rather than another of the 
treatments being offered’.30 ‘This right of choice is not limited to decisions which others 
might regard as sensible. It exists notwithstanding that the reasons for making the choice 
are rational, irrational, unknown or even non-existent.’31 In December 2015, the Court of 
Protection reaffirmed the right of a 50-year-old woman with capacity to refuse life-saving 
dialysis on the basis that such a life ran contrary to her erstwhile ‘emphasis on money, 
material possessions and “living the high life”’.32 Central to the absolute right of capacitous 
individuals to refuse life-sustaining treatment are the principles of autonomy and self-
determination.33 While the principle of the sanctity of life carries significant weight, it is 
not absolute; it can and does give way to other principles including a patient’s autonomy 
and self-determination.34 Further, the United Kingdom (‘UK’) Supreme Court has recently 
confirmed that where doctors and family members are agreed, life-sustaining treatment 
that is not in the patient’s best interests can be withdrawn from incapacitous patients 
 
27 Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill HL Bill (2003-04) 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldbills/017/04017.iii.html> accessed 30 July 2019. 
28 Assisted Dying HL Bill (2014-15) <https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2014-15/assisteddying.html> 
accessed 30 May 2019; Assisted Dying HC Bill (No 2) (2015-16) <https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2015-
16/assisteddyingno2.html> accessed 30 July 2019; Assisted Dying HL Bill (2016-17) 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/2016-2017/0042/lbill_2016-
20170042_en_2.htm#l1g1> accessed 30 July 2019. 
29 Pretty (n 7), Nicklinson (n 7) and Conway (n 7). 
30 Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1992] 3 WLR 782, [1993] Fam 95, 102 (Lord Donaldson). 
31 ibid. See, also, Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, 859, [1993] UKHL 17 (Lady Hale): ‘It is not 
lawful to treat a patient who has capacity and refuses that treatment.’ 
32 Kings College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v C & Anor [2015] EWCOP 80 [8], [2015] 11 WLUK 797. 
33 See, for instance, Re B(Consent to treatment) v An NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam), [2002] 2 All 
ER 449 [16]ff; Bland (n 31), 864. 
34 See, for instance, Bland (n 31) 859, 864 
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without a declaration from the courts.35 In such cases, the patient’s dignity – as evidenced 
in the assessment of their best interests – assumes particular significance. 
In addition to the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, palliative sedation is an accepted 
part of end-of-life care in England and Wales.36 The law has developed to accommodate 
practices that would otherwise constitute murder (relying on oblique intention);37 the 
doctrine of double effect ‘allows death to be knowingly caused as a side-effect [of proper 
pain relief of refractory symptoms] and so draws a distinction between the intention 
underlying an action on the one hand and the consequences that are foreseen but are not 
intended on the other.’38  
Thus, while a doctor cannot assist a patient to die when they are not receiving life-sustaining 
treatment, they can assist a patient who is receiving such treatment. Indeed, they are 
mandated to if the patient is capacitous and refuses or withdraws consent to such treatment 
or, if they are incapacitous, and the treatment is no longer in the patient’s best interests. 
The disparate treatment of end-of-life practices in English law will be considered in greater 
detail in the ensuing chapters.  
4. Assisted suicide and euthanasia: a global perspective39 
4.1 Legally permissive jurisdictions   
Assisted suicide and/or voluntary active euthanasia is currently permitted (meaning there 
is legislation or case law which expressly provides that assisted suicide and/or voluntary 
active euthanasia is lawful, as opposed to there being no express prohibition of the 
practices)40 in the following jurisdictions: 
• Belgium;41 
 
35 An NHS Trust v Y [2018] 3 WLR 751, [2018] UKSC 46. 
36 See, for instance, National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, ‘Guideline NG31: Care of dying 
adults in the last days of life’ (December 2015) 
<https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ng31/chapter/Recommendations> accessed 30 July 2019. 
37 Nicklinson (n 7) [255] (Lord Sumption). Similarly, Ognall J opined, in R v Cox (1992) 12 BMLR 38 (41) that: 
There can be no doubt that the use of drugs to reduce pain and suffering will often be fully justified 
notwithstanding that it will, in fact, hasten the moment of death. What can never be lawful is the 
use of drugs with the primary purpose of hastening the moment of death. 
38 Briggs v Briggs [2016] [2017] 4 WLR 37, [2017] EWCOP 53 [88]. See, also, Nicklinson (n 7) [18] (Lord 
Neuberger). 
39 While every attempt has been made to source the relevant primary material, language restrictions 
necessitate reliance on secondary sources in some instances. 
40 As is the situation in, for instance, Scotland: Gordon Ross v Lord Advocate [2016] CSIH 12, 2016 SC 502.  
41 28 May 2002 Act on Euthanasia, B.S. 22 June 2002. For a translation of the legislation: 
<http://www.ethical-perspectives.be/viewpic.php?LAN=E&TABLE=EP&ID=59> accessed 30 July 
2019.  
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• Canada (federally42 and in Quebec43); 
• Colombia;44 
• Luxembourg;45 
• Switzerland;46  
• The Netherlands;47 






o New Jersey;53 
o Oregon;54 
o Vermont;55 
o Washington State;56  
o Washington D.C.57 
 
42 Criminal Code (RSC 1985, c.C-46) s 241. 
43 Act Respecting End-of-Life Care (Bill-52, 2014). 
44Constitutional Claim Decision C-239/97 (20 May 1997). Summary: 
<http://english.corteconstitucional.gov.co/sentences/C-239-1997.pdf> accessed 30 July 2019. Legislation 
giving effect to that decision is Resolution 1216 (2015), Official Gazette No 49.489 (21 April 2015) 
<http://www.icbf.gov.co/cargues/avance/docs/resolucion_minsaludps_1216_2015.htm> accessed 30 
July 2019. 
45 Law of 16 March 2009 on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide (Mémorial A-No. 46, 16 March 2009) 
<http://www.legilux.public.lu/leg/a/archives/2009/0046/a046.pdf#page=7> accessed 30 July 2019  
46 Swiss Criminal Code, SR 311.0 (1937, amended 2015) art 115. ‘Assisting suicide is legal in Switzerland if it 
is offered without selfish motive to a person with decision-making capacity. There are no direct legal rules 
about physician involvement and most assisted suicides are provided by lay right-to-die associations’ (Samia 
A. Hurst and Alex Mauron, ‘Assisted Suicide in Switzerland: Clarifying Liberties and Claims’ (2017) 31 
Bioethics 199). 
47 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 2002. 
48 End of Life Option Act (2016). 
49 Colorado End-of-Life Options Act (2016). 
50 Our Care, Our Choice Act (2018). 
51 Death with Dignity Act (LD 1313) (2019).  
52 In 2009, the Supreme Court of Montana held that the consent of a terminally ill adult with capacity 
could shield physicians from ‘homicide liability’ in the context of assisted suicide: Baxter and Ors v State of 
Montana & Anor (2009 MT 444). The source of the right is The Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (Title 9, 
Chapter 50 of the Montana Code Annotated) which applies to ‘qualified patients’ who are defined as ‘18 
years of age or older’ with terminal conditions and whose death is anticipated ‘within a relatively short 
time’ (Title 50, Chapter 9, Part 2 of the Montana Code Annotated, 50-9-102(13), 50-9-102(16) and 50-9-
204.  
53 Aid in Dying for the Terminally Ill Act (2019). 
54 Death with Dying Act (1997). 
55 An Act Relating to Patient Choice and Control at End of Life (2013). 
56 Death with Dignity Act (RCW 70.245) (2009). 
57 Death with Dignity Act 2016 (Law 21-182) (2017). 
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• The Australian State of Victoria;58 
• The Australian State of Western Australia.59 
Table 1 provides a comparative overview of the situation in each of the jurisdictions just 
outlined.  
 
58 Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017.  
59 Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2019.  
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60 ‘PAS’: physician-assisted suicide; ‘general’: suicide assisted by persons other than physicians. 
61 Carter (2012) (n 13) [508]. Herman Nys, ‘A discussion of the legal rules on euthanasia in Belgium briefly compared with the rules in Luxembourg and the Netherlands’ in David 
Albert Jones, Chris Gastmans and Calum MacKellar (eds) Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: Lessons from Belgium (Cambridge University Press 2017), 10. 
62 ‘Young people over 14 do not need parental authorization, children between 12 and 14 years of age compulsorily require the consent of their parents, and boys and girls between 
6 and 12 years old must demonstrate a “neurocognitive development and exceptional psychological that allows them to make a free, voluntary, informed and unequivocal decision in 
the medical field and their concept of death reaches the expected level for a child over 12 years old”’ L Lopez Benavides, ‘The right to die with dignity in Colombia’ (2018) 6 Forensic 
Research and Criminology International Journal 426, 428. See, also, decision of the Colombian Constitutional Court in Judgment T-544/2017 [37]-[38]. 
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64 The Luxembourgian Act refers to a ‘medicale sans issue’  which can loosely be translated as a ‘dead end’ medical situation, which does not necessarily mean terminal. The lack of a  
life-expectancy criteria supports this interpretation as do a number of academic writings on the Luxembourgian Act. See, for instance, Nicole Steck, Matthias Egger, Maud Maessen, 
Thomas Reisch and Marcel Zwahlen, ‘Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in Selected European Countries and US States: A Systematic Literature Review’ (2013) 51 Medical Care 938; 
Monica Verhofstadt, Lieve Thienpont and Gjalt-Jorn Ygram Peters, ‘When unbearable suffering incites psychiatric patients to request euthanasia: a qualitative study’ (2017) 211 The 
British Journal of Psychiatry 238; Ezekiel Emanuel, Bregje Onwuteaka-Philipsen, John Urwin and Joachim Cohen, ‘Attitudes and Practices of Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide 
in the United States, Canada and Europe’ (2016) 316 JAMA 79, 80. Given Luxembourg followed Belgium and the Netherlands in permitting assisted dying, neither of which required 
that the individual be terminally ill, it would be most curious if Luxembourg were to introduce such a restriction in the absence of very clear wording to that effect. That, coupled 
with the lack of a life-expectancy requirement, and considering there is a suffering requirement (which, if the system was limited to the terminally ill would, arguably, be unnecessary 
(as is the case in the permissive US states)), tends to favour an interpretation of the Luxembourgian legislation which is not confined to the terminally ill.  
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65 The Montana Supreme Court based its decision on The Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (Title 9, Chapter 50 of the Montana Code Annotated) which does permit the making of 
advance directives relating to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. While it would seem, then, that an individual could make an advance directive concerning assisted suicide, 
the patient must be capable of doing the act that brings about their death (i.e. suicide). On this basis, it would be unlikely that a patient who is incapacitous (and, thus, dependent 
upon an advance directive) could suicide.  
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66 Per translation of the Federal Court’s decision in Haas: ‘Where the wish to die is based on an autonomous and all-embracing decision, it is not prohibited to prescribe sodium 
pentobarbital to a person suffering from a psychiatric illness and, consequently, to assist him or her in committing suicide’ (Haas v Switzerland (2011) 53 EHRR 33 [16]). ‘Terminally 
ill persons, patients with mental disorders and other severely disabling illnesses have recourse to assisted suicide’ Steck et al (n 64) 939 and Table 1. 
67 Termination of Life on Request and Assisted Suicide (Review Procedures) Act 2002, s 2(2)-(4). 
68 ibid, s 2(2).  
69 Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017, Pt 4, Div 2.  
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4.2 Assisted suicide and rights jurisprudence  
The English courts are not unique in their examination of the human rights implications 
prohibiting assisted suicide; courts in Canada, the US, South Africa, Italy and New Zealand 
(to name a few) have similarly had cause to examine domestic bans on assisted suicide 
through the lens of human rights. As the ensuing discussion will demonstrate, there is 
considerable overlap in the core principles underpinning that jurisprudence. Those 
principles are directly relevant to the question of the compatibility of s 2 of the Suicide Act 
1961 with the ECHR, which is considered in subsequent chapters and the conclusions 
reached in those chapters draw support from, and build upon, the international 
jurisprudence canvassed below, in particular the Canadian case of Carter.70  
4.2.1 England and Wales  
There have been five key human rights challenges to the blanket ban on assisted dying in 
England and Wales: Diane Pretty (2001), Debby Purdy (2008), Tony Nicklinson, Paul 
Lamb and ‘Martin’ (2014), Noel Conway (2018), and Omid T (2018).71 While those cases 
are considered in detail in the ensuing chapters, the key aspects of the disputes will be 
considered here, in particular the human rights elements.  
Diane Pretty’s landmark litigation was the first to challenge s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 and 
it did so via the newly enacted Human Rights Act 1998 (‘HRA 1998’), which incorporated 
certain of the rights in the ECHR directly into domestic law and, relevantly, conferred 
power on the courts to declare that legislation was incompatible with the ECHR.72 Given 
the unchartered territory, it is unsurprising that Ms Pretty challenged the ban on a 
multitude of bases: right to life (Article 2), freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment (Article 3), right to private life (Article 8), freedom of conscience (Article 9), and 
freedom from discrimination (Article 14). While the domestic courts rejected the entirety 
of Ms Pretty’s claim, the ECtHR accepted that the ban engaged, and interfered with, her 
right to private life; Article 8, it was held, includes the right to choose the manner and 
timing of one’s death or, to put it another way, to avoid an undignified death. In reaching 
this conclusion, the Court observed that ‘the notion of personal autonomy is an important 
principle underlying the interpretation of [the] guarantees’ in Article 8.73 The Court also 
 
70 Carter (Supreme Court) (n 1) and Carter (n 13). 
71 The dates reference the latest decision by a domestic court in the proceedings. See, n 7 and n 8. As 
discussed below – that ‘Martin’ is again seeking to challenge the blanket ban on the basis of its allegedly 
discriminatory effect. 
72 Human Rights Act 1998, s 4. 
73 Pretty v United Kingdom (n 7) [61]. 
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held that the ‘very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity’.74 Despite 
finding that the ban interfered with Ms Pretty’s right to private life, the ECtHR accepted 
the State’s claim that the blanket ban on assisted suicide was justified and found no 
violation of Article 8. 
The finding that the blanket ban engaged and interfered with the right to private life paved 
the way for subsequent human rights challenges, commencing with Debbie Purdy’s judicial 
review proceedings which centred on the lack of a prosecution policy specific to s 2 of the 
Suicide Act 1961. Mrs Purdy ‘suffer[ed] from primary progressive multiple sclerosis for 
which there [was] no known cure’ and wanted to travel to Switzerland to die by suicide 
with assistance when her suffering became unbearable. Given her condition, she needed 
her husband’s assistance to get to Switzerland and it was unclear whether such conduct 
would lead to prosecution under s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961.75  No one had been 
prosecuted for assisting a loved one to travel overseas to die with assistance in a permissive 
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that such conduct appeared to fall within the ambit 
of s 2. Mrs Purdy argued that it was unclear what factors the Crown Prosecution Service 
(‘CPS’) would take into account when deciding whether to prosecute under s 2 of the 
Suicide Act 1961. The law, it was said, lacked foreseeability and accessibility – both of 
which are required for an interference with Article 8 to be ‘in accordance with law’ for the 
purposes of Article 8(2). The House of Lords agreed that the ban could not ‘be “in 
accordance with the law” unless there [was] greater clarity about the factors which the 
[Director of Public Prosecutions] and [their] subordinates [would] take into account.’76 The 
House of Lords held that there was ‘an obvious gulf between what section 2(1) says and 
the way that the subsection [was] being applied in practice in compassionate cases’77 and 
the generic Code governing prosecutions failed to provide sufficient predictability and 
consistency of decision-making in those cases. The Director was, thus, required to 
promulgate an ‘offence-specific policy identifying the facts and circumstances which 
[would be taken] into account in deciding, in a case such as that which Ms Purdy’s case 
exemplifie[d], whether or not to consent to a prosecution under section 2(1) of the 1961 
 
74 ibid [65].  
75 Purdy (n 7) [17]. 
76 ibid [63]. 
77 Purdy (n 7) [54]. 
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Act.’78 After a consultation period, the CPS published a policy specific to s 2 of the Suicide 
Act 1961.79  
The 2014 Supreme Court decision in Nicklinson involved two appeals. One – that of Tony 
Nicklinson and Paul Lamb – concerned a challenge to the compatibility of the blanket ban 
with Article 8 of the ECHR and the other challenged the lawfulness of the then-recently 
published s 2-specific CPS policy. The aspect of the judgment concerning Mr Nicklinson 
and Mr Lamb is considered in detail in Chapter Four. For instant purposes, it is sufficient 
to note that a majority of the Supreme Court did not reach a conclusion as to the ban’s 
compatibility, while Lady Hale and Lord Kerr did, with both holding that the ban was 
incompatible with Article 8. Relevantly, there was no dispute that the ban ‘impinges 
adversely on the personal autonomy of some people with degenerative diseases’.80 Indeed, 
President Neuberger observed that ‘assisting a suicide could be seen ... as promoting the 
autonomy of the person committing suicide’81 In addition to the principle of autonomy, 
several members of the Supreme Court also recognised that human dignity was relevant 
to an examination of the compatibility of s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961.82  
The second of the appeals in Nicklinson – that involving ‘Martin’ – concerned how the s 2-
specific CPS policy related to carers and health professionals. While the Supreme Court 
unanimously dismissed this aspect of the appeal, they did so having noted that the 
representatives of the DPP had clarified the effect of the policy with respect to carers. 
Following Nicklinson, the CPS policy was updated to reflect the characterisation referred 
to by the Supreme Court.83 The current iteration of the policy sets out 16 public interest 
factors which tend in favour of prosecution and 6 which tend against: 
A prosecution is more likely to be required if: 
1. the victim was under 18 years of age; 
2. the victim did not have the capacity (as defined by the Mental Capacity Act 
2005) to reach an informed decision to commit suicide; 
3. the victim had not reached a voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision to 
commit suicide; 
 
78 ibid [56]. 
79 CPS, ‘Suicide: Policy for Prosecutors in Respect of Cases of Encouraging or Assisting Suicide’ (October 
2014) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/suicide-policy-prosecutors-respect-cases-encouraging-or-
assisting-suicide> accessed 30 July 2019. 
80 Nicklinson (n 7) [96]. 
81 ibid [92]–[97], [186]. 
82 See, for instance, Nicklinson (n 7) [311] (Lady Hale). 
83 CPS Suicide Policy (n 79) factor 14 in favour of prosecution. 
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4. the victim had not clearly and unequivocally communicated his or her decision 
to commit suicide to the suspect; 
5. the victim did not seek the encouragement or assistance of the suspect 
personally or on his or her own initiative; 
6. the suspect was not wholly motivated by compassion; for example, the suspect 
was motivated by the prospect that he or she or a person closely connected to 
him or her stood to gain in some way from the death of the victim; 
7. the suspect pressured the victim to commit suicide; 
8. the suspect did not take reasonable steps to ensure that any other person had 
not pressured the victim to commit suicide; 
9. the suspect had a history of violence or abuse against the victim; 
10. the victim was physically able to undertake the act that constituted the 
assistance him or herself; 
11. the suspect was unknown to the victim and encouraged or assisted the victim 
to commit or attempt to commit suicide by providing specific information via, 
for example, a website or publication; 
12. the suspect gave encouragement or assistance to more than one victim who 
were not known to each other; 
13. the suspect was paid by the victim or those close to the victim for his or her 
encouragement or assistance; 
14. the suspect was acting in his or her capacity as a medical doctor, nurse, other 
healthcare professional, a professional carer [whether for payment or not], or 
as a person in authority, such as a prison officer, and the victim was in his 
or her care; 
15. the suspect was aware that the victim intended to commit suicide in a public 
place where it was reasonable to think that members of the public may be 
present; 
16. the suspect was acting in his or her capacity as a person involved in the 
management or as an employee (whether for payment or not) of an 
organisation or group, a purpose of which is to provide a physical environment 
(whether for payment or not) in which to allow another to commit suicide. 
A prosecution is less likely to be required if: 
1.  the victim had reached a voluntary, clear, settled and informed decision to 
commit suicide; 
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2. the suspect was wholly motivated by compassion; 
3. the actions of the suspect, although sufficient to come within the definition of 
the offence, were of only minor encouragement or assistance; 
4. the suspect had sought to dissuade the victim from taking the course of action 
which resulted in his or her suicide; 
5. the actions of the suspect may be characterised as reluctant encouragement or 
assistance in the face of a determined wish on the part of the victim to commit 
suicide; 
6. the suspect reported the victim’s suicide to the police and fully assisted them 
in their enquiries into the circumstances of the suicide or the attempt and his 
or her part in providing encouragement or assistance.84 
Very recently, Noel Conway and Omid T separately challenged the compatibility of the 
blanket ban with the ECHR. Mr Conway, who has motor neurone disease, argued that the 
ban was incompatible with his Article 8 right to private life as a less restrictive ban – one 
which allowed individuals like him with a terminal condition and with a life expectancy of 
six months or less to be assisted in dying by suicide – better balanced the competing rights. 
Omid T, who had a life-limiting but not terminal condition, also challenged the 
compatibility of the ban with Article 8.85 Both the High Court86 and the Court of Appeal87 
rejected Mr Conway’s claim that a less restrictive ban was available and permission to 
appeal to the Supreme Court was refused.88 It is unclear whether Omid T’s litigation, which 
was stayed pending the outcome of Mr Conway’s proceedings – will proceed following his 
assisted death at a Swiss clinic in October 2018.89 
Pretty, Purdy, Nicklinson, Conway and T centred on the rights contained in the ECHR as 
incorporated into domestic law through the HRA 1998. As it stands, the only right that 
has been found to be engaged by the ban in s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 is the right to 
private life in Article 8. Central to the recognition that the ban interferes with Article 8, 
was the acknowledgment that the right to choose the manner and timing of one’s death 
or, alternatively, to avoid an undignified death, is intimately connected to the principles of 
autonomy and dignity, both of which underpin Article 8 of the ECHR. As was observed 
 
84 Emphasis in original. 
85 R (On the application of T) v Ministry of Justice [2018] 10 WLUK 162, EWHC 2615 (Admin). 
86 Conway (High Court) (n 7). 
87 Conway (Court of Appeal) (n 7). 
88 Conway (Supreme Court) (n 8). 
89 Bindmans, ‘Omid T dies – legal case left unresolved’ (5 October 2018) 
<https://www.bindmans.com/news/omid-t> accessed 30 July 2019. 
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in respect of Noel Conway’s challenge ‘The Article 8 rights engaged are fundamental to 
the personal and psychological autonomy and integrity of Mr Conway and others suffering 
from similar terminal conditions.’90 As the ensuing discussion and following chapters 
reveal, the principles of autonomy and dignity have also assumed significance in rights 
adjudication concerning analogous bans in other jurisdictions.  
4.2.2 International jurisprudence 
Canada’s Carter litigation is examined in detail in Chapter Five. The trial judge in Carter 
held that the Canadian ban on assisted suicide violated, inter alia, the rights to life, liberty 
and security of the person in s 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom (‘Canadian 
Charter’). Central to that conclusion – which was unanimously confirmed by the Canadian 
Supreme Court – was the finding that the ban failed to adequately balance the autonomy 
and dignity of individuals who were suffering unbearably as a result of a medical condition 
with the countervailing interests of society (including protecting vulnerable individuals).91  
In Glucksberg92 and Vacco,93 the Supreme Court of the United States considered whether 
state bans on assisted suicide were unconstitutional because they violated, respectively, the 
Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses in the United States Constitution. While 
the Due Process Clause ‘protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, 
objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’,94 the Equal Protection 
Clause ‘embodies a general rule that States must treat like cases alike.’95 Central to the claim 
in Glucksberg was the contention that Washington State’s ban on assisted suicide violated 
the Due Process Clause because the fundamental right to liberty protected by the Clause 
entailed ‘a right to commit suicide which itself includes a right to assistance in doing so’.96 
The Supreme Court rejected that argument, finding that the fundamental right to liberty 
did not include a right to ‘commit suicide’ and the ban on assisted suicide was rationally 
connected to legitimate government interests including ‘preserving life’ and protecting 
‘vulnerable groups from indifference.’97 Notably, the right relied upon to challenge the 
blanket ban – the right to liberty – included protection for matters ‘central to personal 
 
90 This statement was made by the Court of Appeal in a separate set of proceedings to that examined in 
detail in this thesis: R (On the application of Conway) v Secretary of State for Justice [2017] EWCA Civ 275 [23]. 
91 See, for instance, Carter (Supreme Court) (n 1) [2], [62], [64], [66] and [68]. 
92 Washington v Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
93 Vacco v Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997). 
94 Glucksberg (n 92) 703. 
95 Vacco (n 93) 793. 
96 Glucksberg (n 92) 703. 
97 ibid 703-4. 
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dignity and autonomy.’98 As will become apparent in subsequent chapters, it is significant 
that several members of the Supreme Court (Justices O’Conner, Ginsburg and Breyer) did 
not rule out the possibility that an alternatively formulated right – the ‘right to die with 
dignity’ – would fall within the remit of the fundamental liberty right.99 However, it was 
said that since terminally ill patients had access to palliative care, the ban on assisted suicide 
did not force individuals to endure an undignified death.100 
In Vacco, the Supreme Court rejected the claim that the ban on assisted suicide in New 
York infringed fundamental rights and involved suspect classifications.101 The ban, it was 
said, did not treat anyone differently from anyone else, nor did it draw any distinctions 
between persons.102 The outcome in Vacco ought to be contrasted with the finding in Carter 
that the ban on assisted suicide in Canada ‘imposed a disproportionate burden on persons 
with physical disabilities, as only they are restricted to self-imposed starvation and 
dehydration in order to take their own lives’ and that distinction was discriminatory and 
could not be justified.103 
In Stransham-Ford, the South African High Court accepted the applicant’s claim that the – 
allegedly – blanket ban on assisted suicide conflicted with his constitutional rights to 
human dignity and bodily and psychological integrity.104 The trial judge in Stransham-Ford 
cited the reasons of the trial judge in Carter with approval and concluded that the dictum, 
including the ‘great emphasis placed on the concept of dignity and autonomy’, applied to 
the case at hand.105 While the South African Supreme Court of Appeal ultimately 
overturned the trial judge’s conclusion that the ban violated constitutionally protected 
rights, it did so not on the basis of the judge’s reasoning with respect to the rights at issue. 
Rather, the appeal was overturned because, inter alia, Mr Stransham-Ford’s death before 
the trial judge delivered judgment extinguished his claim for relief and, further, ‘it [could 
not] be said that in the current state of [South Africa’s criminal law] [physician assisted 
suicide was] in all circumstances unlawful.’106   
 
98 Glucksberg (n 92) 744. 
99 ibid 791 (Breyer J). 
100 Glucksberg (n 92) 791-2. 
101 Vacco (n 93) 793. 
102 ibid.  
103 Carter (Supreme Court) (n 1) [29]. 
104 Stransham-Ford v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Ors (Unreported Case No 27401/15, 
4-5-2015). 
105 ibid [18]. 
106 Minister of Justice and Correctional Services v Estate Stransham-Ford (531/2015) 2016 ZASCA 197 [54].  
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The final judgment of comparative note is the New Zealand High Court’s decision in 
Seales.107 The New Zealand High Court rejected the applicant’s claim for, inter alia, a 
declaration that the prohibition on assisted suicide was inconsistent with her right not to 
be deprived of life and the right not to be subject to cruel, degrading or disproportionately 
severe treatment.108 Notwithstanding the lack of success of Ms Seales’s application, it is 
notable that two of the principles that the Court found to be engaged in the case were 
‘respect for human dignity’ and ‘respect for individual autonomy’.109 
4.3 Assisted suicide vis-à-vis other end-of-life practices 
As the preceding analysis reveals, principles of autonomy and dignity are central to an 
examination of the human rights implications of the criminalisation of assisted suicide. 
How those principles are applied, however, and the weight given to competing principles 
such as the sanctity of life, varies considerably between jurisdictions with some courts 
finding that domestic bans on assisted suicide violate human rights, and others rejecting 
that contention. In contrast, those same principles, especially autonomy, together with self-
determination, are consistently prioritised over competing values, including the sanctity of 
life, in cases of refusal or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.  There are many 
jurisdictions in which a capacitous patient’s right to refuse life-saving treatment or to seek 
withdrawal of such treatment is afforded absolute respect while assisted dying is strictly 
prohibited including, as discussed above, England and Wales.110 While sanctity of life 
considerations assume significance in such cases, a more holistic assessment of the 
patient’s best interests is undertaken which includes a consideration of the patient’s quality 
of life (i.e. dignity) and their previously expressed wishes (i.e. autonomy and self-
determination). It is also important to note the nature of the inquiry in cases involving 
incapacitous patients:  
[T]he focus is on whether it is in the patient’s best interests to give the treatment, 
rather than on whether it is in his best interests to withhold or withdraw it. If the 
treatment is not in [their] best interests, the court [or other individuals charged 
with making assessments] will not be able to give its consent on [their] behalf and 
it will follow that it will be lawful to withhold or withdraw it. Indeed, it will follow 
that it will not be lawful to give it. It also follows that (provided of course that they 
 
107 Seales (n 12). 
108 ibid [10]. 
109 Seales (n 12) [62]. 
110 See also, for instance, Australia (all states bar Victoria and Western Australia), New Zealand, France and 
South Africa (though, note the comments about the legal status of assisted suicide above).  
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have acted reasonably and without negligence) the clinical team will not be in 
breach of any duty towards the patient if they withhold or withdraw it.111 
Thus, where a patient is capacitous, their decision to cease/refuse life-sustaining treatment 
must be respected, no matter that death will undoubtedly follow and regardless of their 
reasons for so deciding (provided such reasons do not reflect undue influence). In the case 
of incapacitous patients, where ongoing treatment is not in their best interests, it is lawful 
for life-sustaining treatment to be ceased (or not administered), even when death is the 
unavoidable consequence. These approaches are founded on the well-established common 
law principles of autonomy and self-determination, which reflect the ECHR’s emphasis 
on dignity and bodily integrity. Where, however, a patient is suffering from a terminal or 
life-limiting illness or is otherwise in ‘intolerable pain’ but they are not receiving life-
sustaining treatment the withdrawal or refusal of which would lead to their death, they are 
precluded in England and Wales from obtaining assistance in bringing about their death 
due to the blanket ban on assisted suicide in s 2(1) of the Suicide Act. This is so even 
though the issues of autonomy, self-determination and dignity just outlined apply equally 
to these individuals.    
The differential treatment of assisted suicide vis-à-vis other end-of-life practices, 
notwithstanding the commonality of the principles underpinning those practices, is 
considered in greater detail in subsequent chapters, in particular Chapters Four and Six. 
For now, it is sufficient to note the consistency in the principles applied by courts in 
various jurisdictions when examining the rights implications of bans on assisted suicide. 
That consistency lends support to the structure of the analysis undertaken in the following 
chapters, in particular, the focus on Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (freedom from torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment) and 8 (right to private life) of the ECHR, given the 
centrality of the principles of autonomy and dignity to those rights.  
5. Conclusion  
This chapter introduced the legal treatment of end-of-life practices both in England and 
Wales and in permissive jurisdictions overseas. The differential treatment of assisted 
suicide and voluntary active euthanasia vis-à-vis other end-of-life practices was considered, 
together with the human rights principles underpinning the regulation of those practices. 
 
111 Aintree University Hospital NHS Foundation Trust v James [2014] AC 591, [2013] UKSC 67.  
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Central to all assisted dying practices, from assisted suicide to withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment, are autonomy, dignity and self-determination. Notwithstanding that 
commonality, English law accords significantly different weight to those principles (and to 
competing principles, especially the sanctity of life) depending on the practice. Thus, the 
autonomy and self-determination of a capacitous patient is given pre-eminence over other 
principles, including the sanctity of life, in cases of withdrawal/refusal of life-sustaining 
treatment but those same principles give way to other interests, including the sanctity of 
life, when it comes to assisted suicide and euthanasia. This is so even if both patients are 
capacitous and suffering intolerably as a result of a medical condition which is terminal. 
This distinction – and its legal validity in the context of the ECHR – is considered in 






PROTECTING LIFE AND ASSISTING DEATH: IS NOT ALLOWING ASSISTED DYING A 
VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO LIFE? 
1. Introduction  
Article 2 protects the right to life; it prohibits the arbitrary taking of life by the State or its 
agents.112 In determining whether the blanket ban on assisted suicide is compatible with 
Article 2, the first question is whether the ban engages the right to life. That is, does the 
ban interfere with a person’s right to life? It was argued on behalf of Ms Pretty that the 
right to life encompassed the right not to live, and by denying her the opportunity to die 
by suicide with assistance, the State was violating her right not to live. In rejecting that 
contention, both the House of Lords and the ECtHR reiterated that Article 2 protects life 
and, unlike other articles in the ECHR, cannot be said to protect the inverse (i.e. a right 
not to live). While that may seem determinative of the question of the ban’s compatibility 
with Article 2 (leaving aside for a moment the fact that the ECHR is a ‘living instrument 
... to be interpreted in present-day conditions’113), there is evidence that the ban forces 
some people to take their lives sooner than they otherwise would have if they were able to 
lawfully obtain assistance in dying by suicide at a later time. This chapter will examine in 
greater detail that evidence and whether it is sufficient to support the contention that the 
ban violates the right to life of individuals who feel compelled to take their lives 
prematurely as a result the ban.  
2. Does the blanket ban engage the right to life? 
The trial judge in Carter accepted the anecdotal evidence that the Canadian ban compelled 
some people to take their lives sooner than they otherwise would if assisted suicide were 
permitted: 
[T]he prohibition on physician-assisted dying had the effect of forcing some 
individuals to take their own lives prematurely, for fear that they would be 
 
112 This ‘dual aspect’ is not unique to Article 2. See, for instance, J-F Akandji-Kombe, ‘Positive obligations 
under the European Convention on Human Rights: A guide to implementation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights’, Human Rights Handbooks (No.7) (Council of Europe 2007) 5-6, 8 and 21. See, also, 
Giuliani and Gaggio v Italy (2011) 52 EHRR 3 [204]ff. 
113 See, for instance, Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2011) 53 EHRR 20 [57]; EB v France (2008) 47 EHRR 21 [92]; 
Goodwin v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 18 [74]–[75]. 
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incapable of doing so when they reached the point where suffering was 
intolerable.  On that basis, she found that the right to life was engaged.114 
The Canadian Supreme Court endorsed that finding, holding that the ban ‘may cause those 
affected to take their own lives sooner than they would were they able to obtain a 
physician’s assistance in dying.’115 Consistent with the Canadian jurisprudence, the trial 
judge in the New Zealand case of Seales accepted the submission made by Ms Seales that 
the analogous ban in New Zealand engaged her right to life since it ‘may have the effect 
of forcing [her] to take her own life prematurely, for fear that she will be incapable of doing 
so when her condition deteriorates further.’116 These findings are not unique to the 
Canadian and New Zealand contexts; as then-President Neuberger observed in Nicklinson: 
The argument based on the value of human life is not one which can only be raised 
by the Secretary of State. The evidence shows that, in the light of the current state 
of the law, some people with a progressive degenerative disease feel themselves 
forced to end their lives before they would wish to do so, rather than waiting until 
they are incapable of committing suicide when they need assistance (which would 
be their preferred option). Section 2 therefore not merely impinges adversely on 
the personal autonomy of some people with degenerative diseases, but actually, 
albeit indirectly, may serve to cut short their lives.117 
In 2018, 6,507 individuals died by suicide.118 Given the above findings of Lord Neuberger 
in Nicklinson, the Canadian courts in Carter and the New Zealand High Court in Seales, it is 
likely that a percentage of those 6500 individuals were ‘forced [as a result of the ban on 
assisted suicide] to end their lives before they would wish to do so, rather than waiting 
until they are incapable of committing suicide when they need assistance’.119 Data disclosed 
by the Directors of Public Health in 2014 in response to a freedom of information request 
by Dignity in Dying, revealed that 7 per cent of suicides in England involve people who 
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are terminally ill.120 Assuming, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that that 
percentage has remained relatively stable, that means that approximately 455 people who 
died by suicide in 2018 had a terminal illness. The lack of a central database of coronial 
conclusions, coupled with the fact that many suicide conclusions are not narrative (and 
therefore do not typically disclose the individual’s antecedents), makes it difficult (if not 
impossible) to ascertain how many of those individuals felt compelled to take their lives 
sooner than they otherwise would have chosen to if they could have obtained assistance 
at a later date. However, the anecdotal evidence strongly suggests that at least some of 
those 400 individuals and, indeed, other individuals who, while not terminally ill, may 
nevertheless be experiencing life-limiting conditions (such as Omid T121), took their lives 
sooner than they otherwise would have as a result of the ban. 
This is consistent with evidence from the State Coroner given to the Victorian Standing 
Committee on Legal and Social Issues which was considering the introduction of assisted 
suicide in Victoria (Australia). That evidence revealed that terminally ill individuals were 
dying by suicide in that jurisdiction: 
These are people who are suffering from irreversible physical terminal decline or 
disease, and they are taking their lives in desperate, determined and violent ways. 
They are the category of suicides we want to talk to you today about.  
... 
I will say that there were at least 197 suicide deaths in those four years [between 
2009 and 2012] where the deceased was suffering an irreversible deterioration in 
their physical health. When you break them down, about 80 per cent involved 
physical illness and in about 20 per cent, if you like, the aetiology of the 
deterioration is physical injury.122  
This evidence is consistent with that noted by Lord Neuberger in Nicklinson: ‘[t]here is 
reliable statistical and anecdotal evidence which indicates that, in recent years, hundreds of 
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people suffering from terminal or chronic conditions, whose lives are often painful and/or 
undignified, committed suicide annually’.123  
In addition to the above data, there is first-hand evidence from individuals affected by the 
blanket ban in England and Wales, and analogous bans overseas, confirming that such 
bans do indeed cut short the lives of some individuals. The trial judge in Carter quoted one 
of the plaintiffs in those proceedings who described the impact of the (then-analogous) 
ban in the following way: 
The current state of the law deprives me of the freedom to choose how and when 
I would end my life.  The current law may cause me to initiate a premature 
termination of my life simply because if I wait until I am ready to do so, I may be 
unable to do so, in any humane fashion, without asking my loved ones to put 
themselves at legal risk.124 
A 2017 report prepared by Dignity in Dying based on, inter alia, interviews with individuals 
who were terminally ill as well as those whose loved ones had accessed assistance in dying 
by suicide in permissive jurisdictions overseas, contains multiple statements confirming 
that the ban in England and Wales ‘serve[s] to cut short [the] lives’125 of some individuals: 
• The best way I could describe that feeling is if you leave it too late, you’re trapped. 
I want to reach a stage where I say, ‘look, this isn’t an enjoyment any more.’ But 
there’s no way I’m going to end up trapped. 
• I feel so strongly about that. If it was available in this country, I could get a few 
more months with quality of life. Now, you’ve got to end your life early. It’s not 
practical to say, ‘Oh, let’s go have an extended holiday in Switzerland and then 
when I come to the end...’ Because you can’t. I want my children with me and they 
can’t uproot their lives for me for weeks on end. 
• They should allow assisted dying here because to go to Switzerland, I would have 
to travel while I’m still well enough. I’d be ending my life before I should have 
to. 
• It’s going to be a hard decision. It’s going to be hard to say, ‘Right, I’ve got to go 
now. I’ve got to say it’d be nice to stay longer, but if I stay any longer I could end 
up not able to make it.’ If it comes to a choice between the two, I’d rather go 
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early than take the risk of leaving it too late. If I could do it here, well, that’d be 
marvellous. I’d be able to stay longer. 
• The timing is really difficult. If we’d left it very much longer, Bob would have 
been in too much pain to travel, and I think he knew that, which is why he 
pushed it forward a bit, because he didn’t have choice. 126 
This evidence plainly demonstrates that the ban ‘not merely impinges adversely on the 
personal autonomy of some people with degenerative diseases, but actually, albeit 
indirectly, may serve to cut short their lives.’127 Indeed, Omid T who had multiple systems 
atrophy and whose death was not imminent, decided to travel to Switzerland in late 2018 
while he was still able to do so in order to die with assistance. He did so after a failed 
attempt to take his life in 2015.128 In those circumstances, the ban can be said to engage 
the right to life of such individuals. That, however, does not conclude an examination of 
the compatibility of s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 with Article 2 of the ECHR. Having 
determined that the right to life is engaged, the question remains whether that engagement 
constitutes a violation of the State’s obligation to protect life under Article 2 of the ECHR. 
Put plainly, does the fact that the ban forces some people to take their lives prematurely 
constitute a violation of Article 2 of the ECHR? 
3. Does the blanket ban violate the State’s positive obligation to protect life? 
In the seminal decision of Oneryildiz v Turkey129 the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR was 
clear that ‘Article 2 lays down a positive obligation on States to take appropriate steps to 
safeguard the lives of those within their jurisdiction’ and ‘this obligation must be construed 
as applying in the context of any activity, whether public or not’.130 The ECtHR further 
held that the positive obligation ‘entails above all a primary duty on the state to put in place 
a legislative and administrative framework designed to provide effective deterrence against 
threats to the right to life.’131 
Lady Hale further clarified the nature of the obligations imposed by Article 2 in the 
Supreme Court decision of Rabone holding that there are ‘three distinct obligations upon 
the state’, the third of which ‘is a positive obligation to protect life. As a general rule, that 
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positive obligation is fulfilled by having in place laws and a legal system which deter threats 
to life from any quarter and punishes the perpetrators or compensates the victims if 
deterrence fails’ and ‘in certain circumstances ... [i]t entails an obligation to take positive 
steps to prevent a real and immediate risk to the life of a particular individual from 
materialising’.132 
There is a strong argument that, in forcing individuals such as Omid T to take their lives 
sooner than they would otherwise choose to, the blanket ban contravenes this positive 
obligation to protect life. More specifically, the Suicide Act 1961, not only fails to ‘deter 
threats to life’ but also itself poses a threat to the life of certain individuals. Any claim that 
the ban is nonetheless justified as it is ‘necessary’ fails for a number of reasons. First, the 
reference to ‘absolutely necessary’ in Article 2(2) does not invoke the same analysis that 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ does in, for instance, Article 8.133 Rather, ‘absolutely 
necessary’ qualifies the permitted use of force set out in Article 2(2).134 It asks whether a 
state’s use of force was ‘absolutely necessary’ for one of the reasons set out in Article 2(2). 
Neither the text of Article 2(1), nor the subsequent case law, permits a proportionality 
assessment when determining whether the State has violated its positive obligation to 
protect life.  
Second, even if a proportionality assessment were permitted, the ban would be 
disproportionate for the reasons canvassed in Chapter Four with respect to Article 8. 
When considering the proportionality of the impugned measure, it is necessary to examine, 
inter alia, what the ban actually achieves and whether a lesser measure would unacceptably 
compromise the aims pursued by the measure. Addressing the latter point first, the aims 
of the ban are said to be protecting individuals vulnerable to undue pressure, promoting 
the ‘sanctity of life’ and protecting the doctor/patient relationship. Each of those ‘aims’ 
suffer from the weaknesses discussed at length in Chapter Four. But more pressing is the 
fact that, while the ban is, de jure, blanket insofar as it does not permit of any exceptions, 
the de facto reality is very different. The way in which the CPS exercises its prosecutorial 
discretion demonstrates that there is, in fact, an acceptance of certain forms of assisted 
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suicide. As, the sentencing judgment in Desai135 (discussed at length in Chapter Four) makes 
clear, benevolent assistance rendered to a terminally or chronically ill (or, indeed, an 
elderly) loved one to die by suicide is unlikely to lead to prosecution – though that seems 
to hold true only for assistance that falls short of euthanasia (contrast Desai with Gazeley136). 
Arguably, then, there is a lesser measure which does not unacceptably compromise the 
objective, given the position taken by the CPS and the judiciary with respect to 
prosecutions under s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961. But, again, there is nothing in the 
jurisprudence concerning Article 2 to suggest that an interference with an individual’s right 
to life can be justified on the basis of proportionality.  
In sum, the blanket ban on assisted suicide forces some individuals to take their lives 
prematurely, lest their condition deteriorate such that they are no longer capable of dying 
by suicide without assistance. In maintaining the blanket ban in the face of proposed 
amendments seeking to permit some forms of assisted suicide,137 the State has failed to 
comply with its general positive obligation to protect the right to life of everyone in its 
jurisdiction: ‘the regulatory framework [is] defective’138 and the ban is, thus, incompatible 
with Article 2 of the ECHR.  It would be premature, however, to conclude an examination 
of Article 2 without considering whether the ban also violates the State’s operational 
obligation to protect.  
4. Does the blanket ban violate the State’s operational obligation under 
Article 2? 
The ‘operational obligation’ to protect arises when there is a ‘real and immediate risk to 
the life of a particular individual’.139 For a state to be found to have violated its operational 
duty to protect: 
[I]t must be established that the authorities knew, or ought to have known at the time, of 
the existence of a real and immediate risk to life of identified individuals ... and that they 
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failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, 
might have been expected to avoid that risk.140  
Cases in which the State has been found to have violated its operational duty to protect 
include situations in which: prison authorities failed to protect prisoners from self-harm141 
and from violence perpetrated by other inmates;142 medical professionals failed to protect 
individuals from self-harming,143 including in circumstances where the patient was not 
detained under the Mental Health Act 1983;144 military personnel have failed to implement 
policies regarding the provision of iridium satellite phones to military police patrol units.145 
In each of those cases, the courts (either domestic or the ECtHR) were satisfied that there 
was a ‘real and immediate risk’ to an identified individual(s)146 and the relevant authorities 
knew or ought to have known of that risk but failed to take reasonable steps to protect 
against it. The threshold is high.147 The burden of proof is beyond reasonable doubt, 
although where a person dies while within the State’s control or custody, ‘the burden of 
proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing 
explanation.’148 The meanings attributed to ‘real’ and ‘immediate’ account in large measure 
for the high threshold; ‘real’ means objectively well-founded, while ‘immediate’ connotes 
present and continuing, not remote, fanciful or negligible.149 Given that threshold, it is 
unsurprising that there are numerous cases in which individuals in the custody of the State 
have died by suicide and no violation of Article 2 has been found, either because the 
authorities did not know and could not have known of the risk, or the steps taken to 
ameliorate the risk were reasonable.150 Likewise, no violation of Article 2 was found in Van 
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Colle despite police being alerted to the fact that, prior to his death, the deceased had 
received death threats. Nor was a violation found in Osman despite the family reporting 
their harassment to police prior to the named individual murdering one family member 
and seriously wounding another.151 In both Van Colle and Osman the courts (domestic and 
ECtHR) considered that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that there was a 
‘real and immediate’ risk to life.  
Given the relatively narrow scope of the operational duty and the high threshold applicants 
must meet, the claim that the blanket ban invokes this obligation because some individuals 
may be forced to take their lives sooner than they otherwise would is unlikely to gain 
traction before the courts. In any event, relying on the operational duty to allege an Article 
2 violation is inimical to the objective of such individuals – namely, being lawfully provided 
with assistance in dying by suicide at a later date. Even if an individual were able to 
demonstrate that the duty arose (which, for the following reasons is unlikely), a reasonable 
response by authorities to ameliorate the risk of self-harm would be to take steps to prevent 
the individual from taking their own life which is plainly antithetical to the individual’s 
objective of avoiding a situation in which they cannot take their own life without assistance. 
Leaving aside these fundamental issues, there are several reasons why individuals who find 
themselves in a situation akin to that confronted by Omid T, Ms Taylor and Ms Seales are 
unlikely to meet the high threshold required to establish an operational duty under 
Article 2.  
The main hurdle confronting such individuals is the fact that, unless they make themselves 
known to authorities, they fail to meet the ‘identified individual’ requirement. Even if they 
do make themselves known to police or other authorities, as cases such as Osman and Van 
Colle demonstrate, statements of potential future behaviour are unlikely to meet the high 
threshold required to engage the operational duty. Unless such individuals are able to 
demonstrate that there is an objectively well-founded risk that they will bring about their 
death by suicide and that that risk is present and continuing, the operational duty will not 
arise. That is not to say that it is impossible to conceive of such a situation. Mammadov v 
Azerbaijan concerned a complaint by the applicant that police had violated their operational 
duty under Article 2 in circumstances where the applicant’s wife self-immolated while 
being evicted from their accommodation by police.152 The majority ECtHR observed that: 
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[I]n a situation where an individual threatens to take his or her own life in plain 
view of state agents and, moreover, where this threat is an emotional reaction 
directly induced by the state agents’ actions or demands, the latter should treat this 
threat with the utmost seriousness as constituting an imminent risk to that 
individual’s life, regardless of how unexpected that threat might have been. In the 
Court’s opinion, in such a situation as in the present case, if the state agents become 
aware of such a threat a sufficient time in advance, a positive obligation arises under 
art.2 requiring them to prevent this threat from materialising, by any means which 
are reasonable and feasible in the circumstances.153 
While the majority ultimately found no violation due to conflicting evidence, the minority 
considered that the police had violated their operational duty as a result of their failure to 
take steps to ‘defuse the situation by verbally persuading’ the woman not to self-immolate 
and by failing to ‘intervene and prevent her from igniting’ the kerosene she had poured 
over herself.154 Mammadov demonstrates that, while it is not inconceivable that the blanket 
ban could give rise to an operational duty to protect, even if an individual who was forced 
to take their life prematurely was able to demonstrate a ‘real and immediate risk’ of their 
suicide, the authorities would likely be found to have taken the reasonable steps required 
of them if they can demonstrate that they did all that was reasonably possible to prevent 
the individual from taking their own life at that time. Permitting such individuals to die by 
suicide with assistance at a later date – leaving aside the fact that the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (‘DPP’) does not have such a power, let alone the police155 – is unlikely to be 
considered ‘reasonably necessary’ for the purposes of complying with the operational duty 
under Article 2.  
For those reasons, any claim that the blanket ban violates the operational duty to protect 
specific individuals is unlikely to succeed before the courts as it is doubtful that an 
individual who feels compelled to take their life before their condition deteriorates would 
be able to meet the high threshold imposed by the requirement that the risk of their suicide 
be ‘real and immediate’. Even if they could meet that threshold, the authorities would likely 
be found to have complied with their operational duty by taking steps to dissuade the 
individual from taking their life at that time or, if the circumstances required it, actively 
preventing them from taking such steps. There is nothing in the case law to support the 
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contention that a reasonable response of the authorities would be to authorise the 
provision of assistance at a later date – again, leaving aside the fact that no such power 
exists.  
5. Summary  
The blanket ban on assisted suicide forces some individuals to take their lives sooner than 
they otherwise would if they could access assistance in dying at a later time. Like Omid T, 
many of these individuals have medical conditions that will, ultimately, leave them 
incapable of taking their lives without assistance. In order to avoid that eventuality and a 
potentially prolonged, painful and/or undignified death, such individuals take their lives 
when they are still physically capable of doing so or they travel to a permissive jurisdiction 
while they are still able to do travel. In compelling such individuals to take their lives 
prematurely, the ban violates the State’s general positive obligation to protect individuals. 
More specifically, in maintaining the blanket ban on assisted suicide in the Suicide Act 
1961, the State has failed to establish ‘a legal system which deters threats to life from any 
quarter’.156  
6. Rectifying the incompatibility 
Having established that the ban, insofar as it forces some individuals to take their lives 
sooner than they would otherwise choose to, violates the State’s general positive obligation 
to protect, the next issue is what the State must do to rectify that incompatibility. The 
answer to that inquiry lies in the nature of the incompatibility between the ban and 
Article 2 of the ECHR. The ban is incompatible with the right to life of those individuals 
who feel compelled to take their prematurely lest they deteriorate to the point at which 
they can no longer take their own life without assistance. To rectify that incompatibility, 
the State can take two approaches to amending the legislation. That said, the State could 
choose to do nothing to rectify the incompatibility; a declaration of incompatibility does 
not affect the legal validity of the impugned legislation and Parliament can determine not 
to address the incompatibility.157 
The first method of addressing the incompatibility would be to repeal the ban, at least 
insofar as it applies to individuals who have terminal and degenerative conditions. This is 
not the same as permitting assisted suicide. Rather, it simply removes the criminal 
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sanctions imposed on those who assist certain individuals to die by suicide. A similar 
system exists in Switzerland where providing assistance for benevolent reasons is not 
illegal, though there is no regulatory system governing the provision of assistance and 
doctors are not permitted to provide assistance.158 But such an approach does not address 
the fact that some individuals suffer from conditions which will preclude them from being 
able to take the final step(s) necessary to bring about their death (for instance, swallowing 
the lethal dose which has been provided to them (i.e. the act of assistance)). Individuals 
like Noel Conway who have motor neurone disease face a deterioration to the point where 
they will receive artificial nutrition and hydration (‘ANH’) and will be ventilated. The only 
way for such individuals to bring about their death (aside from withdrawal of the ANH 
and/or ventilation) is if another person directly administers a lethal dose of medication, 
for instance through a PEG tube. An act which in England and Wales would constitute 
murder. Thus, in order for such individuals to be relieved of the pressure to take their lives 
before deteriorating to that state, the State would need to not only repeal the ban on 
assisted suicide, but also amend English law to accommodate such acts, for instance 
through the insertion of an exception to murder in the Offences Against the Person Act. 
The second option available to the State is to amend or repeal the ban and simultaneously 
introduce a system of assisted dying according to which assistance (both to suicide and 
euthanasia) may be rendered by specific persons to individuals who meet specific eligibility 
criteria. This is the scheme adopted in a number of permissive jurisdictions including, most 
recently, Western Australia and Canada, though many confine the permitted assistance to 
suicide only (see, for instance, each of the permissive jurisdictions in the US). In those 
jurisdictions, people who by reason of physical incapacity cannot do the final act leading 
to their death (for instance, swallowing a lethal dose of medication) cannot lawfully access 
assistance in dying. A system that does not accommodate assisted dying for such 
individuals (i.e. euthanasia) will continue to violate Article 2 of the ECHR since it will 
continue to force such individuals to take their lives prematurely while they are still 
physically capable of dying by suicide.  
Which option the State selects (provided it selects an option, as opposed to electing to do 
nothing) will, at least insofar as the ECtHR is concerned, likely fall within its margin of 
appreciation provided it removes the pressure to take one’s life prematurely and does not 
interfere with the ECHR rights of other individuals. That said, the margin of appreciation 
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does not displace the supervisory function of the ECtHR and if the system introduced by 
the State fails to address the incompatibility, it will continue to violate Article 2 of the 
ECHR and the margin of appreciation will not immunise the State from a finding to that 
effect by the ECtHR.159  
7. Conclusion  
Both the House of Lords and the ECtHR resoundingly rejected Diane Pretty’s argument 
that the blanket ban on assisted suicide violated her right to life (Article 2, ECHR). 
However, that argument was based on the contention that, as with other substantive rights 
in the ECHR (such as Article 11), the right to life incorporated the inverse: the right not 
to live. There is an alternative argument with respect to Article 2 which has a much firmer 
foundation in the broader ECHR jurisprudence concerning the right to life. Namely, that 
the blanket ban violates the State’s general positive obligation to protect life. There is 
copious evidence that the ban forces individuals who are facing a painful and undignified 
death over which they will have no control, to take their lives before they deteriorate to a 
point at which they can no longer do so. That is, they suicide prematurely. Such individuals 
do so by travelling to permissive jurisdictions if they are physically capable of doing so and 
have the financial resources necessary or by taking their lives by means that are in no way 
guaranteed to succeed and which can be extremely traumatic for them and their loved 
ones. This clearly reveals that ‘the regulatory framework [is] defective’160 and the ban is, 
thus, incompatible with Article 2 of the ECHR.  The State can rectify this incompatibility 
by repealing the ban which would decriminalise assisted suicide but would not address the 
group of individuals who, as a result of physical incapacity, cannot take their own lives 
and, thus, require more extensive assistance: that is, euthanasia. While the ban does not 
deal with euthanasia, the same arguments with respect to s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 
similarly apply to the offence of murder: by not permitting euthanasia for some individuals, 
English law forces them to take their lives prematurely in violation of the general duty to 
protect under Article 2 of the ECHR. The State would, then, also have to introduce an 
exception to the offence of murder to rectify that incompatibility. The other avenue 
available to the State would be to introduce a system of assisted dying which expressly 
permits assisted suicide and euthanasia in specific circumstances such as to avoid the 
current situation in which individuals are taking their lives prematurely. This alternative 
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would better protect potentially vulnerable individuals and would ensure transparency and 






FREEDOM FROM TORTURE OR INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT: DOES THE 
PROHIBITION ON ASSISTED SUICIDE CONSTITUTE ILL-TREATMENT? 
1. Introduction 
In addition to her Article 2 challenge, Diane Pretty alleged that the refusal to provide her 
husband with immunity from prosecution for assisting her to suicide violated Article 3 of 
the ECHR. Article 3 provides that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.’ The prohibition is absolute; ill-treatment that 
constitutes torture or is inhuman or degrading cannot be justified by reference to its 
purpose or to competing societal values. Diane Pretty’s Article 3 challenge failed before 
both the House of Lords and the ECtHR, both of which rejected any contention that the 
State had subjected Ms Pretty to ‘treatment’ such as to engage Article 3 of the ECHR. The 
decisions of the House of Lords and the ECtHR in Pretty seemingly foreclosed any further 
argument that the ban on assisted suicide was incompatible with Article 3. However, 
subsequent jurisprudence concerning the nature and content of Article 3 provides scope 
for the argument that the ban on assisted suicide in England and Wales does, in fact, 
constitute ‘treatment’ for the purposes of Article 3 and, in the specific circumstances of 
individual cases such as Noel Conway and Omid T, that treatment reaches the minimum 
level of severity such as to violate Article 3 of the ECHR.   
2. Is Article 3 engaged?  
As with other negative rights in the ECHR, the ECtHR has interpreted Article 3 to include 
positive obligations as well. Such obligations derive from Article 1 of the ECHR which, 
when taken together with Article 3, ‘imposes on States positive obligations to ensure that 
individuals within their jurisdiction are protected against all forms of ill-treatment 
prohibited under Article 3, including where such treatment is administered by private 
individuals.’161 While it is not overly clear whether Ms Pretty’s case with respect to Article 
3 was run on the basis of the State’s negative obligation not to subject her to ill-treatment 
or on the basis of the State’s positive obligation to protect her from such treatment,162 
neither line of argument had success before the House of Lords. In respect of the negative 
obligation in Article 3, Lord Bingham held that: 
 
161 Chernega v Ukraine App no 74768/10 (ECtHR, 5 April 2011) [150]. 
162 Contrast the reasons of Lord Bingham, Lord Steyn and Lord Hope in Pretty (n 7) [11(3)], [60] and [89].  
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There is ... nothing in Article 3 which bears on an individual’s right to live or to 
choose not to live. That is not its sphere of application ... Moreover, the absolute 
and unqualified prohibition on a member State inflicting the proscribed treatment 
requires that ‘treatment’ should not be given an unrestricted or extravagant 
meaning. It cannot, in my opinion, be plausibly suggested that the Director or any 
other agent of the United Kingdom is inflicting the proscribed treatment on Mrs 
Pretty, whose suffering derives from her cruel disease.163 
Lord Bingham also determined that the ban did not engage the State’s positive obligation 
to protect since there was ‘no positive obligation to ensure that a competent, terminally ill, 
person who wishes but is unable to take his or her own life should be entitled to seek the 
assistance of another without that other being exposed to the risk of prosecution.’164 
Further, while the negative prohibition is absolute, the positive obligations under Article 3 
are not; a ‘fair balance ... has to be struck between the general interest of the community 
and the interests of the individual’, and that balance had been fairly struck by the criminal 
prohibition on assisted suicide.165 Lord Hope aptly summarised the nature of Ms Pretty’s 
Article 3 claim and the reasons for its rejection, holding that: 
It is clear that [the Director] is not directly responsible for the disease or for its 
consequences. Nothing has been identified that he has done and should be 
restrained from doing in order to remove or alleviate these consequences. I would 
conclude that we are not dealing here with a case with an act which is expressly 
prohibited. The argument is that the article applies positively, as it requires the 
Director to do something to avoid the incompatibility. This raises the question 
whether the Director’s refusal to give the undertaking is incompatible with article 
3 because it is disproportionate. 
... 
It was a proportionate response for Parliament to conclude that that interest could 
only be met by a complete prohibition on assisted suicide. I would also hold that 
... the Director’s decision ... cannot be said to be unfair or arbitrary or to have 
impaired her Convention right more than is reasonably necessary. It was not 
disproportionate to the object of section 2(1).166 
 
163 Pretty (n 7) [13]. 
164 ibid [15]. 
165 Pretty (n 7) [90]–[97]. Similarly, Lord Steyn was of the view that ‘the present case does not involve any 
positive action ... nor is there any risk of a failure to treat [Ms Pretty] properly’ ([60]). 
166 Pretty (n 7) [92] and [97]. 
 58 
By the time the matter reached the ECtHR, the argument under Article 3 was based solely 
on the positive obligation to protect. In rejecting Ms Pretty’s application, Strasbourg 
confirmed the House of Lords’ findings: 
The suffering which flows from natural occurring illness, physical or mental, may 
be covered by Article 3, where it is, or risks being, exacerbated by treatment, 
whether flowing from conditions of detention, expulsion or other measures, for 
which the authorities can be held responsible...  
In the present case, it is beyond dispute that the respondent State has not, itself, 
inflected any ill-treatment on the applicant.... 
The applicant has claimed rather that the refusal of the DPP to give an undertaking 
not to prosecute her husband if he assisted her to commit suicide and the criminal-
law prohibition on assisted suicide167 disclose inhuman and degrading treatment 
for which the State is responsible as it will thereby be failing to protect her from 
the suffering which awaits her as her illness reaches its ultimate stages... 
[T]he positive obligation on the part of the State which is relied on in the present 
case would not involve the removal or mitigation of harm by, for instance, 
preventing any ill-treatment by public bodies or private individuals or providing 
improved conditions or care. It would require that the State sanction actions 
intended to terminate life, an obligation that cannot be derived from Article 3 of 
the Convention.168 
Thus, per the ECtHR, while suffering which flows from an illness may constitute treatment 
contrary to Article 3, for the State to be liable for such treatment the applicant must be 
able to point to conduct on the part of the State which has exacerbated, or runs the risk 
of exacerbating, the individual’s suffering. While the decision of the ECtHR in Pretty is 
ostensibly determinative of the question of whether the ban in s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 
is compatible with Article 3, the ECHR is a ‘living instrument’ and a ‘dynamic and flexible 
 
167 Insofar as this reference to the ban on assisted suicide suggests that it was argued that the ban itself 
constituted treatment, two points need to be made. First, that was not the argument with respect to Article 
3 run before the House of Lords (see, in that respect, the summary of Lord Bingham in Pretty (n 7) [11]). 
And, secondly, insofar as an argument was made before the ECtHR that the ban itself constituted treatment 
(which the ECtHR judgment strongly points against (Pretty v United Kingdom (n 7) [53]), it was made in the 
context of the State’s positive obligation to protect from ill-treatment as distinct from a claim that the ban 
itself constituted treatment which violated the State’s negative obligation to protect. The following discussion 
will illuminate the significance of this distinction. 
168 Pretty (n 7) [54]-[55]. 
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approach [must be taken] to ... [its] interpretation’.169 Bearing that in mind, a closer reading 
of both the House of Lords’ reasons and that of the ECtHR in Pretty in light of the recent 
decision of the Supreme Court in In the matter of an application by the Northern Ireland Human 
Rights Commission for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) (‘Northern Ireland Abortion Case’)170 
reveals that the issue is far more nuanced than the earlier decisions suggest, and, for the 
reasons that follow, there is scope for a claim that the blanket ban is, in fact, incompatible 
with Article 3 of the ECHR. 
As with any Convention right, the first hurdle confronting an applicant claiming a violation 
is to demonstrate that the challenged measure, here the blanket ban on assisted suicide, 
engages the impugned right. In the Article 3 context, that requires proof first, that the 
measure complained of constitutes ‘treatment’ so as to engage the State’s negative 
obligation or, alternatively, that the State has failed to protect a specified individual(s) from 
ill-treatment.  
2. Does the blanket ban constitute ‘treatment’ under Article 3?  
The House of Lords in Pretty was unequivocal in its finding that the suffering of Ms Pretty 
stemmed from her terminal illness and there was no conduct on the part of the State that 
could be said to constitute ‘treatment’ which either caused or exacerbated that suffering. 
Further, there was, according to both the House of Lords and the ECtHR, no harm which 
the State could be said to be obliged to mitigate or protect Ms Pretty from. In sum, the 
refusal of the DPP to grant Ms Pretty’s husband immunity did not invoke either the State’s 
negative or positive obligations under Article 3 of the ECHR. Those findings were, 
however, specific to the argument made on behalf of Ms Pretty that the violation of 
Article 3 emanated from the refusal of the DPP to grant immunity to her husband. Neither 
the House of Lords nor the ECtHR considered the possibility that the criminalisation of 
assisted suicide itself constitutes ‘treatment’ contrary to Article 3 or whether the ban 
exacerbates the suffering of individuals with terminal or life-limiting conditions such as to 
be incompatible in those cases with Article 3 of the ECHR. The decisions of the House 
of Lords and the ECtHR do not, then, address the argument that the blanket ban on 
assisted suicide, insofar as it criminalises assistance, violates the State’s negative obligation not 
to inflict treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR and/or constitutes a failure to 
 
169 ibid [53]. 
170 In the matter of an application by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission for Judicial Review (Northern Ireland) 
[2019] 1 All ER 173, [2018] UKSC 27. 
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comply with the positive obligation to protect against such treatment. In both instances, 
contrary to the argument advanced in the Pretty litigation, the impugned treatment is said 
to emanate directly from the State.  
Before moving on to consider this argument in greater detail, it is first necessary to examine 
how the courts have characterised ‘treatment’ for the purposes of Article 3. In a statement 
that reflects the reasons of the rest of the Court, Lord Bingham in Pretty held that: 
Article 3 is ... complementary to Article 2. As Article 2 requires states to respect 
and safeguard the lives of individuals within their jurisdiction, so Article 3 obliges 
them to respect the physical and human integrity of such individuals. There is in 
my opinion nothing in Article 3 which bears on an individual’s right to live or to 
choose not to live. That is not its sphere of application...171  
Lord Bingham’s emphasis on the sanctity of life in Article 2 overlooks the fact that, as 
discussed in Chapter One, the right to life does not prevent capacitous patients from 
refusing life-sustaining treatment even when the inevitable consequence is death. Likewise, 
it does not preclude doctors, together with an incapacitous patient’s family, ceasing life-
sustaining treatment on the basis that it is no longer in the patient’s best interests. Article 
2 can and does give way to other considerations including an assessment of the quality of 
the individual’s life.172 Thus, although Article 2 ‘requires the State to take appropriate steps 
to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction’,173 it does not prevent the functioning 
of a medical system in which principles of autonomy, dignity and self-determination 
(frequently couched in terms of the Article 8 right to private life174) regularly trump sanctity 
of life concerns as is the case in England and Wales. Further, the House of Lords’ decision 
in Pretty must be considered in light of the fact that the ECtHR went on to find that Article 
8 enshrines a right to choose the manner and timing of one’s death. Article 3 must, then, 
be read in conjunction with both Articles 2 and 8 which, when read together, provide a 
framework in which the sanctity of life provides a starting point, but does not preclude the 
exercise of an individual’s autonomy, dignity and self-determination in choosing the 
manner and timing of their death.175 Another aspect of Lord Bingham’s reasons extracted 
 
171 Pretty (n 7) [13]. See, also, ibid [60] (Lord Hope).  
172 See, in this respect, the Grand Chamber in Lambert: ‘The Court considers that ... in a case such as the 
present one reference should be made, in examining a possible violation of Article 2, to Article 8 of the 
Convention and to the right to respect for private life and the notion of personal autonomy which it 
encompasses.’ Lambert v France (2015) ECHR 545 [142]. 
173 ibid at [140].  
174 Lambert (n 172) [98] citing Haas (n 64) [51] and Koch v Germany (2013) 56 EHRR 6 [52]. 
175 See, for instance, Briggs (n 38) and James (n 111).  
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above must also be considered. His Lordship held that there is nothing in Article 3 that 
‘bears on an individual’s right to live or not to live.’ But, for individuals like Noel Conway, 
accessing assisted suicide is not a question of living/not living. It is a matter of putting an 
end to suffering. And that is precisely the remit of Article 3 of the ECHR. This reasoning 
is illuminated by end-of-life cases involving incapacitious patients. In such cases, a decision 
by doctors along with the patient’s family to cease life-sustaining treatment is not a decision 
that it is better for the patient to die. It is not a question of living/not living. Rather, it is a 
question of whether the current treatment and its ongoing administration is in the patient’s 
best interests. It is, then, an Article 8 question of quality of life, which is influenced by 
Article 2 considerations, in particular the sanctity of life. Likewise, a decision by an 
individual like Noel Conway to access assistance in dying is not a question of living/not 
living but, rather, of suffering/not suffering and that is patently an Article 3 question 
influenced by both Articles 2 and 8. Indeed, as Lord Bingham himself acknowledged, 
Article 3 ‘obliges [states] to respect the physical and human integrity of ... individuals’ living 
within their jurisdiction and suffering – whether physical or psychological – has profound 
implications for a person’s ‘physical and human integrity’.176  
Lord Bingham went on to consider whether the matter of D v United Kingdom177 offered 
any support for Ms Pretty’s argument. In that case, the applicant had sought asylum upon 
arriving at Heathrow airport and was refused. He was subsequently found to be in 
possession of illegal drugs and was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. During his 
imprisonment, he received treatment for HIV. Upon his release, the State sought to deport 
the applicant to St Kitts. The applicant successfully challenged the deportation order on 
the basis that his return would subject him to ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 as he would 
not receive the standard of care he had received in the UK and would likely suffer terribly 
as his condition deteriorated. Consistent with its erstwhile extradition/deportation 
jurisprudence,178 the ECtHR held that there was a real risk that the applicant would suffer 
treatment contrary to Article 3 upon his return to St Kitts. That finding was made even 
though neither the UK nor the authorities in St Kitts would be actively treating the 
applicant in a manner that was inconsistent with Article 3. Rather, it was accepted that the 
 
176 Pretty (n 7) [13]. 
177 D v United Kingdom (1997) 24 EHRR 423. 
178 See, for instance, Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439 and Chahal v United Kingdom (1997) 23 
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applicant would not receive the same standard of treatment which he had received in the 
UK and that would cause a ‘severe increase in his suffering and shortening of his life.’179 
D v United Kingdom appears to provide support for Ms Pretty’s claims insofar as it 
demonstrates that a state may be liable for ill-treatment stemming from suffering that arises 
as a result of an individual’s medical condition and is not directly caused by, but is 
nevertheless exacerbated by, the State. However, Lord Bingham rejected its application to 
Ms Pretty’s case given that in D the ‘state was proposing to take direct action against the 
applicant [i.e. the deportation], the inevitable effect of which would be a severe increase in 
his suffering and a shortening of his life’ and, consequently ‘[t]he proposed deportation 
could fairly be regarded as treatment’.180 In contrast, according to Lord Bingham, the 
Director had not subjected Ms Pretty to any such treatment. In Soering, the ECtHR 
described the origins of an extraditing country’s liability under Article 3 as follows: ‘[i]n so 
far as any liability under the Convention is or may be incurred, it is responsibility incurred 
by the extraditing Contracting State by reason of its having taken action which has as a 
direct consequence the exposure of an individual to proscribed ill-treatment’.181 Lord 
Bingham was, then, correct that D did not assist Ms Pretty, but not for the reasons his 
Lordship proffered. Deportation and extradition cases do not assist an applicant like 
Ms Pretty who did not allege any direct ill-treatment by the State, not because there is no 
‘treatment’ on the part of the State but precisely because the ban itself constitutes treatment 
by the State which causes suffering that reaches the minimum level of severity. That is, the 
State itself is the source of the ill-treatment, as opposed to exposing an individual to ill-
treatment occurring elsewhere.  
As the ensuing discussion of the Northern Ireland Abortion Case reveals, unlike the case run 
on behalf of Ms Pretty, there is scope for the argument that the ban in s 2 of the Suicide 
Act 1961 constitutes treatment by the State which causes suffering for some individuals 
(or, at the least, exacerbates suffering arising from a medical condition) that meets the 
minimum level of severity in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. A majority of the 
Supreme Court in the Northern Ireland Abortion Case held that the appellant did not have 
standing and the appeal was thus dismissed on a procedural basis. Nevertheless, in a unique 
turn of events, several members of the Bench (including two who determined that the 
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appellant lacked standing) proceeded to examine the substantive arguments, including 
those made under Article 3.  
Lord Kerr – with whom Lord Wilson agreed – held that the ban on abortion in the case 
of rape, incest or fatal foetal abnormality was, in general (that is, without reference to the 
facts of a given case) incompatible with Article 3.182 While Lord Mance rejected the 
appellant’s general claim, his Lordship did not foreclose the possibility that an Article 3 
violation may arise in a given case.183 Of particular relevance for instant purposes is the 
acceptance, implicit in that finding, that the prohibition on abortion in those circumstances 
might constitute treatment for the purposes of Article 3. Similarly, while President Hale did 
not consider it necessary to examine the Article 3 complaint in light of her finding that the 
ban violated Article 8 of the ECHR, she nonetheless held: 
[T]hat the risk of prosecution of the woman, and of those who help her, thus forcing 
her to take that risk if she procures an illegal abortion in Northern Ireland, or to 
travel to Great Britain if she is able to arrange that, constitutes ‘treatment’ by the State 
for [the] purpose [of Article 3]. It is the State which is subjecting her to the agonising dilemma. 
I also have little doubt that there will be some women whose suffering on being denied 
a lawful abortion in Northern Ireland, in the three situations under discussion here, 
will reach the threshold of severity required to label the treatment ‘inhuman or degrading.184  
President Hale’s observations in respect of Article 3 are consistent with those of Lord Kerr 
whose reasons deal most comprehensively with the Article 3 case. In rejecting the 
argument made on behalf of the State that those prohibited from accessing abortions in 
the cases of rape, incest and/or fatal foetal abnormality ‘had not been “treated” at all by 
the state’, his Lordship said: 
At present, a girl or woman who obtains an abortion in circumstances other than 
those narrowly prescribed [by the relevant legislation] commits a criminal offence 
and is liable to prosecution. That constitutes ill-treatment in so far as imposing that 
sanction on women amounts to a breach of article 3. Likewise, requiring a woman to 
carry to term a foetus who is doomed to die, or a foetus who is the consequence of rape or incest, 
when the impact on the mother is inhuman and degrading is, in every sense, treatment to which 
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the woman is subjected by the state. It is, moreover, treatment which because of its 
inhumanity or degrading effect, is in violation of article 3.  
Moreover, the threat of prosecution of a doctor whose assistance in the termination of a pregnancy 
is sought has a direct impact on a girl’s or woman’s experience of pregnancy where, for instance, 
she has been told that the foetus she is carrying has a fatal foetal abnormality...185 
The reasons of President Hale and Lords Kerr and Wilson – and, to a lesser extent, Lord 
Mance – support the contention that the blanket ban on assisted suicide, insofar as it 
criminalises the provision of, and thus precludes individuals from lawfully accessing, 
assistance in dying by suicide constitutes ‘treatment’ on the part of the State for the 
purposes of Article 3. Applying President Hale’s reasons, it is the blanket prohibition on 
assisted suicide which subjects the individual to an ‘agonising dilemma’, not their illness. 
As a result of the blanket ban, an individual is forced to decide whether to take their lives 
sooner than they otherwise would, to nonetheless seek assistance and potentially expose 
others to the risk of prosecution, to travel overseas and live their last moments in a foreign 
country without family or loved ones (or, if the latter have attended, with the concern that 
they may be prosecuted under s 2), or they must endure a death over which they have no 
control and which may be prolonged, painful, undignified or otherwise cause significant 
psychological distress. Of course, each of those potential risks are, to varying extents, 
speculative. As the data from the CPS considered in Chapter Four reveals, it is unlikely 
that a person will be prosecuted for assisting another to travel overseas for the purposes 
of dying with assistance in a permissive jurisdiction. Likewise, a person’s death may be 
neither painful nor psychologically distressing. But it is precisely the speculative nature of 
these eventualities which creates the ‘dilemma’ referred to in the context of abortion by 
President Hale and, thus, renders the ban in s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 ‘treatment’ for the 
purposes of Article 3.  
Insofar as the reply is that the State has not caused the individual’s condition, two 
interrelated points must be made. First, in the same way that the State is not responsible 
for the pregnancy of the woman concerned, but is nonetheless responsible for the 
subsequent experience of the woman caused by the ban on abortion, so too is the State 
not responsible for the condition which drives an individual to seek assistance in dying by 
suicide but it is nevertheless responsible for the individual’s subsequent experience caused 
by an express legislative provision and this constitutes treatment for the purposes of Article 
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3. Second, at the very least, the blanket ban on assisted suicide – a measure of the State – 
exacerbates the suffering some individuals experience as a result of their medical condition 
and thus constitutes treatment for which the State is responsible for the purposes of Article 
3.  
Arguably, the reasoning of President Hale and Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson in the Northern 
Ireland Abortion Case has greater force in the assisted dying context given that, in the case 
of abortion, the interests of the mother are pitted against those of the unborn foetus, and 
the enduring question of when life commences – and the margin of appreciation afforded 
by Strasbourg to States in making that assessment – leaves doubt as to whether, in the case 
of abortion, there are two rights in opposition (i.e. the alleged right to life of the unborn 
foetus versus the right to reproductive autonomy of the mother protected by Article 8, 
and her right not to be subjected to ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR). In 
contrast, in the case of assisted suicide, the interests which are said to be in ‘competition’ 
with and, indeed, trump a person’s Article 8 right to choose the manner and timing of their 
death and their Article 3 right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment 
are said to be those of an unspecified group of individuals, namely those ‘vulnerable’ to 
undue influence, and society’s general interest in protecting the doctor/patient relationship 
and the ‘sanctity of life’.186 The tenuousness of such ‘rights’ (if they can be so characterised) 
vis-à-vis the position of the foetus in the Northern Ireland Constitution bolsters the strength 
of the observations of President Hale and Lord Kerr and Lord Wilson when applied to 
the assisted dying context.  In any event, the prohibition on torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment under Article 3 is absolute and cannot be balanced against any other 
rights.187  
Proceeding on the basis that, in light of the findings of President Hale and Lord Kerr and 
Lord Wilson in the Northern Ireland Abortion Case, the ban does constitute ‘treatment’ for 
which the State bears responsibility under Article 3, the next issue is whether it reaches the 
minimum level of severity.   
 
186 See Chapter Four for a more comprehensive assessment of these aims.  
187 See, for instance, Chahal (n 178) and Northern Ireland Abortion Case (n 170) [32] (Lady Hale).  
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3. The minimum level of severity  
3.1 General principles  
‘The right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment is absolute – 
it is not to be balanced against any other rights’188 As Lord Kerr has observed, once the 
minimum level of severity has been met ‘it does not matter a whit what the person or 
agency which is responsible for the perpetration of that treatment considers to be the 
justification for it’.189  
However, as Lord Kerr also recognised, the ‘anterior question’ – whether the treatment 
has reached the minimum level of severity – ‘does not, in every instance, leave out of 
account the purpose of the conduct.’190 As the Grand Chamber held in Gäfgen, an 
assessment of whether the threshold has been reached: 
[D]epends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the 
treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state 
of health of the victim. Further factors include the purpose for which the treatment 
was inflicted together with the intention or motivation behind it...191  
The fact that such relativity seems directly at odds with the absoluteness of the prohibition 
has been the subject of extensive academic debate, though such debate does not impact 
the present inquiry.192 It is sufficient for instant purposes to note that once the threshold of 
severity has been met, there is no scope for exception or justification.193 The issue, then, is 
whether the blanket ban on assisted suicide reaches the relevant threshold.  
As noted above, Lord Mance in the Northern Ireland Abortion Case did not consider it 
possible to determine, in general, whether the ban on abortion in the specified 
circumstances constituted inhuman or degrading treatment. His Lordship was of the view 
that any finding of a violation of Article 3 would depend on the facts of the given case. 
Such a position is consistent with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR which, as the extract 
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from Gäfgen above reveals, is dependent on ‘all the circumstances of the case’ including, 
importantly, the characteristics of the individual. As President Hale observed in the 
Northern Ireland Abortion Case, ‘it cannot be said that every woman who is denied an abortion 
[in the three circumstances under consideration] will suffer so severely that her rights under 
article 3 have been violated. It depends upon an intense focus on the facts of the individual case’.194  
While, ostensibly, Lord Mance’s conclusion seems to be at odds with Lord Kerr’s 
determination that the prohibition was, in general, incompatible with Article 3, the two 
seemingly opposing outcomes can be reconciled by the fact that Lord Mance was 
considering the issue from the point of view of the State’s negative obligation not to inflict 
treatment contrary to Article 3, while Lord Kerr considered the State’s positive obligation 
to protect individuals from such treatment. According to Lord Kerr, the ban on abortion 
posed a risk to some girls and women of treatment contrary to Article 3 and that risk of 
acting incompatibility with their Article 3 rights was sufficient to engage the positive 
obligation of the State to prevent that risk materialising. The blanket prohibition on 
abortion in the case of rape, incest and/or fatal foetal abnormality, insofar as it posed a 
risk of constituting inhuman or degrading treatment to some girls and women (who he 
described as belonging to a ‘highly vulnerable group’195), thus constituted a violation of the 
State’s positive obligation to protect against such treatment.196 President Hale expressed 
‘sympathy’ with that conclusion, though determined it unnecessary to explore it further 
given her findings with respect to Article 8.197  
The reasons of Lord Mance and Lord Kerr reveal that, in the context of the State’s negative 
obligation not to inflict treatment contrary to Article 3, whether the ban on assisting another 
to suicide reaches the threshold of inhuman and degrading treatment depends on the 
individual’s circumstances. In contrast, in the context of the State’s positive obligation to 
protect individuals from such treatment, it may be that the risk of some (unspecified) 
individuals being subjected to such treatment is sufficient to engage the State’s obligation 
to protect and the failure to permit assistance in certain circumstances constitutes a 
violation of that positive obligation. Common to both perspectives is an examination of 
whether being denied assistance could constitute treatment that reaches the minimum level 
of severity contrary to Article 3.  
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 68 
3.2 Torture, inhuman or degrading treatment: does the blanket ban reach the 
minimum threshold?  
The Grand Chamber in Jalloh summarised the ECtHR’s jurisprudence with respect to 
inhuman and degrading treatment in the following terms: 
Treatment has been held by the Court to be ‘inhuman’ because, inter alia, it was 
premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused either actual bodily 
injury or intense physical and mental suffering ... Treatment has been considered 
‘degrading’ when it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and 
inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their 
physical or moral resistance ... or when it was such as to drive the victim to act 
against his will or conscience ... Furthermore, in considering whether treatment is 
‘degrading’ within the meaning of Article 3, one of the factors which the Court will 
take into account is the question whether its object was to humiliate and debase 
the person concerned, although the absence of any such purpose cannot 
conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 ... In order for a 
punishment or treatment associated with it to be ‘inhuman’ or ‘degrading’, the 
suffering or humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable 
element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate 
treatment or punishment...198  
As for the distinction between inhuman or degrading treatment on the one hand and 
torture on the other, the Grand Chamber in Gäfgen observed: 
[I]t appears that it was the intention that the Convention should ... attach a special 
stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering ... 
In addition to the severity of the treatment, there is a purposive element to torture 
[namely] ... intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering with the aim, inter alia, 
of obtaining information, inflicting punishment or intimidating...199 
There is nothing to suggest that the State enacted s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 with the 
intention of inflicting pain or suffering. There is, then, no question of the ban constituting 
torture for the purposes of Article 3 (though this is not to say that a given individual would 
not find the dilemma posed by the ban torturous). As for whether it amounts to inhuman 
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or degrading treatment, a preliminary issue that requires examination is what role, if any, 
the ban’s purpose plays in this assessment.  
As the earlier extract from Gäfgen identifies, in addition to the subjective characteristics of 
the individual, a further factor that may be relevant to an assessment of the severity of the 
treatment is ‘the purpose for which the treatment was inflicted together with the intention 
or motivation behind it’.200 Insofar as this suggests that an examination of the treatment’s 
necessity is required, that is plainly wrong. The preceding extracts from the Grand 
Chamber’s decisions in Jalloh and Gäfgen make clear that, insofar as purpose is relevant, it 
goes to whether treatment which might not otherwise be inhuman or degrading 
nonetheless reaches that threshold because the purpose of the treatment was to humiliate 
or debase the individual. Importantly, there is a long line of ECtHR case law that confirms 
that the absence of such a purpose is not determinative and does not inexorably lead to a 
conclusion that the treatment did not meet the minimum level of severity.201 Thus, in Jalloh 
there was no suggestion that the forcible administration of emetics to an individual 
detained by police to extract drugs was inflicted other than for the purpose of procuring 
evidence of a crime. Nonetheless, the treatment was found to violate Article 3 because it 
was capable of humiliating and debasing the applicant. Likewise, the decision to detain 
Ms Price, ‘a severely disabled person’, ‘in conditions where she [was] dangerously cold, 
risk[ed] developing sores because her bed [was] too hard or unreachable, and [was] unable 
to go to the toilet or keep clean without the greatest of difficulty, constitute[d] degrading 
treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention’ even though the ECtHR was satisfied 
that there was no intention to humiliate or debase her.202 In contrast, in Gäfgen, the mere 
threat of torture (which may not, absent intention or purpose, have reached the requisite 
threshold) was intended to humiliate and debase and, thus, constituted ill-treatment 
contrary to Article 3. 
Cases before the ECtHR in which the purpose of the treatment has been relevant tend to 
have involved acts by State agents directed at individuals with a view to extracting 
confessions, intelligence or other evidence.203 According to Lord Kerr, these decisions 
‘confine[...] the issue of motivation or purpose to a relatively narrow compass’: ‘an 
assessment of whether treatment which might otherwise not meet the standard set by 
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Article 3 crosses the threshold by reason of that motivation or purpose.’204 Such an 
interpretation must be correct if the prohibition is, as the ECtHR insists, absolute. As the 
ECtHR has repeatedly reaffirmed, once the minimum level of severity is reached, the 
reason or motivation behind the conduct cannot convert that behaviour to a condition 
where it does not meet the Article 3 threshold.205 To find otherwise would be to 
fundamentally undermine the absolute nature of the prohibition in Article 3.  
The purpose of prohibiting access to assisted suicide is, then, irrelevant when determining 
whether that treatment is contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR. There is no suggestion of 
intentional infliction of ill-treatment and, as will be canvassed below, the ban has the 
potential to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment for some individuals such that 
there is no need to have regard to its purpose in order to transform otherwise Article 3 
compliant conduct into inhuman or degrading treatment. But, even if the ban’s purpose 
were relevant, as the analysis of Article 8 in the ensuing chapter makes clear, the validity 
of the alleged purposes of the ban are debatable. As Chapter Four reveals, the practical 
impact of the ban – in particular, its failure to prevent individuals from accessing assistance 
in dying by suicide and the institutional acceptance of such conduct as evidenced by the 
lack of CPS prosecutions – falls well short of constituting ‘provable benefits’. That is all 
the more so when the individual toll of the ban is examined.  
In light of the preceding conclusions that the ban in s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 may, in 
fact, constitute ‘treatment’ for the purposes of Article 3 and that the purpose of that 
treatment is either irrelevant or, insofar as it is relevant, does not carry any real weight in 
the instant context, the ban may constitute treatment contrary to Article 3 for some 
individuals provided the minimum level of severity is reached. Whether the ban reaches 
that threshold depends on the individual facts of a given case.  
3.3. The minimum level of severity – specific cases 
As Lady Hale observed in Nicklinson ‘no-one who has read the appellants’ accounts of their 
lives and their feelings can doubt that they experience the law’s insistence that they stay 
alive for the sake of others as a form of cruelty.’206 Likewise, Lord Sumption acknowledged 
that the argument made on behalf of the appellants in Nicklinson that the ban required 
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them to ‘suffer a painful and degrading death’ was ‘a forensic point, but up to a point it is 
a legitimate one.’207  
The trial judgment in Carter is also replete with accounts from individuals with terminal or 
otherwise life-limiting illnesses of the choices – or, to use President Hale’s nomenclature, 
‘the agonising dilemma’ – they faced as a result of the analogous ban on assisted suicide in 
that jurisdiction: 
• ‘A physician-assisted death would be compassionate, legal, painless and 
dignified.  The alternatives seem barbaric and cruel.  There is also the fear and 
anxiety associated with taking my own life by other means.  I am concerned about 
having a protracted and painful death should I do nothing, while on the other hand 
I dread the thought of suicide with the complexities and legal dilemma that will be 
involved if I have my wife assist me.  We both face this reality, that we have only 
two terrible and imperfect options with a sense of horror and loathing.’ 
• ‘I simply cannot understand why the law holds that the able-bodied who are 
terminally ill are allowed to shoot themselves when they have had enough because 
they are able to hold a gun steady, but because my illness affects my ability to move 
and control my body, I cannot be allowed compassionate help to allow me to 
commit an equivalent act using lethal medication.  The law obliges me to act now 
and kill myself – while I am able but while my life is still enjoyable – or to forego 
altogether the right and ability to legally exercise control over the manner and timing 
of my death.  That is a cruel choice to impose on someone.’208 
The following account of Ms LaForest who had Stage IIIC anal cancer provides a 
harrowing insight into the suffering she was likely to experience and the impact the 
Canadian ban was going to have on her: 
I have been told that I will likely experience a number of alarming side effects [of 
treatment].  Radiation and chemotherapy will wipe out my red and white blood 
cells to dangerous levels, leaving me susceptible to infections, moulds and severe 
fatigue.  The radiation may lead to severely burned skin.  My doctors have told me 
to expect burning of my vulva, anus, bowel, vaginal canal and bladder.  This cannot 
be avoided as I am being irradiated right through the pelvis. 
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If I survive the cancer, I may end up with permanent scarring of my bowel and 
anus resulting in diarrhea and incontinence.  My vulva and vaginal canal will likely 
shrink and be scarred making intercourse painful in the future.  My bladder may 
be damaged and require, like the vagina, dilators to stretch out badly scarred tissue, 
and stents to hold open vessels and canals that have collapsed. 
I asked my oncologist what would happen if I decided not to have this painful 
treatment.  They told me this was not an option.  They described that death by this 
type of disease is ugly.  It is not a way anyone would want to die.  It would take 
time and I would die in agony, regardless of pain medication and therapies that 
currently exist.  They described how my legs would swell to gross proportion as 
the poisons and toxins built up in my system.  And the tumour would continue to 
grow to explosive proportions blocking off the bowel which will begin to twist and 
contort under pressure.  I would ooze putrescence and mucous, blood and fecal 
matter out of every orifice.  No amount of drugs they assured me would deal with 
the “break through” pain. 
I decided that I would undergo the treatments to try to avoid an awful death, and 
also because my daughter is just starting university in the fall, and I wanted to make 
sure that she could take her first steps into adulthood unencumbered by that 
nightmare.  Even if I were to only get another year, I want that time. 
Of course, there is the possibility that even despite all my best attempts to beat this 
disease, I might not be one of the lucky ones.  The normal course of incurable anal 
cancer is that the tumour in the rectal area infects local nodes, which go on to 
involve the lymphatic system.  These nodes enter the bloodstream and are quickly 
spread to the adrenal glands, then to the liver and lungs, and then if you survive 
long enough, into the brain.  It was easy for me to deduce that if I am not lucky 
this first time around, I have months, maybe years of medical torture and agony to 
face before hitting the end of this vicious disease.  Now if you were to take my 
place in this story, can you understand why I might want to skip the last chapter?209 
Those accounts find reflection in the case of Noel Conway, who has motor neurone 
disease and who unsuccessfully challenged the compatibility of s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 
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with the ECHR before the domestic courts. Mr Conway described the progression of his 
illness and its consequences for him in the following terms:  
I do not wish to get to a stage where my quality of life is so limited, in the last six 
months of life, that I am no longer able to find any enjoyment in it. This disease is 
a relentless and merciless process of progressive deterioration. At some point, my 
breathing will stop altogether or I will become so helpless that I will be effectively 
entombed in my own body. I would not like to live like this. I would find it a totally 
undignified state for me to live in. I find the prospect of this state for me to live 
quite unacceptable and I wish to end my life when I feel it is the right moment to 
do so, in a way that is swift and dignified...210 
The account of Mr Conway, and the experiences of those individuals extracted from Carter 
above, clearly demonstrate that, for some individuals, the ban on assisted suicide will cause 
‘either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering’ and will ‘arouse ... 
feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and 
possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance’.211 In those circumstances it is strongly 
arguable, at least insofar as Noel Conway and others with terminal or life-limiting 
conditions are concerned, that the blanket ban on assisted suicide in England and Wales 
constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment by the State in violation of its negative 
obligation not to inflict such treatment. 
When the focus is on the specific circumstances of the individual(s) bringing the claim 
under s 4 of the HRA 1998 – as it should be – it is readily apparent that, in some instances, 
the ban constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. 
When the focus is on the specific case, and not a ‘general claim’ of incompatibility, the 
interests of others, or society’s interest in protecting the sanctity of life or the 
doctor/patient relationship, lose all relevance: ‘inhuman or degrading treatment are 
forbidden. That is the end of it.’212  
In sum, then, the blanket ban, insofar as it criminalises the rendering of assistance to 
another to suicide, constitutes treatment which, in some circumstances, may constitute 
inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR either because the 
ban itself is causing suffering that reaches the minimum level of severity or because, at the 
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very least, the ban exacerbates the suffering arising from a medical condition. In those 
cases, the State has breached its negative obligation not to inflict such treatment. That is, 
not, however the end of the Article 3 examination; it is necessary to consider whether the 
ban also violates the State’s positive obligation to protect individuals from inhuman or 
degrading treatment.  
4. The positive obligation to protect  
In the Northern Ireland Abortion Case, Lord Kerr considered it undeniable that some girls 
and women would suffer profound psychological trauma as a result of the ban on abortion 
in the case of rape, incest and fatal foetal abnormality and ‘[t]hat circumstance [was] 
sufficient to give rise to a violation of Article 3 where proper safeguards to mitigate the 
risk of such trauma are not put in place’.213 His Lordship was of the view that the State’s 
positive duty did not depend on the ‘onset of actual suffering’; the State has a positive 
obligation to ‘take adequate measures for [the] care and protection’ of those who come 
within a ‘highly vulnerable class’ and this positive obligation is ‘triggered by the likelihood’ 
that some individuals in that class will suffer as a result of ill-treatment contrary to Article 
3 of the ECHR.214 ‘[T]he risk of women and girls being subject to ill-treatment contrary to 
article 3 is therefore sufficient to trigger the state’s positive obligations to take measures to prevent 
that happening.’215 That finding was made in the context of a broader determination that 
forcing a girl or woman to continue with a pregnancy that arose as a result of rape or incest 
or when she knows that the foetus she carries will die was ‘plainly humiliating’ and claims 
by the respondent State that the fact that such girls and women could travel to England to 
obtain an abortion did not ameliorate that humiliation but, rather, ‘the fact of being 
required to do so [was] in itself sufficient to expose [girls and women] to the risk of 
inhuman and degrading treatment’.216 As also noted earlier, President Hale expressed 
‘sympathy’ for, but did not expressly endorse, Lord Kerr’s conclusion that the risk of 
inhuman or degrading treatment was sufficient to engage the State’s positive obligation to 
prevent that risk materialising.  
Much of what Lord Kerr said with respect to the State’s positive obligations in the Northern 
Ireland Abortion Case can be applied to s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961. The preceding 
examination of Noel Conway’s circumstances confirm that the ban on assisted dying 
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constitutes inhuman or degrading treatment for him and others suffering life-limiting or 
terminal conditions. Such individuals are frequently described as being ‘vulnerable’ and 
there is no question that individuals like Diane Pretty and Noel Conway, by virtue of their 
conditions and the lack of control they possess over their deaths, belong to a ‘highly 
vulnerable group’.217 That being the case, and given that the impugned treatment stems 
from the State through its criminalisation of assistance, the State arguably has a positive 
obligation to protect individuals belonging to that highly vulnerable group from the 
materialisation of such ill-treatment. The fact that some individuals could travel to a 
permissive jurisdiction to access assistance in dying does not ameliorate the risk the ban 
poses, if anything it exacerbates it since that requires an individual to travel to a foreign 
country to die alone or, if a loved one attends with them, with the worry that the latter will 
be prosecuted under s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961. Likewise, the reality that, in the main, 
such individuals are not prosecuted does not alter the fact that, as Desai218 makes clear, 
people who provide benevolent assistance are prosecuted and the risk of such prosecution 
can cause feelings of fear and anguish on the part of the individual seeking assistance such 
as to constitute ill-treatment contrary to Article 3. Insofar as the justifications for the ban 
are relevant to the question of the violation of the State’s positive obligation to protect, 
the analysis in Chapter Four reveals that the blanket ban is disproportionate to the aims 
pursued. Consequently, the reasons given for the violation of the positive obligation to 
protect in Article 3 do not, in reality, justify the violation.  
When one examines what the ban achieves vis-à-vis its consequences, its incompatibility 
with Article 3 is patent. The ban requires that individuals cede control over the manner 
and timing of their death (an aspect of the right to private life protected by Article 8 of the 
ECHR) and prevents them from lawfully asserting that autonomy in their country of 
residence, surrounded by loved ones. ‘They are forbidden to do to their bodies that which 
they wish to do; they are prevented from arranging their lives in the way that they want; 
they are denied the chance to shape their future as they desire ... [They must] endure untold 
suffering and desolation. What is that, if not humiliation and debasement?’219 The ban, 
thus, forces some individuals to endure intense physical and/or psychological suffering, 
feelings of fear, anguish or otherwise humiliates or debases them and, consequently, 
constitutes a violation of the State’s negative obligation under Article 3 in those specific cases. 
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Insofar as there is plainly a risk of such treatment arising in respect of some individuals 
with terminal or life-limiting conditions who, accordingly, belong to a highly vulnerable 
class of individuals, and the State has failed to prevent that risk from materialising, it 
constitutes a general violation of the State’s positive obligation under Article 3.  
The issue, then, is what the State must do to rectify that incompatibility.  
5. Rectifying the incompatibility  
As noted with respect to Article 2, what steps the State must take to rectify the 
incompatibility depends on the nature of the violation. In the case of Article 2, the State 
could redress the incompatibility by legalising assistance for some individuals (for instance, 
capacitous individuals with a degenerative illness that will leave them unable to die by 
suicide without assistance and individuals with only a certain period of time left to live), or 
it could adopt the Swiss model and simply decriminalise benevolent assistance without 
introducing a regulated system of assistance. While the above analysis has been limited to 
assessing the compatibility of the Suicide Act 1961 with Article 3, the same reasoning could 
be applied to euthanasia, though this would require an examination of the common law 
offence of murder since euthanasia is the intentional taking of a person’s life whereas in 
the case of assisted suicide, the individual does the final act leading to their death. That 
distinction aside, there is no principled reason why the same conclusion of incompatibility 
would not be reached in the context of euthanasia. The State criminalises euthanasia 
through the lack of relevant exceptions to the offence of murder and that, like the Suicide 
Act 1961, constitutes ‘treatment’ which forces individuals such as Tony Nicklinson to live 
in a state of unbearable suffering or to bring about their death through starvation or other 
distressing means (for instance, refusing treatment in the event of infection). The account 
of Tony Nicklinson’s condition and the manner of his death given by Lord Neuberger in 
Nicklinson provides ample support for the contention that the prohibition on euthanasia 
constitutes treatment by the State that reaches the minimum level of severity for some 
individuals.220   
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Notwithstanding the conclusion that the ban on assisted suicide (and, indeed, euthanasia) 
is incompatible with Article 3, the State can decline to act to remedy the incompatibility.221 
Should the State decide to take action, the steps necessary to address the violation are more 
expansive than those required with respect to the Article 2 violation, primarily because the 
ban has the potential to affect more individuals from an Article 3 perspective than it does 
under Article 2 of the ECHR. While the Article 2 incompatibility can be remedied by 
allowing a specific group of individuals – those whose condition will leave them unable to 
take their own lives without assistance – to be able to lawfully access assisted suicide 
and/or euthanasia, the ill-treatment which the criminalisation of assistance causes is not 
confined to such individuals. As the anecdotal evidence outlined above makes clear, the 
ban may constitute ill-treatment in cases involving individuals like Tony Nicklinson who 
are incapable of taking their own lives and it may also constitute ill-treatment for 
individuals who are currently capable of taking their own lives but do not wish to do so 
via the risky and potentially barbaric avenues available to them. As the following extract 
from Carter makes clear, criminalising assistance of capacitous individuals who are 
physically able to take their own lives may constitute ill-treatment because:  
A physician-assisted death would be compassionate, legal, painless and 
dignified.  The alternatives seem barbaric and cruel.  There is also the fear and 
anxiety associated with taking my own life by other means.  I am concerned about 
having a protracted and painful death should I do nothing, while on the other hand 
I dread the thought of suicide with the complexities and legal dilemma that will be 
involved if I have my wife assist me.  We both face this reality, that we have only 
two terrible and imperfect options with a sense of horror and loathing.222 
Any system of assisted dying must also accommodate the highly subjective nature of the 
‘suffering’ covered by Article 3 of the ECHR. Only allowing assisted dying for individuals 
with terminal illnesses and a specific life-expectancy (as is the case in the permissive 
jurisdictions in the US and the Australian States of Victoria and Western Australia) will fail 
 
At the time of the hearing before the Supreme Court, Mr Nicklinson had died following a ‘very difficult and 
painful course of self-starvation, refusing all nutrition, fluids, and medical treatment [after which] he died of 
pneumonia’ ([6]). 
221 As Lady Hale observed in Nicklinson (n 7) [300]:  
Parliament is ... free to cure that incompatibility, either by a remedial order under section 10 of the 
Act or (more probably in a case of this importance and sensitivity) by Act of Parliament, or to do 
nothing. It may do nothing, either because it does not share our view that the present law is 
incompatible, or because, as a sovereign Parliament, it considers an incompatible law preferable to 
any alternative. 
222 Carter (n 13) [1044]. 
 78 
to protect individuals who have conditions which cause them unbearable suffering but are 
not terminal or are unlikely to cause their death within a foreseeable period (such as Tony 
Nicklinson and Omid T). Indeed, even the Canadian requirement that the patient be 
suffering a ‘grievous and irremediable medical condition’ which, while broad enough to 
cover ‘illness, disease or disability’ and which incorporates the subjectivity of suffering 
through the additional requirement that the individual’s condition causes them ‘enduring 
physical or psychological pain’, nevertheless requires that the individual’s death be 
‘reasonably foreseeable’ and would fail to address the incompatibility between s 2 of the 
Suicide Act 1961 and Article 3 of the ECHR. In fact, litigation is progressing through the 
provincial courts in Canada challenging the definition of ‘grievous and irremediable 
medical condition’ on this very basis. In the Lamb case it is alleged that the Supreme Court 
did not confine its findings to individuals with only a certain period left to live and the 
statutory requirement that a person’s death be ‘reasonably foreseeable’ is incompatible with 
the Canadian Bill of Rights because it fails to accommodate individuals such as Ms Lamb 
who has spinal muscular atrophy and Ms Moro who has Parkinson’s disease, whose deaths 
are not reasonably foreseeable, but whose conditions nevertheless cause them ‘enduring 
physical or psychological ban’.223 
In sum, then, if the State determines to rectify the incompatibility and introduces a system 
of assisted dying, to be compliant with Article 3 of the ECHR it must be available to 
individuals based on the suffering they are experiencing, as opposed to the terminal nature 
of their condition and/or the imminence of their death. Indeed, as Lord Neuberger 
observed in Nicklinson, ‘there seems to me to be significantly more justification in assisting 
people to die if they have the prospect of living for many years a life that they regarded as 
valueless, miserable and often painful, than if they have only a few months left to live.’224 
Such systems exist in the Benelux jurisdictions. In Belgium, the individual seeking 
assistance is required to be in ‘persistent and unbearable physical or psychological suffering 
which cannot be relieved and which stems from a serious and incurable condition caused 
by accident or disease’.225 In the Netherlands, the individual must be suffering unbearably 
with no prospect of improvement.226 And, in Luxembourg, the individual must ‘be in a 
medical situation with no way out’ and ‘no prospect of improvement’ and, as a result of 
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this condition, ‘suffer ... physically or psychologically in a constant and unbearable way’.227 
Given the highly subjective nature of ‘unbearable’ suffering, significant debate has attended 
its scope in the Benelux countries. As Bernheim et al aptly put it:  
A main condition for euthanasia in the Benelux laws is ‘unbearable’ suffering. This 
is actually a slightly unfortunate misnomer. ‘Unbearable’ is an objective notion, 
while it is the subjective assessment by the patient that matters most. The objective 
measurement of suffering is still in its infancy ... and no one is in a position to call 
someone else’s suffering bearable or not... The public, most physicians, and the 
Control and Evaluation Commission of Euthanasia interpret this term in the 
euthanasia legislation to mean suffering that is no longer tolerated by the patient.228 
It is left to the medical practitioners involved to determine whether the individual’s 
suffering has reached the requisite threshold. Safeguards are in place which require the 
second (and, in some instances, third) opinion of a relevantly qualified individual to 
confirm the patient’s suffering and the relevant regulatory bodies retain oversight over 
compliance with the eligibility criteria, including examining a practitioner’s assessment of 
the patient’s suffering. It is possible to avoid the issue in an objective assessment of 
suffering by making the ‘threshold’ suffering that is intolerable to the individual (which is the 
standard in, for instance, Canada and Victoria (Australia)).  
Of course, as with any system based on human judgement (including the medical system 
in England and Wales more generally) there is room for error, and opinions will and do 
differ as to whether a patient’s suffering has met the relevant threshold. But the criterion 
of ‘suffering’ must be sufficiently subjective to ensure a permissive scheme is, in fact, 
compatible with Article 3 of the ECHR. As the law surrounding withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment of incapacitous patients makes clear, a system which permits the 
withdrawal of such treatment in the absence of a patient’s express consent based on 
assessments of their best interests (which, following the recent UK Supreme Court 
decision of Y, can occur without judicial oversight) can be accommodated within the 
broader human rights framework.229 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision reveals that a 
system in which family members and doctors make decisions regarding the ongoing 
treatment of incapacitous patients – who are, by virtue of their condition, exceedingly 
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vulnerable – does not pose an unacceptable risk to vulnerable individuals. Arguably, a 
system in which only capacitous individuals who meet specific eligibility criteria are able to 
access assistance in dying poses even less of a risk to vulnerable individuals. Certainly, such 
a system strikes a far better balance between the interests of individuals who, as a result of 
the ban, experience inhuman or degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR 
and any other individuals who may be vulnerable to undue influence (which is discussed 
in detail in Chapter Four).  
Drawing the above together, should the State determine to take action to rectify the ban’s 
incompatibility with Article 3 of the ECHR, it will need to introduce a permissive scheme 
in which individuals who are suffering to an extent which they find is intolerable can access 
assistance in dying by suicide (the same reasoning would likely lead to the conclusion that 
the offence of murder is also incompatible with Article 3 insofar as it prohibits euthanasia 
for individuals like Tony Nicklinson). Any qualification attaching to the individual’s 
condition beyond the unbearableness (or like adjectival qualifier) of their suffering (for 
instance, that it is terminal or that it will cause the individual’s death within a certain period 
of time) will fail to address the fact that for those individuals who do not meet that criteria, 
the ban continues to constitute ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR. How the 
State seeks to protect against errors of judgement will largely be a matter for it, in the 
exercise of its margin of appreciation. It must be recalled, however, that in the context of 
Article 3, there is no scope for ‘balancing’ the rights of others against those individuals 
subjected to ill-treatment. Having determined that for some individuals the ban will 
constitute ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR, the State must introduce a 
system in which those individuals can obtain assistance in dying (or, it can refuse to act, 
though the ban will remain incompatible with Article 3). Any eligibility criteria and 
safeguards must not unduly circumscribe access to assistance, otherwise the State runs the 
risk of introducing a system that falls short of addressing the current incompatibility with 
Article 3 of the ECHR and further litigation akin to the Lamb proceedings currently being 
heard by the Canadian provincial courts.  
6. Conclusion   
The decisions of the House of Lords and the ECtHR in the Pretty litigation, in particular 
their rejection of the claim of a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR, had the effect of 
foreclosing subsequent litigation challenging the compatibility of the blanket ban on 
assisted suicide with Article 3. None of the subsequent cases challenging the Suicide Act 
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1961, including Noel Conway’s recent litigation, included a challenge on the basis of Article 
3. But, the ECHR is a ‘living instrument’ and the ECtHR has advocated a ‘dynamic 
approach’ to interpreting the protections contained therein, including the freedom from 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. Adopting such an approach, through a critical 
examination of the reasoning of the House of Lords and the ECtHR, in light of subsequent 
Article 3 jurisprudence, reveals that there is a strong argument that the ban on assisted 
suicide in England and Wales constitutes ‘treatment’ by the State which is inhuman or 
degrading for some individuals. More specifically, the decision of the Supreme Court in 
the Northern Ireland Abortion Case and, in particular, the reasons of President Hale, Lord 
Kerr (with Lord Wilson) and, to a lesser extent, Lord Mance, supports the contention that 
the State, in criminalising the provision of assistance in dying by suicide, subjects 
individuals like Noel Conway and Omid T (and, indeed, Diane Pretty) to an agonising 
dilemma which constitutes treatment such as to engage Article 3 of the ECHR. In such 
cases, it is the State’s criminalisation of assistance which causes the individual’s suffering. 
Certainly, at the very least, the ban on assisted suicide exacerbates the suffering arising 
from the individual’s medical condition and that is sufficient to engage Article 3 of the 
ECHR.  
As for the whether the treatment reaches the minimum level of severity such as to 
constitute a violation of Article 3, that turns on the facts in a given case. Having regard to 
the accounts extracted in Nicklinson, Conway and in the Canadian case of Carter, there is 
little doubt that denying individuals the right to control the manner and timing of their 
death causes them ‘either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering’ and 
‘will arouse ... feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing 
them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance’.230 The ban thus reaches the 
minimum level of severity such as to constitute inhuman and degrading treatment for some 
individuals in England and Wales and thus violates the State’s negative obligation not to 
subject individuals to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR in those cases. The 
prohibition on ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 is absolute and, consequently, the reasons 
for the ban are irrelevant.  
The reasoning of Lord Kerr in the Northern Ireland Abortion Case raises the possibility of an 
additional basis upon which a finding that the ban violates Article 3 of the ECHR could 
be made. Namely, the State’s positive obligation to protect. More specifically, Lord Kerr 
 
230 Jalloh (n 198) [68]. 
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found that the ban on abortion in Northern Ireland in cases of rape, incest and fatal foetal 
abnormality posed a risk of ill-treatment contrary to Article 3 for some girls and women 
and that risk was itself sufficient to engage the State’s positive obligation to protect against 
such harm materialising. Applying Lord Kerr’s reasoning to the blanket ban on assisted 
suicide, it is arguable that the State has failed to protect individuals like Noel Conway and 
Omid T – who belong to a ‘highly vulnerable group’ of people – from the harm caused by 
the ban. As the analysis in Chapter Four reveals, the blanket ban is disproportionate to the 
aims pursued and, consequently, insofar as a violation of the positive obligation to protect 
can be justified, there is not such justification in respect of the blanket ban.  
Thus, contrary to the findings of the House of Lords and the ECtHR in Pretty, there is a 
strong argument that the ban on assisted suicide in England and Wales constitutes 
inhuman or degrading treatment for some individuals, or causes harm which the State has 
failed to protect against, such as to violate Article 3 of the ECHR. There is no principled 
reason why the same arguments do not apply to the prohibition on euthanasia, which stems 
from the common law offence of murder and there is, then, a similarly strong argument 
that the prohibition on euthanasia violates Article 3 for individuals like Tony Nicklinson 
who cannot die by suicide.  
The State could decide to do nothing about those violations, however, should Parliament 
decide to remedy the incompatibility, permitting assisted suicide for terminally ill 
individuals who have a life-expectancy of 6 months or less (as was recommended in the 
most recent amendments considered by Parliament)231 will not rectify the violation of 
Article 3. Individuals like Tony Nicklinson who are incapable of doing the final act 
necessary for taking their life (for instance, swallowing a lethal dose of medication), will be 
ineligible to access assistance and the prohibition on euthanasia will continue to violate 
their Article 3 rights. Likewise, for a terminally ill person who could do the final act 
necessary to die by suicide, they may nevertheless be unable to access assistance in dying 
by suicide because they have a life expectancy of six months or more. Yet, for those 
individuals, their suffering may meet the minimum level of severity and the ban on assisted 
suicide in their case would continue to violate Article 3 of the ECHR. Thus, the State 
would need to introduce a system of assisted dying (i.e. one that permits both assisted 
suicide and voluntary active euthanasia) which is based on the individual’s suffering, as 
opposed to the nature of their illness and their life expectancy. The Benelux jurisdictions 
 
231 Assisted Dying HL Bill (2016-17) (n 28).  
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provide potential models, though ‘suffering’ should be subjectively measured (for instance, 
by requiring that the individual’s suffering is intolerable to them) as opposed to objectively 





THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE THE MANNER AND TIMING OF ONE’S DEATH: A RE-
EXAMINATION OF THE BAN’S PROPORTIONALITY  
1. Introduction  
This chapter examines the compatibility of the blanket ban with Article 8 of the ECHR. 
Following the structure of Article 8, the chapter commences with a consideration of the 
nature of the right to choose the manner and timing of one’s death before examining 
whether the interference which the Suicide Act 1961 poses to that right can be justified 
under Article 8(2). More specifically, is the ban ‘in accordance with law’ and ‘necessary in 
a democratic society’? Both of these issues will be considered separately, with the latter 
assuming the greatest significance. An examination of the compatibility of the ban with 
Article 8 centres on whether the ban itself is proportionate. Contrary to the erstwhile 
examination by the domestic and Strasbourg courts, the focus of the proportionality test 
is not the viability or otherwise of a proposed alternative to the ban; rather, the focus is 
the ban itself and whether it is proportionate. As this chapter will demonstrate, when 
examined from that perspective, the blanket ban is not proportionate and is, thus, 
incompatible with Article 8 of the ECHR. In any event, as the ensuing analysis, together 
with Chapter Five, reveals, there is a less restrictive alternative to the blanket ban.  
2. Scope of Article 8(1) 
Pursuant to Article 8(1) of the ECHR ‘[e]veryone has the right to respect for [their] private 
and family life, [their] home and [their] correspondence.’ ‘Private life’ ‘is a broad term not 
susceptible to exhaustive definition’.232 It covers the physical and psychological integrity of 
a person, it can encompass identity (including, for instance, gender identification and 
sexual orientation), and it also protects the right to personal development (which can be 
contrasted with the right to develop familial bonds, covered by the right to ‘family life’).233 
The broad scope of the protections afforded by the right to private life reflect the 
principles underpinning Article 8, especially the ‘notion of personal autonomy’ and self-
 
232 Pretty v United Kingdom (n 7) [61]. Pretty (n 7) [100] (Lord Hope). This is consistent with the domestic 
jurisprudence concerning the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment: 
The right to determine what shall be done with one’s own body is a fundamental right in our society. 
The concepts inherent in this right are the bedrock upon which the principles of self-determination 
and individual autonomy are based. Free individual choice in matters affecting this right should, in 
my opinion, be accorded very high priority. 
(Re T (n 30), 116-17 (President Butler-Sloss) (emphasis added)). 
233 Pretty v United Kingdom (n 7) [61]. 
 85 
determination.234 The right to private life is, thus, directed at ensuring individuals are given 
sufficient freedom (subject to legitimate restraint) to pursue the life of their choosing. This 
includes pursuing activities which may be inherently dangerous or which are perceived by 
others to be morally contentious (there is, for example, a long line of authority concerning 
the criminalisation of homosexuality).235 Moreover, as discussed in Chapter One, 
Article 8 protects the right of capacitous individuals to refuse life-sustaining treatment.236 
Given the breadth of the protections afforded by Article 8 and its emphasis on the 
individual’s autonomy and self-determination, it is unsurprising that the ECtHR has held 
that the right to ‘conduct one’s life in the manner of one’s choosing’ extends to ‘exercising 
[one’s] choice to avoid what [one] considers will be an undignified and distressing end to 
[their] life.’237 In subsequent decisions, the ECtHR has described this ‘right’ as being able 
to ‘choose the time and manner of [one’s] death’.238  Plainly, a ban which precludes 
individuals from exercising that choice by way of assisted suicide constitutes an 
interference with that right, and this has been confirmed in both the domestic and 
Strasbourg jurisprudence.239 
The question, then, is whether that interference is justified under Article 8(2) of the ECHR.  
3. Justifying an interference: the Article 8(2) requirements   
Article 8(2) of the ECHR provides that ‘[t]here shall be no interference by a public 
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society’ in one or more of the enumerated legitimate aims. As 
the ECtHR in Tysiac observed ‘[a]ccording to settled case-law, the notion of necessity 
implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and in particular that it 
is proportionate to one of the legitimate aims pursued by the authorities’.240 The courts 
have dedicated considerable time to clarifying the meaning of ‘in accordance with law’ and 
‘necessary in a democratic society’.  
 
234 ibid  
235 Culminating, at least insofar as the United Kingdom is concerned, in the decision of Dudgeon v United 
Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 149. 
236 See, for instance, Purdy (n 7) [63]. 
237 Pretty v United Kingdom (n 7) [67]. This was also observed by Lady Hale in Purdy (n 7) [61]. 
238 See, for instance, Haas (n 64) [60]. 
239 The HRA 1998 transposed the ECHR into domestic law such that, when dealing with a complaint under 
the HRA 1998, the focus of the domestic courts is on the proper interpretation and application of domestic 
rights, as opposed to international rights enshrined in the ECHR (see, for instance, Re G (Adoption: Unmarried 
Couple) [2009] 1 AC 173, [2008] UKHL 38 cited with approval in Nicklinson (n 7) [71] (President Neuberger)). 
See, also, Pretty v United Kingdom (n 7) [67] and Nicklinson (n 7) [79], [103] and [111] (Lord Neuberger). 
240 Tysiac v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42 [109] (citations omitted). 
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3.1. ‘In accordance with the law’  
In the seminal decision of Sunday Times, the ECtHR characterised the requirement of being 
‘in accordance with law’ as comprising two elements: 
Firstly, the law must be adequately accessible: the citizen must be able to have an 
indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a 
given case. Secondly, a norm cannot be regarded as a ‘law’ unless it is formulated 
with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate [their] conduct: [they] 
must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is 
reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may 
entail.241 
Prosecuting an offence under s 2(1) requires the consent on the DPP.242 This aspect of s 2 
and, more specifically, the policy243 governing the exercise of the prosecutorial discretion, 
were considered in detail by the House of Lords in the matter of Purdy244 and, again, in 
Nicklinson (insofar as the DPP’s appeal was concerned).245 At the time Purdy was decided 
there was no specific policy governing the exercise of discretion to prosecute an offence 
under s 2(1); the decision was made by reference to the generic principles of sufficient 
evidence and public interest.246 It was this lack of clarity as to the factors that were relevant 
to the decision to prosecute an offence under s 2 which was at the centre of Debbie Purdy’s 
challenge.  
The House of Lords accepted the submission made on behalf of Ms Purdy that ‘if the 
justification for a blanket ban depends upon the flexibility of its operation, it cannot be “in 
accordance with the law” unless there is greater clarity about the factors which the DPP 
and his subordinates will take into account in making their decisions.’247 Following the 
successful appeal in Purdy, the CPS developed a policy specific to prosecutions under s 2.248 
The policy reiterates that neither list is exhaustive; each case must be considered on its 
 
241 The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979-80) 2 EHRR 245 [49]. 
242 Suicide Act 1961, s 2(4): no proceedings shall be instituted for an offence under this section except by or 
with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
243 ‘Law’ as it appears in Article 8(2) is afforded an expanded meaning, and covers guidelines such as those 
generated by the DPP (see, for instance, Purdy (n 7) and Nicklinson (n 7)). 
244 Purdy (n 7). 
245 The policy was also considered in detail in Chapter One.  
246 CPS, ‘The Code for Crown Prosecutors’ (26 October 2018) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/full-
code-test> accessed 30 July 2019. 
247 Purdy (n 7) [63]. 
248 CPS, ‘Assisted Suicide’ (31 July 2019) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/publication/assisted-suicide> accessed 
6 February 2020. 
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own facts and its own merits. This residual discretion may, to a large extent, account for 
the fact that of the 152 cases classified by police as assisting/encouraging suicide and 
referred to the CPS for consideration between April 2009 and July 2019, 104 were not 
proceeded with (i.e. 68 per cent).249 And, of the post-policy cases that have been prosecuted 
under s 2, only three have been successful. As will be discussed below, the facts of the 
cases that have been successfully prosecuted vary considerably. In addition to the s 2 
prosecutions, a small number of cases in which individuals who have engaged in what 
might otherwise be characterised as ‘mercy killings’ are prosecuted for other violent 
offences (for instance, manslaughter250). The statistics made public by the CPS indicate that 
of the cases referred by police for consideration under s 2, eight have been referred 
onwards for prosecution for homicide or other serious crime. There is, however, no 
indication of the rate of successful prosecution of such offences, nor of the number (or 
nature) of the cases which were classified as homicide or other serious offences from the 
outset (i.e. not referred on from an initial s 2 referral by police).  
In Nicklinson, the Supreme Court was faced with, inter alia, an appeal by the DPP against a 
decision of the Court of Appeal (by a 2:1 majority) that the post-Purdy policy was 
insufficiently clear in terms of the impact of the assister being a healthcare professional. 
More specifically, it was argued that whereas it was sufficiently clear how the DPP would 
approach a case in which a friend or family member assisted and all the factors tending 
against prosecution were present, it was far less clear how the DPP would approach the 
same case in circumstances where the assister was a healthcare professional, especially if 
the healthcare professional had not had a previous professional relationship with the 
person being assisted. The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the guidance was 
insufficiently clear insofar as it did not permit ‘healthcare professionals to foresee to a 
reasonable degree the consequences of providing assistance’, whereas it was sufficiently 
clear when it came to relatives and close friends acting out of compassion.251  
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the DPP’s appeal (although for varying 
reasons).252 During the appeal, counsel for the DPP clarified the meaning and intention of 
 
249 A further 29 cases were withdrawn by police, making a total of 87.5 per cent of cases initially classified as 
assisted suicide by the police either not being pursued by the CPS or the police: ibid.  
250 As was the case in Gazeley (n 136).  
251 R (On the application of Nicklinson and Lamb) v Ministry of Justice; R (on the application of AM) v DPP [2014] 2 
All ER 32, [2013] EWCA Civ 961 [140]. 
252 Contrary to the position adopted by the other eight Justices, Lord Kerr considered that the DPP’s appeal 
should be allowed because, having found that s 2(1) was incompatible with Article 8, that incompatibility 
could only be addressed by way of a declaration of incompatibility and not by requiring the DPP to prepare 
(or, indeed, clarify) its policy with respect of prosecutions under s 2 (Nicklinson (n 7) [362]-[366] (Lord Kerr)).  
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the fourteenth factor in favour of prosecution. More specifically, they confirmed that the 
qualifying phrase ‘and the victim was in his or her care’ applied to the entirety of the clause:  
[F]actor fourteen was not intended to embrace healthcare professionals ‘brought 
in from outside, without previous influence or authority over the victim, or his 
family, for the simply [sic] purpose of assisting the suicide after the victim has 
reached his or her own settled decision to end life.’253  
A majority of the Supreme Court considered that while it was not clear that the fourteenth 
factor had this significance, it was not the role of the Court to advise the DPP on what the 
policy should say. Instead, the majority determined to afford the DPP the opportunity to 
re-examine the policy in light of the arguments and concessions made during the appeal.254  
The policy was amended following Nicklinson with the fourteenth factor being edited so 
that the words ‘and the victim was in his or her care’ are now in bold and underlined. 
Additionally, a note was added to the policy stating: 
For the avoidance of doubt the words ‘and the victim was in his or her care’ qualify 
all of the preceding parts of this paragraph [14]. This factor does not apply merely 
because someone was acting in a capacity described within it: it applies only where 
there was, in addition, a relationship of care between the suspect and the victims 
such that it will be necessary to consider whether the suspect may have exerted 
some influence on the victim.255 
Thus, the present iteration of the policy is in line with the dissenting judgment of the Lord 
Judge in the Court of Appeal who observed: 
The Policy certainly does not lead to what would otherwise be an extraordinary 
anomaly, that those who are brought in to help from outside the family circle ... 
are more likely to be prosecuted than a family member when they do no more than 
replace a loving member of the family, acting out of compassion, who supports 
the ‘victim’ to achieve [their] desired suicide. The stranger who is brought into this 
situation, who is not profiteering, but rather assisting to provide services which, if 
 
253 Nicklinson (n 7) [192] (Lord Mance). 
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255 CPS, ‘Suicide Policy’ (n 79).  
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provided by the [spouse], would not attract a prosecution, seems to me most 
unlikely to be prosecuted...256 
The question arises whether this ‘clarification’ renders the policy more in line with the 
legality requirement of Article 8(2) or whether it poses more questions than it answers. 
According to Lord Sumption, the clarified interpretation raises significant concerns 
regarding the role of other factors favouring prosecution, in particular factor six (the 
accused was not ‘wholly motivated by compassion’). While the purely compassionate 
character of the assister’s motivation is a major head of mitigation, this is far more likely 
to be demonstrated by a family member or loved one, than by an outsider with no 
emotional or even a prior professional connection with the individual seeking assistance.257 
Similar questions arise with respect to the interplay between factors fourteen and twelve 
(the ‘suspect’ and ‘victim’ were not known to each other). Those apparent inconsistencies 
pose but do not answer the questions: what kind of ‘professional carer with no earlier 
responsibility for the care of the victim’ is covered by the clarified factor fourteen? And 
how are persons who charge for their services affected by factor thirteen (which covers 
‘profiteering’)? Finally, what sorts of conduct are covered by factor sixteen in light of the 
revised factor fourteen: does this only cover operations such as Dignitas or are less 
‘extreme’ enterprises also caught?258 In the absence of information regarding the nature of 
the cases that are referred by the police but not prosecuted under s 2, it is impossible to 
ascertain whether any of the issues foreshadowed by his Lordship have arisen following 
the policy’s post-Nicklinson ‘amendment’.  
These ambiguities notwithstanding, the law arguably meets the certainty requirements to 
be ‘in accordance with law’ as required by Article 8(2); citizens clearly know the legal rules 
applicable (i.e. s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961) and s 2 is plainly formulated with precision: 
intentional assistance and encouragement of another’s suicide is unlawful without 
exception. As the ECtHR has held, ‘absolute certainty’ is unattainable and the 
interpretation and application of many laws ‘is a question of practice’. Such is the case with 
s 2, as demonstrated by the ensuing analysis of the three post-Purdy prosecutions that have 
led to convictions. 
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3.1.1.  Prosecutions under s 2, Suicide Act 1961 
As noted above, only a miniscule number of cases referred for prosecution under s 2 have 
been successfully prosecuted since the 2010 (post-Purdy) policy was introduced (three as at 
August 2019). Prosecutions for other violent offences (typically manslaughter by way of 
diminished responsibility) have occurred in circumstances which might be described as 
mercy killings.259 However, the proportion of prosecutions for assisting/encouraging 
suicide under s 2 compared with the number of referrals from the police illustrates the 
significant role the discretion in s 2(4) plays in implementing the ban on assisting and 
encouraging suicide. The question then is what impact this flexibility has on the ban’s 
certainty (and, thus, legality) for the purposes of Article 8 of the ECHR.  
3.1.1.1. R v Howe 
Mr Howe was convicted after trial of assisting suicide contrary to s 2(1).260 Mr Howe, who 
was 19 at the time of offending, had purchased petrol and a cigarette lighter for his friend, 
Stephen Walker (who was then aged 30), knowing that Mr Walker intended to set himself 
alight. Both Mr Howe and Mr Walker had consumed a considerable amount of alcohol in 
the hours leading up to Mr Howe’s purchase. Mr Howe gave the petrol and the lighter to 
Mr Walker and then left Mr Walker’s home. Despite attempts by neighbours to intervene, 
Mr Walker ignited the petrol and the ‘house burst into flames’.261 Mr Walker survived the 
blaze but suffered severe burns to 95 per cent of his body. Mr Howe was initially sentenced 
to 12 years’ detention in a Young Offender Institution.  
The Court of Appeal allowed Mr Howe’s appeal, and substituted a term of 10 years’ 
imprisonment. In doing so, the Court held that the 2010 CPS policy provided guidance to 
judges sentencing individuals convicted of an offence under s 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961. 
The Court had regard to pre-policy jurisprudence, ranging from suicide pacts (for which 
sentences of 3 years’ imprisonment ‘will generally be appropriate’) to encouraging and 
assisting a cellmate to suicide (for which the accused was sentenced to 8 years’ 
imprisonment following a guilty plea). Having examined those cases, the Court ‘identif[ied] 
a number of non-inclusive factors of relevance, stressing the need for each case to be 
considered on its own facts’.262 Relevantly, the Court held that it: 
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[S]hould consider whether the victim had a settled, voluntary and informed 
intention to commit suicide, or whether his or her state of mind was less certain. 
Whether the victim solicited assistance or encouragement is relevant, as is the 
victim’s capacity to make a decision as to suicide. In this context, knowledge by 
the offender of the extent of any vulnerability of the victim will be important. 
Again, evidence of threats, pressure or persuasion applied to the victim will have a 
bearing on culpability.263 
In determining that Mr Howe’s offending warranted a custodial sentence of 10 years, the 
Court of Appeal reiterated that while Mr Walker did not die, his injuries were especially 
grave as was his suffering (and that of his family). Further, Mr Howe ‘was well aware of 
[Mr Walker’s] vulnerability and knew that his previous threats of suicide were not idle.’264 
The Court also considered there to be a ‘degree of premeditation’265 and determined that 
Mr Walker did not have a settled intent to take his own life: ‘[o]ur judgment is that his state 
of mind was less certain than that.’266 While it is not clear from the reasons given why their 
Honours concluded that Mr Walker did not have a ‘settled intention’, it seems that the 
Court placed considerable weight on the fact that Mr Walker could not have attempted 
suicide in the manner in which he did were it not for Mr Howe’s actions.267 The Court also 
emphasised that the actions of Mr Howe ‘were not carried out in the context of a very 
elderly or terminally ill person who was suffering and wanted to be put out of their misery. 
There were no compassionate circumstances. This is not a mercy killing’.268  
3.1.1.2. R v Desai 
In stark contrast to Howe, Desai269entailed what could be considered a ‘mercy killing’ by a 
son of his elderly father. Mr Desai had been charged with murdering his father and, in the 
alternative, assisting his suicide. At the commencement of the trial, the judge ruled that the 
defendant had no case to answer with respect to the murder charge. Mr Desai had 
separately pleaded guilty to assisting his father’s suicide. Mr Desai’s father was 85 years old 
at the time of his death. The trial judge determined that the defendant’s father had 
expressed a wish, on numerous occasions, to die and that: 
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[W]ish was the firm and settled wish of a man of sound mind, in his 80’s who 
was suffering from an ever increasing lack of mobility, who was endemically 
lonely and who was fed up with existence. Evidence was also given in court by 
third parties who ... described him as a man fed up with life.270 
The defendant, a pharmacist, procured a lethal dose of a medication following an 
administrative error, which he sequestered with the potential to administer to his father at 
a later date. He kept the dose at his home for 6 months before adding it to a smoothie, 
which his father, knowing its contents, drank, after which he injected his father with 
insulin. The defendant voluntarily attended a police station where he admitted his conduct.   
In sentencing the defendant in respect of the offence of assisted suicide, the trial judge 
determined that ‘this case sits at the very lowest level of seriousness of cases involving a 
death’ as: 
• The defendant’s actions were motived by ‘pure compassion and mercy’; 
• The defendant’s father ‘had a firm, settled and informed wish to die’ which he had 
expressed over a number of years; 
• The defendant had reluctantly agreed to assist his father, but only after many 
months of attempting to deter him; 
• The assistance provided by the defendant was intended to ‘make death as gentle 
and comfortable’; 
• The defendant handed himself into police and was fully cooperative.271 
The cumulative weight of all of those factors resulted in a custodial sentence of 9 months, 
suspended for 9 months (and no separate sentence for the charges of theft relating to the 
drugs and syringes taken from his pharmacy).272 
Of particular relevance for instant purposes are the trial judge’s observations with respect 
to the decision to prosecute Mr Desai for assisting his father’s suicide. The trial judge 
reiterated that ‘there is no duty to prosecute every offence that is committed’ contrary to 
s 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 and, indeed, ‘there are very few prosecutions’.273 At that 
point, the only post-Purdy prosecution had been that of Mr Howe which the trial judge 
described as coming ‘within a hair’s breadth of amounting to a gruesome and brutal 
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murder.’274 Referencing the factors outlined in the post-Purdy policy, the trial judge noted 
that the defendant’s conduct ‘prima facie falls into the category of cases where there would 
be no prosecution.’275 While not seeking to ‘comment upon or criticise the charging 
decisions in this case’, the trial judge nonetheless observed: 
 I have now sat through the Prosecution case and have formed a judgment on the 
relevant facts. If these facts had been as evident then as they are to me now I am 
strongly of the view that there would have been no prosecution. I acknowledge that this is a 
judgment with the benefit of hindsight and it is not intended as criticism of the 
Crown. But it leaves you in the position that you have faced charges and punishment where 
someone else in the same position as you would not have.276  
Significantly, the trial judge said: 
There is an underlying point of principle here. The House of Lords in Purdy required the 
DPP to provide proper guidance to meet the requirements of the State under 
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The House of Lords 
held that a person who was in the position of being asked to assist a suicide - such 
as you were - had a right to know what factors would be likely to lead to a 
prosecution. Transparency and consistency were necessary to avoid the law being arbitrary, in 
other words being applied in a discriminatory manner. 
I turn to the appropriate sentence. I can see no appropriate or sensible basis upon 
which a sentence of immediate imprisonment is appropriate. Indeed, the logic of 
the analysis under the DPP’s Guidelines and Article 8 suggests that you should be 
given an unconditional discharge because this would place you in the position that, it can be said, 
you were entitled to be in had you been assessed under the Guidelines on the facts as I have found 
them.277 
The implications of his Honour’s observations in terms of the ban’s legality for the 
purposes of Article 8(2) of the ECHR will be discussed in greater detail shortly. First, 
however, it is necessary to consider the most recent s 2 prosecution.  
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3.1.1.3. R v Gordon 
Ms Gordon was convicted by a jury of encouraging the suicide of Mr Burkinshaw, who 
had a history of mental illness and suicidal ideation. The two met on an internet forum 
where Mr Burkinshaw had ‘posted six messages ... saying that he intended to commit 
suicide in mid-January, probably by jumping off Beachy Head and he was looking for 
someone to join him’ and concluded with a post on 16 December that read ‘I’m jumping 
Beachy Head in 24hrs. I want to be there for the sunrise on Thursday morning. If anyone 
wants to come they are welcome.’ Mr Bukinshaw gave his telephone number but requested 
that ‘only genuine people ... contact him and for no one to try to convince him against 
it.’278 
The defendant, who had previously attempted suicide, contacted Mr Burkinshaw and 
agreed to die by suicide with him. Ms Gordon proposed that Mr Burkinshaw travel to 
where she lived and they die by carbon monoxide poisoning by lighting a disposable 
barbeque in Mr Burkinshaw’s car. Mr Burkinshaw travelled to Ms Gordon, purchased a 
disposal barbeque and died by carbon monoxide poisoning after lighting it in his vehicle. 
The trial judge accepted that Ms Gordon travelled with Mr Burkinshaw to the place at 
which he ultimately died but determined not to kill herself. Mr Burkinshaw knew of Ms 
Gordon’s decision not to proceed with what the trial judge described as a ‘suicide pact’ as 
originally planned and, indeed, provided her with money so she could get a taxi home. 
Ms Gordon’s partner had contacted police after becoming concerned by her text messages 
which indicated that she may be considering suicide. The police collected Ms Gordon 
approximately a mile from where Mr Burkinshaw’s car was parked. Ms Gordon did not 
tell police about Mr Burkinshaw at that time, although they were informed some time later, 
at which point he was deceased.279   
Of interest is the trial judge’s finding (in light of the jury’s guilty verdict) that Ms Gordon 
did encourage Mr Burkinshaw to suicide, although Mrs Justice Cheema-Grubb also 
accepted, in light of evidence of Mr Burkinshaw’s comments on various suicide chat-
forums, that he had a settled intention to suicide.280 The trial judge’s findings warrant 
extracting in full in this respect: 
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[A]lthough [Mr Burkinshaw] was contemplating committing suicide towards the end of 
2015 he may not have gone through with it as he did on 17th December if you had not agreed 
to accompany him in what he believed to be a genuine suicide pact. However, on 
this important second question I resolve the issue more favourably to you and 
conclude that given his clear indication on the posts he would have committed suicide at 
some time approximate to 17th December.281 
Ms Gordon was convicted of encouraging Mr Burkinshaw to suicide because although Mr 
Burkinshaw had a ‘clear intention’ to die by suicide and would have done so ‘at some time 
approximate to 17th December’ regardless of Ms Gordon’s input, his method of suicide changed 
following Ms Gordon’s involvement (or, to employ the language of the statute, her 
‘encourag[ement]’). It appears that Ms Gordon’s culpability arose as a result of her 
proposing that instead of ‘jumping off Beachy Head’ on 17 December as Mr Burkinshaw 
had expressed he would, he travel to her home and they die by carbon monoxide poisoning 
together. This is consistent with the reasoning in Howe discussed above. The trial judge 
also made much of the fact that Ms Gordon determined not to go through with her suicide. 
According to Justice Cheema-Grubb, Ms Gordon did not have a ‘settled intention’ to die 
by suicide and she ‘misled [Mr Burkinshaw] into believing that [she] was genuinely and 
firmly intent on committing suicide with him’.282 Yet, the accepted evidence was that 
Mr Burkinshaw knew Ms Gordon was not going to suicide before he killed himself; he paid 
for her to get home and still proceeded to die by suicide. Mr Burkinshaw was, then, fully 
aware of Ms Gordon’s intentions at the time he died by suicide and it is unclear how 
Ms Gordon can be said to have misled him. The reasons of the trial judge strongly suggest 
that Ms Gordon was being punished for not dying by suicide despite s 1 of the Suicide Act 
1961 decriminalising suicide to avoid precisely that situation. 
One is left to wonder whether Ms Gordon would have been prosecuted if she had 
responded to Mr Burkinshaw’s online posts by attending with him at Beachy Head on the 
17th of December and, having met with him at the allotted time and place, determined not 
to jump. That is, what would have occurred if Ms Gordon had attended at Beachy Head 
with no firmer resolution to die by suicide than she had when she got into Mr Burkinshaw’s 
car? Does her conviction of encouraging Mr Burkinshaw’s suicide rest solely on the fact 
that she proposed he travel to her home and that they die by carbon monoxide poisoning 
instead of jumping from Beachy Head? While this case clearly raises important questions 
 
281 ibid at [12] (emphasis added). 
282 Gordon (n 278) [14]. 
 96 
about the nature of the offence under s 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961, its relevance to the 
instant inquiry rests in the fact that the judgment, together with Howe and Desai, confirms 
the observations in both Desai and of the Lord Judge in Mr Martin’s appeal283 that 
prosecutions under s 2 are highly unlikely in cases involving ‘compassionate, amateur 
assistance from nearest and dearest’284 of individuals with life-threatening or life-limiting 
conditions, or elderly individuals, where they have expressed a settled will to die. This 
consistency in the practical application of s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 suggests that 
individuals are able to foresee, ‘to a reasonable degree’, the consequences of their actions 
such as to satisfy the ‘legality’ requirement of Article 8(2) of the ECHR.  
3.1.2. Legality and Article 8(2): the utility of the post-Purdy CPS guidelines 
While Lord Hughes in Nicklinson was of the view that the generic Full Code Test for 
prosecutors was sufficient to meet the legality requirement of Article 8(2), as the House of 
Lords in Purdy identified, many of the factors in the generic public interest test are 
irrelevant to a decision to prosecute under s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961.285 Further, there are 
factors specific to determining whether to prosecute under s 2 which do not fit easily with 
the Full Code Test. For instance, culpability under the Full Code takes into account the 
level of premeditation however, such premeditation on the part of a wholly compassionate 
assister may be a factor against prosecution under s 2 insofar as it was actually ‘reluctant 
encouragement or assistance in the face of a determined wish on the part of the victim to 
[die by] suicide’ (per factor 5 tending against prosecution). Such limitations of the generic 
code in the context of s 2 offences were expressly recognised by the DPP in his reasons 
for not prosecuting the members of Daniel James’s family who assisted him to travel to 
Switzerland where he could die by suicide at a Dignitas clinic.286  
Moreover, during the Second Reading of the Suicide Bill in 1961, the House of Lords 
noted that the purpose of requiring that the DPP provide their consent before a 
prosecution under s 2 could occur was to ‘ensure that consistency was maintained’.287 It is 
arguable that consistency has been secured with respect to friends/family assisting a person 
 
283 Nicklinson and Lamb (n 251). 
284 HC Deb 11 September 2015, col 674 (Sir Keir Starmer) 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmhansrd/cm150911/debtext/150911-0001.htm> 
accessed 31 July 2019. 
285 See, for instance, Purdy (n 7) [49] (Lord Hope); [79] (Lord Brown). 
286 ibid. 
287 HL Deb 2 March 1961, vol 229, cols 246-76, 251. 
<http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1961/mar/02/suicide-bill-hl> accessed 31 July 2019.  
 97 
to travel to Dignitas given that over 200 cases288 involving such conduct were known to 
police and none resulted in prosecution.289 Such consistency is bolstered by the successful 
prosecutions of Mr Howe and Ms Gordon, both of which entailed friends or acquaintances 
assisting or encouraging another in circumstances where the individual who attempted 
to/did die by suicide was not terminally ill, suffering intolerably as a result of a life-limiting 
or similar condition or was not elderly and there was no cogent evidence to suggest that 
the relevant acts were ‘wholly motivated by compassion’ or mercy. In this respect, the 
decisions to prosecute Mr Howe and Ms Gordon reflect the CPS’s post-Purdy policy and 
its emphasis on compassion and protecting vulnerable individuals.290 Desai also confirms 
this practice. While the prosecution was dubious, the trial judge confirmed the approach 
to compassionate assistance of the elderly, terminally ill and those suffering intolerably as 
a result of a life-limiting condition in the sentence that was passed and in the reasons given.  
This ‘certainty’ is further supported by the case of Ms Caller who was acquitted by a jury 
of assisting her friend’s suicide. Ms Caller, aged 22 at the time of her acquittal, admitted 
she had provided the noxious gas her friend used to bring about her death, though she 
claimed that she did not think her friend would use the gas to take her life.291 The fact that 
Ms Caller was prosecuted is consistent with the decisions to prosecute Mr Howe and 
Ms Gordon. As with Mr Howe, Ms Caller was friends with ‘the victim’ and, like both Mr 
Howe and Ms Gordon (insofar as her culpability derived from her suggestion as to the 
means of Mr Burkinshaw’s suicide), her level of involvement in her friend’s death was 
quite significant given that she supplied the means by which her friend was able to bring 
about her death. While it is possible that these cases would have been prosecuted in the 
absence of an offence-specific policy, the policy makes it clear (and, indeed, foreseeable) 
that instances of assistance/encouragement such as those at the centre of the cases of 
Mr Howe, Ms Gordon and Ms Caller will likely lead to prosecution based on the factors 
set out therein. In this respect, the policy ensures that like cases are treated alike, thereby 
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securing the consistency required by Article 8(2)’s legality requirement and, indeed, as was 
intended by requiring the DPP’s consent per s 2(4) of the Suicide Act 1961.  
Contrary to Lord Hughes’s claim in Nicklinson, then, the CPS’s offence-specific policy with 
respect to assisted suicide (which joins a growing number of offence-specific guidance 
documents)292 was necessary to redress the fact that ‘in the absence of any such statement 
of policy, there is simply no sufficiently clear or relevant guidance available as to how the 
very widely expressed discretion accorded to the Director in section 2(4) of the 1961 Act 
will be exercised’.293 The policy was, then, a means of ensuring that s 2 complies with 
Article 8(2)’s legality requirement, in particular the need for foreseeability and consistency. 
The comments of the trial judge in Desai serve to highlight this point. In identifying that 
another individual in Mr Desai’s situation would likely not have been prosecuted, his 
Honour, albeit implicitly, referenced the practice of not prosecuting ‘wholly 
compassionate’ acts of assistance involving loved ones/friends who are terminally ill, 
suffering intolerably as a result of a life-limiting condition or elderly. That trend exists 
irrespective of the policy, but the policy ensures that the prosecutorial discretion is 
exercised in a manner that meets Article 8(2)’s requirements of accessibility, foreseeability 
and transparency. Of course, prosecutors enjoy a residual degree of discretion; the factors 
enumerated in the policy are not exhaustive. However, the policy serves to ensure that 
individuals who are considering engaging in acts which may run afoul of s 2 are aware as 
far as is possible of the consequences of their actions, which is imperative to avoid arbitrary 
interferences with the Article 8(1) right to private life.    
In sum, while there remain concerns with respect to the certainty of the 2010 CPS policy 
concerning prosecutions under s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961, its application has led to a 
degree of foreseeability and consistency such that the ban can be said to be ‘in accordance 
with the law’ (as required by Article 8(2) of the ECHR). The policy’s emphasis on 
compassion and the condition of the victim accounts for the decisions to prosecute Mr 
Howe, Ms Gordon and Ms Caller and it enabled the trial judge in Desai to question the 
decision to prosecute on the basis of concerns regarding consistency. The CPS policy thus 
serves two important functions: it ensures the ban satisfies the legality requirement in 
Article 8(2); and, it enables the DPP to achieve the objective of the discretion in s 2(4), 
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namely consistency. The ECtHR has repeatedly confirmed that secondary legislation, 
codes of practice and regulations that are available to the public can provide the relevant 
statutory provision with the certainty and foreseeability required to be ‘in accordance with 
law’.294 In those circumstances, it would be difficult to maintain a claim that the blanket 
ban, read in light of the CPS policy, was not ‘in accordance with the law’.  
Having established that the ban is in accordance with law, the next question is whether the 
ban is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ which requires, inter alia, that the ban pursues a 
‘legitimate aim[s]’.295  
3.2. ‘Legitimate aim’ 
While Article 8(2) does not make express reference to ‘legitimate aim’, an aim will typically 
be found to be ‘legitimate’ ‘provided it falls within one of the categories [of interests] set 
out in paragraph 2 of Article[8]’.296 Thus, so long as the State can demonstrate to the 
requisite standard that the impugned measure seeks to achieve an aim related to an interest 
listed in Article 8(2), it will generally comply with the ‘legitimate aim’ requirement of Article 
8(2) of the ECHR.297 The question, then, is whether the objective/s (or aim/s) of s 2 of 
the Suicide Act 1961 relates to one or more of the interests listed in Article 8(2). 
The political and academic debate surrounding assisted suicide is replete with various 
justifications for continuing to criminalise all assistance, with the most commonly cited 
being: 
• It would devalue the lives of those who would be permitted access; 
• Even restricted access could result in desensitisation to such an extent that 
people who were not originally envisaged as being able to access assistance 
would eventually be able to die with assistance (or would be killed by euthanasia 
without consent) (i.e. the ‘slippery slope’ argument);  
• It would compromise the relationship of trust between doctors and patients; 
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• It would put pressure on individuals who might be vulnerable to undue influence 
by family or loved ones such that they would seek assistance in dying by suicide 
in circumstances where they do not desire to die. 
While all the above justifications have featured heavily in the debates of the various Bills 
proposing amendments to the Suicide Act 1961,298 the primary legal justification is the 
alleged need to protect people ‘vulnerable’ to undue influence or, to use the vernacular of 
the ‘interests’ recognised by Article 8(2) ‘the protection of the rights of others’, specifically 
the right not to be intentionally deprived of their life or, alternatively, the ‘protection of 
health’.299 Indeed, this is (subject to the anomalous reasoning of the courts in Conway300 
which is considered below) the sole legal justification for s 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961. 
As Lady Hale observed in Nicklinson: 
The only legitimate aim which has been advanced for this interference is the 
protection of vulnerable people, those who feel that their lives are worthless or 
that they are a burden to others and therefore that they ought to end their own 
lives even though they do not really want to. In terms of article 8.2, this could be put 
either as the “protection of health” or as the “protection of the rights of others”, 
the right in question being the most important right of all, the right to life protected 
by article 2. As Lord Sumption points out, an alternative aim might be advanced, 
as the “protection of morals” ... Respect for individual autonomy and human 
dignity are also important moral principles. The very complexity of the moral argument, 
amply demonstrated in the material before this court, tells against relying upon this as the 
legitimate aim of the legislation.301 
Lady Hale had expounded a similar conceptualisation of the ban’s objective in the earlier 
decision of Purdy wherein she described the focus of the ban as ‘people who are vulnerable 
to all sorts of pressures, both subtle and not so subtle, to consider their own lives a 
worthless burden to others.’302 Consistent with Lady Hale’s observations in both Purdy and 
Nicklinson, Lord Mance in the latter held that the objective of s 2(1) is to protect ‘vulnerable 
individuals who might feel themselves a burden to their family, friends or society and 
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might, if assisted suicide were permitted, be persuaded or convince themselves that they 
should undertake [suicide], when they would not otherwise do so.’303 
The ECtHR has confirmed the domestic authorities’ conceptualisation of the ban’s 
objective: 
The law ... was designed to safeguard life by protecting the weak and vulnerable and 
especially those who are not in a condition to take informed decisions against acts 
intended to end life or to assist in ending life. Doubtless the condition of terminally 
ill individuals will vary. But many will be vulnerable and it is the vulnerability of the 
class which provides the rationale for the law in question...304  
The ECtHR thus attributed the alleged vulnerability of ‘many’ terminally ill individuals to 
‘the [entire] class’ of terminally ill individuals who might avail themselves of assistance in 
dying by suicide should it be decriminalised. Having done so, the Court then afforded the 
United Kingdom a wide margin of appreciation in determining how to protect against the 
risks to those ‘vulnerable’ individuals: ‘[i]t is primarily for States to assess the risk and the 
likely incidence of abuse if the general prohibition on assisted suicides were relaxed or if 
exceptions were to be created.’305  
Consistent with the characterisation of the ban’s objective proffered by the domestic 
courts and the ECtHR, the Canadian Supreme Court in Carter described the ‘target’ of that 
jurisdiction’s analogous blanket prohibition as ‘preventing vulnerable persons from being 
induced to commit suicide at a time of weakness’.306 Similarly, the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Glucksberg held that one of the central objectives of Washington State’s 
(then) blanket ban was ‘protecting the poor, the elderly, disabled persons, the terminally 
ill, and persons in other vulnerable groups from indifference, prejudice, and psychological and 
financial pressure to end their lives’.307  
There is, then, a significant degree of consensus across the various jurisdictions that have 
examined the human rights implications of their respective bans on assisted suicide that 
one of the primary legal justifications, if not the sole legal justification, is the need to 
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protect ‘vulnerable’ people from feeling pressured into taking their lives. Notwithstanding 
this consensus and seemingly in direct conflict with the jurisprudence of the UK Supreme 
Court (in particular, Lady Hale’s observations at [311] in Nicklinson extracted above) and 
the ECtHR, the Divisional High Court in Conway accepted the State’s claim that the ban 
had multiple objectives namely, to protect: the vulnerable; the doctor/patient relationship; 
and, society’s moral value in the sanctity of life. The subsequent appellate decisions in the 
Conway litigation have perpetuated this contention.  Given its significance to the instant 
inquiry, this finding warrants closer inspection. It is certainly necessary to examine the 
merits of the High Court’s reasoning before moving on to consider whether the ban is 
necessary to achieve its objective(s) since the decision, if valid, significantly expands the 
Article 8(2) inquiry.  
3.2.1. Conway and the blanket ban’s legitimate aim(s) 
The High Court in Conway held that because of the findings of the UK Supreme Court in 
Nicklinson and the ECtHR in Pretty and Nicklinson (and, in particular, the asserted lack of a 
finding of incompatibility by either court), Mr Conway was not seeking a ‘declaration of 
incompatibility with Convention rights as contained in the ECHR’ but, rather, he was 
seeking a ‘declaration of incompatibility with the Convention rights as set out as distinct 
provisions in domestic law under the HRA.’308 The distinction between ECHR rights as 
contained in the Convention and ECHR rights as contained in domestic law derives from 
the decision of the House of Lords in Re G309 which confirmed that ‘a distinct claim of 
incompatibility with such rights can be maintained even where there is no breach of the Convention 
itself.’310 While the distinction is largely immaterial to the remedies available to a successful 
applicant, it does have the potential to effect the outcome of an appeal and/or a complaint 
before the ECtHR.  
There are several issues with the High Court’s classification of Mr Conway’s claim as 
concerning ECHR rights contained in domestic law as opposed to the ECHR itself. The 
first is that it is based on a mischaracterisation of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Nicklinson which is discussed in greater detail below. A majority of the Supreme Court (5:4) 
determined that the Court had the competence to examine the question of the ban’s 
compatibility with Article 8 of the ECHR, though only two members of the bench 
proceeded to undertake that exercise, both reaching the conclusion that the ban was 
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incompatible with Article 8. The remainder of the majority decided the more appropriate 
course was to give Parliament the opportunity to consider the issue. The Supreme Court 
thus did not determine that the ban was compatible with Article 8 of the ECHR. Insofar 
as members of the minority expressed their views on the ban’s compatibility, such musings 
constitute obiter given that they determined that the Court lacked the competence to 
consider the issue of compatibility. The decision of the Supreme Court in Nicklinson thus 
did not foreclose a finding of a breach of the ECHR itself.  
A second, and perhaps more significant issue with the High Court’s decision to adopt a 
Re G examination of Mr Conway’s complaint lies in the fact that that decision seemingly 
emboldened the Court to depart from the relevant case law of the Supreme Court and the 
ECtHR and expand the list of legitimate aims which the ban allegedly seeks to secure. In 
addition to protecting vulnerable individuals, the High Court accepted the submission of 
the State that the ban’s legitimate aims included ‘respect for the sanctity of life and 
promotion of trust between patient and doctor in the care relationship.’311 The Court 
clarified that promotion of trust between patient and doctor is secured by ‘reinforcing the 
ethical standards applied by doctors, so that patients get and have the confidence to make 
use of the best advice and treatment available.’312 As counsel for the State and the 
Divisional High Court itself noted, neither the Supreme Court in Nicklinson nor the ECtHR 
in Pretty considered such objectives to be legitimate aims of the ban. Neither decision 
involved an assessment of whether such objectives could appropriately be considered 
legitimate aims of the ban, nor did they examine whether the ban was necessary and 
proportionate to securing those objectives. Somewhat ironically, perhaps, a consequence 
of the High Court’s expansion of the ban’s legitimate aims is that, insofar as the additional 
objectives specified by the High Court in Conway can be said to be ‘legitimate aims’ for the 
purposes of Article 8(2) of the ECHR, the question of whether the ban is proportionate 
to those aims remains at large and Mr Conway’s complaints ought to have been considered 
under the ECHR itself as opposed to a Re G assessment under domestic law. This, in turn, 
enlarges the bases upon which the ban could be said to be incompatible with Article 8 and 
raises the possibility of a successful complaint to the ECtHR on the basis that the ban 
does, in fact, violate the ECHR because the blanket ban remains disproportionate to the 
objective of protecting vulnerable individuals (as found by Lady Hale and Lord Kerr in 
Nicklinson) and it is not necessary to secure the additional objectives.  
 
311 Conway (Court of Appeal) (n 7) [201]. 
312 Conway (n 7) [47]. 
 104 
This in turn begs the question whether the new objectives are, in fact, legitimate aims for 
the purposes of Article 8(2) of the ECHR. Turning first to the ‘promotion of the doctor 
and patient relationship’, the Divisional High Court considered that such an objective 
could be characterised as the ‘protection of morals’, ‘protection of health’ and ‘protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others’. It is unclear how promotion of the doctor and patient 
relationship could be characterised as the protection of morals which has ‘usually been 
interpreted as a synonym of sexual morality.’313 Insofar as ‘morals’ extends beyond sexual 
morality, it has been cited as a justification for the Republic of Ireland’s ban on abortion; 
it was argued in A, B and C v Ireland that the ban on abortion was necessary for the purpose 
of protecting morals ‘of which the protection in Ireland of the right to life of the unborn 
was one aspect.’314 It is difficult to see how promotion of the doctor and patient 
relationship falls within the protection of morals beyond the claim that criminalising 
assistance of suicide by doctors protects the sanctity of life, which the High Court 
recognised as a discrete aim pursued by the ban.  Rather, promotion of the doctor/patient 
relationship most cogently falls within the objective of either protecting the rights of others 
or the protection of health. Indeed, the High Court seemingly accepted as much when it 
described the ‘aim’ of promoting trust between a doctor and patient in the following terms: 
The evidence before us shows that there is a real concern amongst doctors and a 
real risk that if the prohibition against assistance for suicide were relaxed, patients 
(particularly vulnerable and elderly patients) would have less confidence in their 
doctors and the advice they might give. This could well have deleterious 
consequences on the extent to which patients are willing to share information 
about their conditions freely with their doctors and the extent to which patients 
would be willing to accept and act upon medical advice given to them. Both these 
things would tend to undermine the quality and efficacy of medical treatment made available 
to them.315  
Plainly, insofar as promotion of trust between doctors and patients is a legitimate aim for 
the purposes of Article 8(2) of the ECHR, it is because it protects the rights of individuals 
to quality and efficacious medical treatment or, in Article 8(2) terms, because it protects 
the rights of others and/or it protects health, as opposed to the protection of morals. 
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Whether a blanket ban is, in fact, necessary to secure such an objective is a separate issue 
which will be considered below.  
As for the finding that the ban also secures the legitimate aim of the protection of the 
sanctity of life and, thus, the protection of morals, there is no doubt that, insofar as a 
society values the sanctity of life, it constitutes society’s morals for the purposes of Article 
8(2) of the ECHR (as argued in A, B and C v Ireland and, more recently, in the Northern 
Ireland Abortion Case). The question, however, is whether it can properly be said that English 
society values the sanctity of life over all other competing values. It is in this respect that 
the observations of Lady President Hale in Nicklinson assume significance, especially that 
‘[r]espect for individual autonomy and human dignity are also important moral principles. 
The very complexity of the moral argument, amply demonstrated in the material before this court, tells 
against relying upon [the sanctity of life as manifestation of the protection of morals] as the legitimate aim 
of the legislation.’316  
It bears noting that these observations of Lady Hale were overlooked by the Divisional 
High Court and the Court of Appeal in Conway in favour of extracts from Lord Sumption’s 
reasons, even though Lord Sumption did not examine the ban’s compatibility with Article 
8 of the ECHR. Beyond the issues with prioritising equally weighty values identified by 
Lady Hale, as Lord Kerr noted in Nicklinson, significant doubt attends the issue of whether 
‘the sanctity of life [is] protected or enhanced by insisting that those who freely wish to 
but are physically incapable of bringing their lives to an end, should be required to endure 
untold misery until a so-called natural death overtakes them’.317 Moreover, polls of the 
public and doctors indicate increasing support of assisted suicide. In a 2015 Populus study 
of 5018 people, 4 out of 5 of those surveyed supported Lord Falconer’s Bill which 
contemplated affording terminally ill, capacitous, individuals the right to obtain assistance 
in dying by suicide.318 As for the medical profession, recent research suggests that the 
position of doctors – insofar as it is possible to characterise such a diverse group so 
homogenously – with respect to assisted dying is far more nuanced than that reflected in 
the reasons of the High Court in Conway in which it was said that ‘there is a real concern 
amongst doctors ... that if the prohibition against assistance for suicide were relaxed, 
patients (particularly vulnerable and elderly patients) would have less confidence in their 
 
316 Nicklinson (n 7) [311] (emphasis added). 
317 ibid [357]. 
318 Populus, ‘Dignity in Dying poll’ (March 2015) <http://www.populus.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/DIGNITY-IN-DYING-Populus-poll-March-2015-data-tables-with-full-party-
crossbreaks.compressed.pdf> accessed 31 July 2019. 
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doctors and the advice they might give.’319 Certainly, there is concern amongst doctors. 
But, there is also support for physician assisted suicide. A 2017 poll of over 700 doctors 
indicated that 55 per cent were in favour of allowing assisted suicide.320 Indeed, a recent 
poll of 6885 members of the Royal College of Physicians (from over 30 specialities) 
revealed increasing support amongst members for permitting assisted suicide which, 
significantly, led the College to adopt a position of neutrality with respect to assisted suicide 
in place of its erstwhile negative position. While the proportion of physicians who 
considered that the College should be opposed to a change in the law remained relatively 
consistent (43.4 per cent in 2014 versus 44.4 per cent in 2019) the percentage of members 
in favour of the College supporting a change to s 2 to allow assisted dying rose significantly 
from 24.6 to 31.6 per cent. The neutral position arose as 25 per cent of members thought 
the College’s position should be neutral, thus 56.6 per cent of members were in favour or 
neutral on the question of permitting assisted suicide. The survey also asked the physicians 
for their personal views on a change to the law. Those supporting a change rose from 32.3 
per cent in 2014 to 40.5 per cent in 2019 while those personally against fell from 57.5 per 
cent to 49.1 per cent.321 Such evidence demonstrates that the public and the medical 
profession value autonomy, self-determination and dignity as well as the sanctity of life. 
This, in turn, supports the contention that the ‘protection of morals’, insofar as that refers 
to protecting the sanctity of life, should not be relied upon as a ‘legitimate aim’ of the 
blanket ban. The legitimacy of the aim of protecting the sanctity of life, as a manifestation 
of the protection of morals, is, thus, questionable.  
The preceding analysis has highlighted several fundamental issues with the High Court’s 
reasoning in Conway with respect to the ban’s additional ‘legitimate aims’. Assuming, 
however, for the purposes of the instant inquiry that the aims identified by the High Court 
(and accepted, at least implicitly, as valid by the Court of Appeal and unchallenged by the 
Supreme Court in its reasons rejecting the appeal)322 in Conway are ‘legitimate’, the ensuing 
discussion will consider whether the blanket ban is ‘necessary’ in order to secure such aims 
 
319 Conway (n 7) [94]. 
320 Jacky Davis, ‘Most UK doctors support assisted dying, a new poll shows: the BMA’s opposition does not 
represent members’ (2018) BMJ 360. 
321 Royal College of Physicians, ‘No majority view on assisted dying moves RCP position to neutral’ (21 
March 2019) <https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/news/no-majority-view-assisted-dying-moves-rcp-position-
neutral> accessed 31 July 2019. 
322 Conway (Court of Appeal) (n 7) [201]. See, also, Conway (Supreme Court) (n 8) [6]: ‘several justifications 
have been put forward to support a hard and fast rule – the protection of weak and vulnerable people from 
insidious pressures, respect for the sanctity of all human life, and the preservation of trust and confidence in 
the medical profession’. 
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as well as the recognised legitimate aim of protecting individuals vulnerable to undue 
pressure.  
3.3.  ‘Necessary in a democratic society’ 
As with the legality requirement of Article 8(2), the courts (both domestic and Strasbourg) 
have examined the scope and content of the ‘necessity requirement’ in considerable detail. 
According to the Supreme Court, the necessity requirement ‘implies a pressing social need and 
requires that [the challenged] measure ... be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued ... 
Proportionality involves striking a fair balance between the interests of the individual and those of the 
community as a whole.’323  
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR described the necessity requirement – and the 
attendant function of the margin of appreciation – in the following terms: 
An interference will be considered ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for a 
legitimate aim if it answers a ‘pressing social need’ and, in particular, if it is proportionate 
to the legitimate aim pursued and if the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it 
are ‘relevant and sufficient’... 
While it is for the national authorities to make the initial assessment in all these 
respects, the final evaluation of whether the interference is necessary remains subject to review by 
the court for conformity with the requirements of the convention. A margin of appreciation must 
be left to the competent national authorities in this assessment. The breadth of this margin 
varies and depends on a number of factors including the nature of the convention 
right in issue, its importance for the individual, the nature of the interference and 
the object pursued by the interference...324 
The domestic courts have clarified what is required for an interference with Article 8 to be 
necessary in a democratic society. In Nicklinson, Lord Kerr described the ‘test to be applied’ 
in such cases in the following manner (given its significance to the instant examination, it 
will be quoted in full, including references): 
Justification of interference with a right to bring intolerable suffering to an end 
must be of a different order from that which will be required to warrant intervention in most species 
of article 8 rights. One should not fail to confront the stark reality of this. The appellants 
 
323 R (ZH and CN) v Lewisham London Borough Council [2015] AC 1259, [2014] UKSC 62 [62] (citations omitted 
and emphasis added). 
324 Fernandez Martinez (n 159) [124]-[125] (emphasis added). 
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are condemned to a life bereft of pleasure or quality. They live in the knowledge of the distress that 
their condition and their own misery causes to those close to them.  
The nature of the interference in this case is not in dispute, and the test for whether 
it is justified is set out in the decisions of the House of Lords in Huang v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2007] 2 AC 167 and of this court in R (Aguilar Quila) 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 1 AC 621. In the latter case, Lord 
Wilson said at para 45: 
‘… In Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] 2 AC 167, 
Lord Bingham of Cornhill suggested, at para 19, that in such a context four 
questions generally arise, namely: (a) is the legislative objective sufficiently 
important to justify limiting a fundamental right?; (b) are the measures 
which have been designed to meet it rationally connected to it?; (c) are they 
no more than are necessary to accomplish it?; and (d) do they strike a fair 
balance between the rights of the individual and the interests of the 
community? …’325 
Other members of the Nicklinson Supreme Court described the test in similar terms, citing 
both Aguilar and Huang,326 while Lord Mance described the test to be applied by reference 
to the Court’s decision in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2): 
The main justification advanced for an absolute prohibition on assisting suicide, 
even in cases as tragic as Mr Nicklinson’s and Mr Lamb’s, is the perceived risk to 
the lives of other, vulnerable individuals who might feel themselves a burden to 
their family, friends or society and might, if assisted suicide were permitted, be 
persuaded or convince themselves that they should undertake it, when they would 
not otherwise do so. The relevant measure is the prohibition, which on this basis 
has a legitimate aim. Whether it is rationally connected to that aim depends upon 
the existence of the perceived risk. Whether it is necessary depends upon whether 
a lesser measure would have achieved, or at least not “unacceptably” have 
compromised, the aim. Whether it is proportionate depends upon identifying what 
 
325 Nicklinson (n 7) [336]-[337] (Lord Kerr). 
326 ibid, for instance, [80]ff (Lord Neuberger), [171] (Lord Mance), and, [310] (Lady Hale). Citing R (Aguilar 
Quila) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 1 AC 621, [2011] UKSC 45 and Huang v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2007] 2 AC 167, [2007] UKHL 11.  
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the measure achieves and balancing this against the consequences for other 
interests...327 
Each of the nine members of the Nicklinson Supreme Court delivered separate reasons in 
which they applied the ‘test’ to varying extents and with differing outcomes: 
• Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption, Lord Reed and Lord Hughes considered that the 
nature of the subject matter and, in particular, its moral complexity, rendered it 
‘institutionally [in]appropriate’ for the Court to consider the compatibility of the 
ban with the ECHR;328 
• Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance and Lord Wilson determined that while the Court 
could consider the ban’s compatibility with the ECHR, ‘it was such a controversial 
issue’ that it was institutionally inappropriate to issue a declaration without first 
giving Parliament the opportunity to (re)consider the issue;329 and, finally,  
• Lady Hale and Lord Kerr proceeded to examine the compatibility of s 2 of the 
Suicide Act 1961 with Article 8 of the ECHR and, having done so, determined that 
the blanket ban was incompatible and would have issued declarations to that effect 
under s 4 of the HRA 1998.  
The majority Supreme Court thus did not consider the ban’s compatibility and certainly did 
not issue a determination with respect to the compatibility of the ban with Article 8 of the 
ECHR. The absence of a finding of incompatibility cannot be used as proof of its corollary: 
the majority did not conclude that the ban was compatible with Article 8. Indeed, Lord 
Neuberger was unable to reach a conclusion with respect to the third and fourth elements 
of the proportionality test and any determination that the ban was compatible with Article 
8 would depend on a positive finding with respect to all aspects of the proportionality 
test.330 If there is any assumption, it must be that the interference which the ban poses to 
the right to private life is unjustified. Since it is accepted that the ban poses an interference 
 
327 Nicklinson (n 7) [171] citing Bank Mellat v HM Treasury (No 2) [2014] AC 700, [2013] UKSC 39.  
328 Although, as Elizabeth Wicks has identified, it is arguable that Lord Sumption and Lord Clarke were less 
fervent in their view that this was (and would always remain) solely the concern of Parliament; the separate 
judgments of each of their Lordships make reference to the possibility of the Court having a role to play 
should Parliament ‘abdicate’ its responsibility (Lord Sumption) by ‘choos[ing] not to debate these issues’ 
(Lord Clarke). See, Elizabeth Wicks, ‘The Supreme Court judgment in Nicklinson: One step forward on 
assisted dying; two steps back on human rights’ (2015) 23 Medical Law Review 144, 147-8 citing Nicklinson 
(n 7) [233] (Lord Sumption) and [293] (Lord Clarke). 
329 Lord Neuberger, ‘The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law’ (The Conkerton Lecture, Liverpool, October 
2014) <https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-141009-lord-neuberger.pdf> accessed 31 July 2019.  
330 Nicklinson (n 7) [120] (Lord Neuberger). 
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with the Article 8 right of some individuals such as Diane Pretty, Tony Nicklinson and 
Noel Conway, the burden was thus on the State to justify that interference. In the absence 
of a finding with respect to the ban’s justifiability by the majority, the ban remains 
unjustified. As the following will demonstrate, when the proportionality test is applied to 
the blanket ban, the inescapable conclusion is that the ban is disproportionate and, thus, 
incompatible with Article 8 as found by both Lady Hale and Lord Kerr.  
3.3.1 Section 2 of the Suicide Act and the domestic proportionality test 
3.3.1.1 Sufficiently important objective? 
There can be little doubt that protecting individuals vulnerable to undue influence, 
protecting the doctor/patient relationship, and, protecting the sanctity of life, are 
sufficiently important objectives to justify interfering with certain rights. Greater dispute, 
however, attends the question of whether the ban on assisting suicide is ‘rationally 
connected’ to those objectives. 
3.3.1.2 Rational Connection? 
a. Protecting ‘vulnerable individuals’ 
As Figure 1 demonstrates, the ban covers everyone in society, even though only a very small 
number of people (Group B) require protection (precise figures are elusive given the 
subjectivity of ‘vulnerability’, although it is highly likely that, were Figure 1 to reflect the 
numbers of individuals in each group, Groups B and D would be considerably smaller 
than Groups A and C). More significantly, the ban does not prevent people in Group A 
(i.e. those who are vulnerable to pressure but are nonetheless able to die by suicide without 
assistance) from taking their own lives by way of suicide as a result of undue influence. 
The question, then, is whether the ban, which covers all groups, including those who are 
not vulnerable, can be said to be ‘rationally connected’ to its objective, namely the 
protection of those individuals in Group B. 
Group A 
Vulnerable but physically capable of 
suicide 
Group B 
Vulnerable and physically incapable of 
suicide 
Group C 
Not vulnerable and physically capable of 
suicide  
Group D 
Not vulnerable but physically incapable of 
suicide  
Figure 1: All individuals are caught by the ban, while the ban’s objective is only directed at protecting those in Group B (highlighted yellow).  
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Arguably, a blanket ban (i.e. one which covers everyone) will, because of its breadth, be 
‘rationally connected’ to the objective. Ostensibly, it prevents everyone, including those 
who are vulnerable, from being assisted to die by suicide and, as such, is ‘rationally 
connected’ to the objective of protecting vulnerable individuals. Whether the ban does in 
fact protect such individuals is a separate issue and one which will be explored in greater 
detail below. For now, it is sufficient to note that while the connection between the ban 
and its objective may be ‘tenuous’, ‘in general terms ... a blanket ban on assisting suicide 
will protect the weak and vulnerable’.331  
There is, however, an alternative view which was articulated by Lord Kerr. His Lordship 
held that there was no rational connection on the basis that ‘[i]t is reasonable to assume 
that this “vulnerable class of persons” [which the ban is said to be aimed at protecting] is 
composed of persons who are physically able to commit suicide. Why should they feel 
more vulnerable because those who cannot do so are enabled to bring their lives to an 
end?’332 Lord Kerr thus took a more holistic approach to the examination of rational 
connection and combined Groups A and B into one monolithic group: the ‘vulnerable 
class of persons’ which comprised both those capable of bringing about their own death 
and those who were incapable (see Figure 2 below).  
Group A 
Vulnerable but physically capable of suicide 
+ 
Group B 
Vulnerable and physically incapable of suicide 
Group C 
Not vulnerable and physically capable of 
suicide  
Group D 
Not vulnerable but physically incapable 
of suicide  
Figure 2: Lord Kerr’s conceptualisation of the ban’s rational connection.  
When examined from this perspective, Lord Kerr’s conclusion has some appeal: the State 
provided no evidence that permitting Group D to access assistance in dying by suicide 
would increase the risk of pressure on Group A save for a bald statement to that effect333 
 
331 Nicklinson (n 7) [85] (Lord Neuberger). Lord Neuberger also considered that ‘section 2 is a somewhat 
indirect and blunt instrument in that it is, as a matter of practice, aimed at those who need assistance in 
committing suicide rather than those who are weak and vulnerable’ (ibid).  
332 Nicklinson (n 7) [350] (Lord Kerr). 
333 The absence of evidence should not, however, suggest an absence of argument. The claim that permitting 
assisted suicide would lead to a change in society’s norms such that individuals who are vulnerable but 
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and, when that group is included with Group B – i.e. a monolithic ‘vulnerable’ group 
comprising both those capable and incapable of dying by suicide without assistance – it is 
easier to dismiss the alleged rational connection between the ban and that monolithic, 
vulnerable class of persons.  
However, such an approach seems to have greater force with respect to the ban’s 
proportionality, as included within the monolithic ‘vulnerable’ group are – at least 
potentially – individuals who are incapable of dying by suicide without assistance and who 
are vulnerable to undue influence (i.e. Group B). The sheer breadth of the blanket ban, and 
the corresponding scope of the people ‘caught’ by it, presents a fairly decisive reply to any 
contention that it is not rationally connected to the objective of protecting ‘vulnerable’ 
people. Insofar as the connection depends on the existence of a ‘perceived risk’,334 any 
contention that the blanket ban is not rationally connected to protecting Group B from 
being pressured into taking their lives is difficult to sustain, even if the connection is highly 
‘tenuous’ and even when Groups A and B are combined. Nonetheless, the ‘fairly weak 
connection’ between the ban and its objective is ‘not irrelevant when one turns to [the 
third and fourth] requirements’ of the proportionality analysis.335  
b. Additional objectives post-Conway 
It is arguable that there is a rational connection between a blanket ban on assisted suicide 
and promoting the sanctity of life provided ‘sanctity of life’ is taken to refer to the fact of 
life itself, as distinct from qualitative considerations. If, however, ‘sanctity of life’ is taken 
to have a meaning consistent with that espoused by Lord Kerr in Nicklinson, greater doubt 
attends the question of whether there is a rational connection between a ban that precludes 
capacitous individuals with terminal or degenerative conditions from suiciding with 
assistance and promoting the sanctity of life. As Lord Kerr queried ‘is the sanctity of life 
protected or enhanced by insisting that those who freely wish to but are physically 
incapable of bringing their lives to an end, should be required to endure untold misery 
until a so-called natural death overtakes them?’336 
 
capable of suiciding without assistance would feel increased pressure to do so, has featured in both the 
Parliamentary debates and litigation challenging s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961. See, for instance, Select 
Committee on Medical Ethics (n 19) [26], [239] and, more recently, HC Deb 4 July 2019 (n 11) cols 1426, 
1440. See, also, Nicklinson (n 7) [50] (Lord Neuberger).  
334 Nicklinson (n 7) [171] (Lord Mance). 
335 ibid [111] (Lord Neuberger). 
336 Nicklinson (n 7) [357] (Lord Kerr). 
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Yet, as Lord Kerr himself recognised, questions regarding the appropriate characterisation 
of the ‘sanctity of life’ and whether, in fact, it is secured by a blanket ban on assisted suicide 
are more appropriately considered when examining whether the ban strikes a fair balance 
between competing interests. For now, then, it is sufficient to observe that a ban which 
covers all individuals and, thus, at least ostensibly ‘protects’ all forms of life from assisted 
suicide – regardless of their character and/or quality – is arguably ‘rationally connected’ to 
the objective of protecting morals by virtue of promoting the sanctity of life.  
As for whether the ban is rationally connected to promoting the doctor/patient 
relationship, there is evidence to suggest that allowing terminally ill patients the freedom 
to openly discuss their end of life care by permitting physician assisted suicide better 
promotes trust between patients and doctors since it ensures an open and honest 
dialogue.337 It also has the potential to redirect power away from doctors and back to the 
patients given that they are legally permitted to make plans (and, in some jurisdictions, 
including England and Wales, advance directives) with respect to when their life-sustaining 
treatment should be ceased. That power and control has led some researchers to conclude 
that allowing physician assisted suicide promotes a healthier relationship between doctors 
and patients.338 There is, then, scope for the argument that a blanket ban on assisted suicide 
is not, in fact, rationally connected to the promotion of the doctor/patient relationship. 
There is also, however, a consistent line of argument that allowing doctors to take steps to 
bring about their patients’ deaths is the antithesis to their role and contrary to the 
Hippocratic oath.339 And, as with every system based on human assessment, there is always 
a risk that a doctor will act, whether with mala fides or not, in a way that is deleterious to a 
patient’s interests. There is, then, a ‘perceived risk’ that allowing assisted suicide will 
undermine the doctor/patient relationship and, consequently, the ban can be said to be 
‘rationally connected’ to the objective of promoting the relationship between doctors and 
patients (i.e. protection of health or the rights of others). Whether a blanket ban is necessary 
to secure that objective is an entirely separate question.  
 
337 See, for instance, Ina Otte, Corinna Jung, Bernice Elger and Klaus Bally, ‘“We need to talk!” Barriers to 
GPs’ communication about the option of physician-assisted suicide and their ethical implications: results 
from a qualitative study’ (2017) 20 Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 249. 
338 ibid. 
339 See, for instance, Richard Momeyer, ‘Does Physician Assisted Suicide Violate the Integrity of Medicine?’ 
(1995) 20 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 13; Cheryl Smith, ‘What about Legalised Assisted Suicide?’ (1992-
93) 8 Issues in Law and Medicine 503.  
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3.3.1.3 No less restrictive alternative available? 
The third stage of the domestic proportionality test ‘asks whether the aim could have been 
achieved without significant compromise by some less intrusive measure’?340 That is, is the 
measure in its current iteration ‘necessary’, which depends on ‘whether a lesser measure 
would have achieved, or at the least not, “unacceptably” have compromised, the aim.’341  
a. Protecting vulnerable individuals  
According to the majority in Nicklinson, in order for the ban to be considered 
disproportionate, the Court would have to be satisfied that there was: 
[A] physically and administratively feasible and robust system whereby [individuals] 
could be assisted to kill themselves, and that the reasonable concerns expressed by 
the Secretary of State (particularly the concern to protect the weak and vulnerable) 
were sufficiently met so as to render the absolute ban on suicide disproportionate.342  
Such a contention is wholly inconsistent with the principles underpinning Article 8 of the 
ECHR. Once an applicant has demonstrated that a measure interferes with a right 
protected by the ECHR, if that right is qualified (as is the case with Article 8) the onus 
shifts to the State to prove that the interference is justified.343 It is accepted, following the 
ECtHR decision in Pretty and subsequent case law,344 that the blanket ban on assisted 
suicide in s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 constitutes an interference with the right to private 
life protected by Article 8(1) of the ECHR. That being the case, the onus is on the State 
to demonstrate that the ban is in accordance with law and necessary in a democratic 
society. Insofar as the requirement espoused by the majority in Nicklinson to prove a 
‘physically and administratively feasible and robust system’ suggests that the onus is on the 
applicant alleging incompatibility to establish that there is a less restrictive means available, 
it is plainly erroneous.  
The State bears the onus of proving that the interference is, inter alia, proportionate and 
this includes establishing to the requisite standard of proof that the objective could not  
 
340 Nicklinson (n 7) [171] (Lord Mance).  
341 ibid. 
342 Nicklinson (n 7) [120] (Lord Neuberger) (emphasis added). See, also, [201] (Lord Wilson) and [188] (Lord 
Mance).   
343 See, generally, Parillo v Italy App no 46470/11 (ECtHR, 27 August 2015); Biao v Denmark App no 38590/10 
(ECtHR, 24 May 2016); Mozer v The Republic of Moldova and Russia (Grand Chamber) App no 11138/10 
(ECtHR, 23 February 2016). See, also, for instance, Mary Arden, Human Rights and European Law: Building 
New Legal Orders (OUP 2015), 36; David Hoffman and Jermyn Rowe, Human Rights in the UK: An Introduction 
to the Human Rights Act 1998 (3rd edn, Pearson Education Limited 2010), 116.  
344 See, for instance, Koch (n 174); Gross v Switzerland (2014) 58 EHRR 7; Haas (n 66). 
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‘have been achieved without significant compromise by some less intrusive measure.’345 
Where the evidence is insufficient to enable a finding of proportionality in accordance with 
the domestic proportionality test,346 the State has plainly failed to discharge its onus and 
the interference which the ban poses to the Article 8 right to choose the manner and timing 
of one’s death remains unjustified. Any suggestion that the applicants bear responsibility 
for ‘meeting’ the concerns of the State when the State has failed to meet its burden of 
proving that the ban was proportionate in the first place patently lacks merit; there is no 
presumption of compatibility, no matter how wide the margin of appreciation. And, while 
the margin of appreciation affords a degree of latitude to the State in determining whether 
a measure is necessary, the courts including, ultimately, the ECtHR, retain responsibility 
for making a ‘final evaluation’ of whether the interference is, in fact, necessary.347 Indeed, 
‘the approach of the ECtHR to the question of what margin of appreciation member states 
should be accorded is not mirrored by the exercise which a national court is required to 
carry out in deciding whether an interference with Convention rights is justified’ which 
reaffirms the role of the domestic courts in ascertaining whether the ban is justified.348 In 
sum, the blanket ban must be intrinsically proportionate: ‘If it is disproportionate measured 
by its capacity to achieve its own purpose, it cannot be saved from that condition by the claim 
that a less intrusive restriction that would have excluded the appellants has not been 
articulated.’349 Further, imposing on applicants challenging the ban’s compatibility the 
obligation to provide evidence of a  ‘fully-formed, guaranteed-to-function, less intrusive 
means of achieving the objective’ ‘would herald a significant circumscription of the 
operation of the principle of proportionality generally.’350  
Even if the requirement on the applicants to prove a ‘fully-formed, guaranteed-to-function, 
less intrusive means of achieving the objective’ were valid, it cannot be permissible to 
require applicants to prove that a less intrusive alternative is ‘guaranteed-to-function’ when 
the current measure is not itself ‘guaranteed-to-function’. Notwithstanding the ban, people 
are taking their lives with assistance, both domestically and overseas. As Lord Mance 
acknowledged in Nicklinson, ‘it may be argued that the current blanket prohibition is 
 
345 Nicklinson (n 7) at [171], per Lord Mance. 
346 As was the case for Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance and Lord Wilson in Nicklinson (n 7). See, for instance, 
Nicklinson (n 7) [120] (Lord Neuberger). 
347 Fernandez Martinez (n 159) [125].  
348 R (On the application of Steinfeld and Keidan) v Secretary of State for International Development [2018] 1 WLR 415, 
UKSC 32 [28]. See, also, Re G (n 239) [118]: ‘the doctrine of the “margin of appreciation” as applied by 
Strasbourg has no application in domestic law.’ 
349 Nicklinson (n 7) [354] (Lord Kerr) (emphasis added). 
350 ibid.  
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unnecessary or disproportionate. The present position is that some persons (whether or 
not capable of committing suicide unaided) are assisted to do so (unlawfully though it be) 
without any such prior review [of their vulnerability].’351 The fact that people are already 
taking their lives by suicide with assistance was also recognised by Lord Neuberger, who 
observed that ‘between 1998 and 2011, a total of 215 people from the UK used [Dignitas’s] 
services, and ... nobody providing assistance in that connection has been prosecuted.’352 
Similarly, Lord Hope noted in Purdy that: 
A number of other people have already made the journey to countries where 
assisted suicide is lawful, and those who have assisted them have not been 
prosecuted. Your Lordships were told that by the time of the hearing [2 June 2009] 
there had been 115 such cases. Of those cases only eight had been referred to the 
Director for a decision as to whether or not the assistants should be prosecuted. 
In all but two of them the decision not to prosecute had been taken on the ground 
that there was insufficient evidence.353 
Records indicate that, as at 2018, over 400 British members of Dignitas have been 
‘accompanied’ to a clinic in Switzerland where they have subsequently died by suicide with 
assistance.354 These figures only cover those individuals who were accompanied to a 
Dignitas clinic in Switzerland. They do not include the numbers of individuals using other 
bodies in Switzerland which provide assistance to non-citizens to die nor do they cover 
the numbers of people who are assisted to suicide in England and Wales. As the sentencing 
judge in Desai made abundantly clear, there are cases which might otherwise fall within the 
remit of s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 or, indeed, constitute murder, which are not (properly, 
in his Honour’s opinion based on CPS practice) prosecuted. Indeed, as outlined above, the 
latest statistics from the CPS reveal that while 152 cases have been referred by police as 
assisted suicides, only three cases have been ‘successfully prosecuted’ under s 2.355 Plainly, 
a very significant number of cases which are classified as assisted suicide are not prosecuted 
(at least 86 per cent of the cases referred). People are, thus, being assisted to varying extents 
to die by suicide both domestically and internationally, notwithstanding the ban.  
In addition to the fact that the ban does not stop people dying by suicide with assistance, 
there are fundamental problems with the way in which the ban allegedly achieves the 
 
351 Nicklinson (n 7) [186] (Lord Mance). 
352 ibid [48] (Lord Neuberger).  
353 Purdy (n 7) [30] (Lord Hope). 
354 Dignitas (n 6).  
355 CPS (n 248). 
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objective of protecting vulnerable individuals. Given the ban, the only ‘formal’ assessment 
of vulnerability that occurs in cases of individuals dying by suicide with assistance in 
England and Wales is an ex post facto examination undertaken by police and possibly the 
CPS in those cases which come to their attention and, in the even fewer number of cases 
that are prosecuted, the courts. Such a system plainly does not protect vulnerable 
individuals. And while clinics in Switzerland such as Dignitas have their own processes in 
place to protect vulnerable individuals (individuals seeking assistance must make a 
‘reasoned request’)356 there is no oversight beyond the organisation’s own internal 
procedures (the position in the Benelux jurisdictions is different for a number of reasons 
including the fact that there are regulatory bodies which provide an additional layer of, ex 
post facto, oversight). The ban in England and Wales thus precludes an examination of the 
individual’s capacity and whether they are acting as a result of undue pressure before they 
suicide. What the preceding reveals in stark detail is that, notwithstanding the blanket ban 
on assisted suicide, people are dying by suicide with assistance both in England and Wales 
and overseas. And in those cases, it is not possible to determine with certainty if any were 
vulnerable to the pressure which the ban is said to be necessary to protect against or, 
indeed, how many were acting because of that pressure since, at least in England and 
Wales, no independent individuals or bodies are tasked with assessing the specific 
individual’s reasons and competence before they die. Leaving aside its dubious legal validity, 
the unfairness of expecting applicants challenging the compatibility of the ban with the 
ECHR to provide evidence of a ‘guaranteed-to-function’ alternative to a ban which is not, 
itself, ‘guaranteed-to-function’ is manifest.  
Even if the apparent need to prove a fully formed alternative was valid, there is nothing to 
suggest that the vulnerability which the ban is said to be directed at could not be protected 
against by the medical profession which is well accustomed to dealing with vulnerable 
patients, including when providing end-of-life care. To examine this issue in detail it is first 
necessary to determine what the ‘vulnerability’ is which the State contends can only be 
protected against by way of a blanket ban. The following extract from Lord Sumption’s 
judgment in Nicklinson aptly describes that vulnerability: 
 
356 There is also an ‘in-depth evaluation of the member’s written request and medical information’ and ‘at 
least two face-to-face meetings with the member’: Dignitas, ‘Brochure of Dignitas: Legal assistance for 
suicide with Dignitas’ 
<http://dignitas.ch/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=22&Itemid=62&lang=en> 
(accessed 31 July 2019). 
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The problem is not that people may decide to kill themselves who are not fully 
competent mentally. I am prepared to accept that mental competence is capable of 
objective assessment by health professionals. The real difficulty is that even the 
mentally competent may have reasons for deciding to kill themselves which reflect 
either overt pressure upon them by others or their own assumptions about what 
others may think or expect. The difficulty is particularly acute in the case of what 
the Commission on Assisted Dying called ‘indirect social pressure’. This refers to 
the problems arising from the low self-esteem of many old or severely ill and 
dependent people, combined with the spontaneous and negative perceptions of 
patients about the views of those around them ... It is one thing to assess some 
one’s mental ability to form a judgment, but another to discover their true reasons 
for the decision which they have made and to assess the quality of those reasons. 
I very much doubt whether it is possible in the generality of cases to distinguish 
between those who have spontaneously formed the desire to kill themselves and 
those who have done so in response to real or imagined pressure arising from the 
impact of their disabilities on other people. 
Leaving aside the fact that an increasing number of jurisdictions (including those with 
rights documents which enshrine the right to life) have determined that it is possible to 
distinguish between those cases in which the ‘desire’ to kill oneself has arisen free from 
pressure and those in which the desire is a ‘response to real or imagined pressure arising 
from the impact of their [condition] on other people’, the more pressing flaw in Lord 
Sumption’s reasons concerns the fact that that assessment is central to the existing end-
of-life ‘system’ in England and Wales. However, instead of being able to directly question 
the individual seeking assistance to suicide and test their motives before they die – as occurs 
when a capacitous individual seeks withdrawal of/refuses life-sustaining treatment – the 
blanket ban on assisted suicide restricts the police, CPS and courts to an ex post facto 
examination of the evidence which, in the vast majority of cases, is unlikely to involve 
evidence of the sort obtained by doctors and other professionals in those jurisdictions 
which permit assisted suicide and, thus, involve an ex ante facto examination of the 
individual’s motives.357 Arguably then, the fears of Lord Sumption – which sit at the core 
of the opposition to permitting assisted suicide358 – are misplaced. Plainly, a system which 
entails direct assessment of the individual seeking assistance, including their reasons for 
 
357 See, for instance, Victoria’s Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2017, Divisions 4-6.  
358 As summarised in Keown (n 16).  
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wanting to die, is better able to achieve the aim of protecting potentially vulnerable 
individuals than the present situation. Certainly, an ex ante facto assessment of the individual 
by appropriately qualified professionals would be more likely to identify those who are 
vulnerable to undue pressure than an ex post facto assessment which, even if it were to reveal 
that the individual was acting as a result of undue influence, has patently failed to protect 
them.  
Moreover, even if the fears expressed by Lord Sumption were well placed, in the absence 
of any evidence to the contrary, the pressure which the ban is said to protect against – 
namely, the ‘real or imagined pressure arising from the impact of [the individual’s 
condition] on other people’ – must necessarily exist for individuals who suffer from similar 
conditions but who are receiving life-sustaining treatment. Indeed, a person’s concerns 
regarding ‘the impact of their disabilities on other people’ may well inform their decision 
to discontinue life-sustaining treatment and must be respected by their treating physicians 
provided they do not reflect undue influence. The Supreme Court has confirmed that such 
concerns, insofar as they are discernible, must be taken into account when determining an 
incapacitous patient’s best interests.359 As was observed by Charles J in Briggs (which 
concerned withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment of an incapacitious patient): 
[T]he factors that will give indications as to what the individual ... wants include the 
interests of other people who [the patient] would have been likely to take into account and so, 
for example, many if not most [of the patients] when they had capacity would have 
taken into account their relationships with others (e.g. spouse and children), how 
they think they their children should be parented and the impact on those closest to them 
of what they decide to do.360 
It would be wholly unrealistic to assume that the decisions made by capacitous individuals 
to cease life-sustaining treatment are not, in at least some circumstances, affected by 
concerns regarding the impact their illness has on those around them. Indeed, as the 
preceding extract from Briggs demonstrates, such concerns, provided they can be 
ascertained from the available evidence, are relevant to an assessment of whether the 
continuation of life-sustaining treatment is in an incapacitous patient’s best interests. That 
being the case – that individuals who make decisions regarding life-sustaining treatment 
 
359 Law Commission, Mental Incapacity (Law Com No 231, 28 February 1995) [3.31]: ‘altruistic sentiments 
and concern for others’, which formed the basis of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and which was cited in 
James (n 111) [24]. 
360 Briggs (n 38) [56] (emphasis added).  
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may well be ‘afraid that their lives have become a burden to those around them’ or, at the 
least, are ‘acutely conscious that their disabilities make them dependent on others’ and are 
permitted to act on those concerns by refusing life-sustaining treatment – it is difficult to 
reconcile the fact that the law recognises (and protects) the right of capacitous patients to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment even if they are doing so because of concerns regarding 
their being a burden on others, while the blanket ban on assisted suicide is said to be 
directed at preventing such individuals (i.e. those acting as a result of concerns about being 
a burden) from acting on that concern. In the absence of any reasons not only in the case 
law but also in Parliamentary debate and academic literature to suggest that the former 
individuals are ‘less vulnerable’ than the latter, the claim that a blanket ban is necessary to 
protect the latter from acting on concerns which the former are fully entitled to act upon 
– including by way of bringing about their death – is dubious and paternalistic in the 
extreme.  
In addition, vulnerability is not a novel issue in the context of medical treatment. It is a 
factor which is directly relevant to a doctor’s assessment of whether a patient’s consent to 
treatment is valid, including in situations involving withdrawal/refusal of life-sustaining 
treatment.361 Voluntariness is central to informed consent: pressure that amounts to undue 
influence will vitiate consent for the purposes of medical treatment.362 As Lord Donaldson 
in Re T observed in the context of capacity to refuse treatment: 
In some cases doctors will not only have to consider the capacity of the patient to 
refuse treatment, but also whether the refusal has been vitiated because it resulted 
not from the patient’s will, but from the will of others. It matters not that those 
others sought, however strongly, to persuade the patient to refuse, so long as in 
the end the refusal represented the patient’s independent decision. If, however, his 
will was overborne, the refusal will not have represented a true decision. In this 
context the relationship of the persuader to the patient, for example, spouse, 
parents or religious adviser, will be important, because some relationships more 
readily lend themselves to overbearing the patient’s independent will than do 
others.363 
 
361 Guidance provided by the British Medical Association regarding consent provides: ‘Doctors must respect 
a refusal of treatment if the patient is an adult who is competent, properly informed and is not being coerced’. 
BMA, ‘Consent tool kit: 2 – General information’ (6 June 2016) 
<https://www.bma.org.uk/advice/employment/ethics/consent/consent-tool-kit/2-general-information> 
accessed 31 July 2019.  
362 See, for instance, Re T (n 30), 108. 
363 Ibid, 116. 
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In the same decision, Lady Butler-Sloss noted that: 
 [I]t has long been recognised that an influence may be subtle, insidious, pervasive 
and where religious beliefs are involved especially powerful. It may also be 
powerful between close relatives where one may be in a dominant position vis-à-
vis the other.364  
There is, however, no presumption that certain patients are going to be subject to such 
influence merely because of their condition. Rather, whether influence or pressure has 
vitiated informed consent depends on the specific circumstances of a given patient 
including the source of the influence/pressure and the relationship between the patient 
and the influencer. Being terminally ill does not ipso facto render a patient ‘vulnerable’ to 
such influences. Doctors are required to ensure, as far as is practicable, that consent to any 
medical treatment in any given case has not been vitiated by undue influence. A patient 
may be more susceptible to such influence because of their condition. But, likewise, they 
may also be more susceptible because of the relationship between them and the influencer. 
Equally as likely is the possibility that they are not susceptible to undue influence. 
Regardless, doctors are required to be attuned to such influence when ascertaining whether 
a patient’s request to cease or their refusal of life-sustaining treatment is the result of undue 
influence such as to vitiate their informed consent. Presumably, then, doctors would be 
capable of ascertaining whether a patient’s request for assistance in dying was the result of 
undue influence. Certainly, doctors providing end-of-life care are already required to 
ensure that their patients’ consent is not vitiated by the pressure identified by Lord 
Sumption in the quote above.  
As the preceding demonstrates, the ‘vulnerability’ which the ban is said to protect against 
is not unique to the assisted suicide context; it pervades medicine generally, including end-
of-life care. In that context, feelings of being a burden or, more generally, concerns 
regarding the impact of one’s condition on family members and loved ones, have been 
recognised both by the courts and the medical profession, as being factors relevant to – 
and, thus, requiring respect when considering – a decision to cease/withdraw life-
sustaining treatment. In the absence of reasons and/or evidence illustrating how 
individuals who seek assistance in dying by suicide are uniquely vulnerable, it must be the 
case that Lord Sumption’s concerns are, in fact, directed at undue influence, something 
which the medical profession is acutely familiar with and required to protect against in all 
 
364 Re T (n 30), 120.  
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instances of medical treatment. Insofar as his Lordship does, in fact, contend that the ban 
on assisted suicide is necessary because the State must protect people from their valid 
concerns regarding the impact of their condition on loved ones, it reflects a paternalism 
that is unsupported by any evidence cited by his Lordship beyond the bald assertion that 
‘[t]here is a good deal of evidence that this problem exists’ (which was made in respect of 
both direct and indirect pressure). Given that such pressures must necessarily exist for 
individuals with similar conditions who are receiving life-sustaining treatment, there is no 
justification for respecting a decision by such an individual to cease life-sustaining 
treatment even when that individual’s decision is motivated by concerns regarding the 
impact of their condition on loved ones – provided those concerns do not evidence undue 
influence – while denying other individuals with similar conditions who are not receiving 
life-sustaining treatment the ability to act upon such concerns by way of assisted suicide.  
The preceding discussion reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the ban’s objective 
in respect to vulnerable individuals which is reflected in Lord Sumption’s reasons in 
Nicklinson extracted above. The legitimate aim of the ban is not to protect capacitous 
individuals from feeling that they are burden. Such a contention reflects a paternalism that 
has no place in a society that respects autonomy and self-determination. Rather, the ban’s 
aim is to protect individuals who are vulnerable to undue influence from acting as a result 
of such influence. Or, as Lord Mance opined, to protect those individuals who ‘might ... 
be persuaded or convince themselves that they should undertake [assisted suicide], when 
they would not otherwise do so.’365 Indeed, the Scottish Court of Sessions explicitly recognised 
this in the judgment of Ross wherein the Court held that it is ‘well established that the 
interference [posed by s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961] did have a legitimate aim; viz. the 
protection of the vulnerable from undue influence, or other acts that would circumvent their 
will.’366 There is nothing to suggest that medical practitioners could not apply the 
techniques they already employ when ascertaining whether a patient is acting under undue 
influence to ensure that a patient seeking assistance in dying by suicide is not doing so in 
circumstances where they ‘would not otherwise do so.’ There is nothing in the reasons of 
the majority in Nicklinson to indicate that the State had demonstrated that only a blanket 
ban could protect against such pressure given the medical profession’s existing familiarity 
in dealing with it in other end-of-life contexts. Certainly, the CPS’s de facto authorisation of 
benevolent assisted suicide by loved ones reflects the fact that this ‘vulnerability’ can be 
 
365 Nicklinson (n 7) [171] (Lord Mance) (emphasis added).  
366 Ross (n 40) [6].  
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adequately protected against by a less restrictive measure. Further, there was no 
consideration by the majority in Nicklinson or indeed the Divisional High Court in Conway 
of whether an ex post facto assessment of vulnerability – which is what the present system 
involves – better secures the ban’s objective than an ex ante facto examination of the 
individual seeking assistance and their reasons for doing so. In those circumstances, it is 
difficult to maintain the argument that a blanket ban, as distinct from one which permits 
certain exceptions (i.e. one that reflects the reality in England and Wales as a result of the 
CPS’s discretion), is the ‘least restrictive means available’ to protect individuals from what 
are, in reality, concerns regarding undue influence.  
This conclusion is consistent with the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Re Y367 
which confirmed that there is no statutory or common law obligation to obtain judicial 
consent to withdraw life-sustaining treatment from incapacitous patients when there is 
agreement between family and treating physicians. While the State argued that such 
authorisation was necessary in all cases involving such patients for the obligations under, 
inter alia, Article 8 of the ECHR to be complied with, the Supreme Court determined that 
the existing statutory and regulatory system provided sufficient protections for individuals 
who are undeniably extremely vulnerable. While such individuals are incapable of refusing 
further treatment and are thus not directly vulnerable to undue influence, their family 
members or others charged with making decisions regarding their medical treatment may 
nonetheless be acting with the motivations which would lead them to exert such influence 
on a capacitous patient. The Supreme Court’s finding in Re Y confirms that the medical 
profession is well placed to protect patients from undue influence, however it manifests.  
In sum, the contention that a blanket ban is necessary to protect individuals vulnerable to 
undue influence or, alternatively, that there is no lesser measure which would not 
‘unacceptably’ compromise the aim, is difficult to sustain given that: 
• Individuals are already accessing assistance in dying by suicide, both 
internationally and domestically; 
• As opposed to being an impossibility (as claimed by Lord Sumption in Nicklinson 
and the Divisional High Court in Conway), the present system already requires an 
(albeit ex post facto) examination of vulnerability by the police, CPS and courts  
• Such an ex post facto examination will, in the vast majority of cases, fail to include 
evidence that would be available if the examination was ex ante facto including, in 
 
367 Re Y (n 35). 
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particular, as assessment of the reasons for the individual seeking assistance to die 
by suicide; 
• The ‘vulnerability’ which the ban is said to protect against pervades medicine more 
generally, and in particular end-of-life care, and is protected against by doctors 
ensuring consent is freely given and not vitiated by undue influence.   
These factors demonstrate that there is a less restrictive means available, namely a legal 
system which reflects the de facto system of benevolent assistance of loved ones who have 
terminal or life-limiting conditions or are elderly, which exists in England and Wales as a 
result of the exercise of the CPS’s discretion. These factors also have relevance for the 
fourth requirement of the domestic proportionality test, namely, ‘identifying what the 
measure achieves and balancing this against the consequences for other interests.’368 Before 
considering that issue, however, the necessity of the additional objectives identified by the 
Conway High Court must be examined.  
b. Additional aims post-Conway 
A number of the factors considered above which are relevant to an assessment of whether 
the blanket ban is necessary to protect vulnerable individuals are similarly relevant to an 
examination of whether the blanket ban is necessary to promote the sanctity of life and to 
protect the doctor/patient relationship.  
Commencing with the objective of promoting the ‘sanctity of life’, it is important to 
consider what is meant by that phrase. As discussed in Chapter One, the sanctity of life, 
while a fundamental principle in English law, is not absolute. It can, and does, give way to 
considerations of autonomy, dignity and self-determination, particularly in the context of 
decisions by capacitous patients (and incapacitous patients who have made a valid advance 
directive) to cease/refuse life-sustaining treatment. As the Grand Chamber observed in 
Lambert, quality of life considerations – which are typically considered under Article 8 of 
the ECHR – take on significance under Article 2 of the ECHR when considering whether 
a State has complied with its positive obligation to protect individuals in the context of 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.369 That observation reflects the fact that sanctity 
of life considerations are not absolute and the obligation to protect life does not prevail in 
circumstances in which a person’s quality of life is such that ongoing treatment is inimical 
to their best interests. Recognising the importance of sanctity of life considerations does 
 
368 Nicklinson (n 7) [171] (Lord Mance).  
369 Lambert (n 172) [142]-[143].  
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not lead to a presumption favouring the preservation of life for its own sake.370 And, again, 
it must be queried whether ‘the sanctity of life is protected or enhanced by insisting that 
those who freely wish to but are physically incapable of bringing their lives to an end, 
should be required to endure untold misery until a so-called ‘natural death’ overtakes 
them?’371 The evidence cited in Chapters Two and Three on Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR 
clearly demonstrates that in the case of some individuals, such as Noel Conway, Omid T, 
Tony Nicklinson and Diane Pretty, the ban does not secure their sanctity of life. If the 
blanket ban does not secure the sanctity of life of individuals who are compelled to suicide 
prematurely or whose quality of life is (or will be) significantly diminished, whether because 
of a terminal or degenerative illness or because they are elderly or otherwise suffering 
intolerably as a result of a life-limiting or similar disease, then it is failing to meet its 
objective and is a disproportionate interference with the Article 8 rights of those 
individuals. So much appears to be reflected in the practical application of the ban and the 
CPS’s practice of not prosecuting ‘compassionate, amateur assistance’ of the terminally ill 
and/or elderly by loved ones.372 That practice strongly suggests that there is a less intrusive 
means of securing the objective of protecting the sanctity of life of all individuals, while 
also ensuring that individuals such as Noel Conway, Omid T and Diane Pretty are able to 
exercise their right to choose the manner and timing of their death. When that is 
considered in light of the extensive experience the medical profession has in identifying 
patients acting under undue influence, it is clear that the blanket ban is not the least 
restrictive means available of securing the aim of protecting morals by protecting the 
sanctity of life.  
As for the objective of protecting the doctor/patient relationship, as the examination 
above reveals, doctors who treat terminally ill patients or patients receiving life-sustaining 
treatment will likely encounter a situation in which they are required to oversee (or 
perform) the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. Similarly, a key – albeit controversial 
– aspect of palliative care is palliative sedation.373 To suggest, then, that doctors are not 
 
370 See, for instance, An NHS Trust v H [2012] EWHC B18 (Fam) at [35].  
371 Nicklinson (n 7) [357] (Lord Kerr).  
372 Starmer (n 284). 
373 See, for instance, Bert Broeckaert, ‘Palliative Sedation, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Euthanasia: “Same, 
Same but Different?”’ (2011) 11 American Journal of Bioethics 62; Nathan Cherny and Lukas Radbruch, 
‘European Association for Palliative Care recommended framework for the use of sedation in palliative care’ 
(2009) 23 Palliative Medicine 581, 581; National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, ‘Guideline NG31’  
(n 36); Lukas Radbruch, Carlo Leget, Patrick Bahr, Christof Müller-Busch, John Ellershaw, Franco de Conno 
and Paul Vanden, ‘Euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide: A white paper from the European Association 
of Palliative Care’ (2016) 30 Palliative Medicine 104, 111. 
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already engaged in end-of-life practices is nonsense. There is, however, the legal artifice by 
which acts that comprise the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment (for instance, removal 
of artificial ventilation, nutrition and/or hydration) are considered ‘omissions’ to ensure 
that doctors are not liable for murder.374 And the doctrine of double effect operates to 
insulate doctors from culpability even when the act they engage in undoubtedly leads to, 
or at the least hastens, the patient’s death.375 Regardless of how such conduct is legally 
classified, the reality is that doctors, particularly those treating terminally ill patients, are 
regularly engaged in acts which cause or, at the very least, hasten the patient’s death. Insofar 
as the argument is that in such cases doctors do not do those acts (or ‘omit’ to act) with 
the intention of bringing about the patient’s death, there is research which plainly reveals 
that doctors do in fact withdraw treatment and palliatively sedate patients with the express 
intention of bringing about their deaths.376 Such research has also revealed that doctors 
engage in that conduct without the patient’s involvement/prior knowledge.377 Arguably, a 
system in which patients are able to have open and honest conversations with their doctors 
about their end-of-life care, including at which point in their deterioration they would like 
to be palliatively sedated or, indeed, to die, would be more conducive to securing a trusting 
and efficacious doctor/patient relationship than the current system in which doctors can 
make unilateral decisions regarding the patient’s end-of-life care.378 It is arguable, then, that 
the blanket ban is not the least restrictive means possible of securing the ban’s objective of 
protective the doctor/patient relationship. This is bolstered by the recent poll by the Royal 
College of Physicians discussed above which revealed an increase in support amongst the 
members polled for a change to the law on assisted dying in England and Wales. Arguably, 
in adopting a neutral position, the College’s official position is that assisted dying does not 
damage the doctor/patient relationship.   
 
374 See, for instance, Bland (n 31).   
375 Pursuant to the ‘doctrine of double effect’, doctors are not liable for a patient’s death, even if through the 
administration of pain relieving medication they bring about (or hasten) a patient’s death, provided they have 
acted in order to address a patient’s symptoms without the intention of bringing about their death: see, for 
instance, Adams [1957] Criminal Law Review 365 cited by Suzanne Ost, ‘Euthanasia and the defence of 
necessity: advocating a more appropriate legal response’ (2005) Criminal Law Review 355.  
376 Clive Seale, ‘National survey of end-of-life decisions made by UK medical practitioners’ (2006) 20 Palliative 
Medicine 3; Clive Seale, ‘End-of-life decisions in the UK involving medical practitioners’ (2009) 23 Palliative 
Medicine 198.  
377 ibid.  
378 Samia Hurst and Alex Mauron, ‘The ethics of palliative care and euthanasia: exploring common values’ 
(2006) 20 Palliative Medicine 107, 108. See, also, Louise Campbell, ‘Current debates about legislating for 
assisted suicide: ethical concerns’ (2018) 24 MLJI 20.  
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3.3.1.4 Fair balance?  
Protecting vulnerable individuals from undue influence, securing the sanctity of life and 
protecting the doctor/patient relationship are lofty objectives and, as the domestic case 
law demonstrates, are quite difficult to argue against. However, when one looks at what 
the blanket ban actually achieves (the task required by this step of the domestic 
proportionality test379), the narrative fundamentally shifts. Returning to Figure 1, it is 
apparent that the ban: 
• Prevents individuals in each group from exercising their Article 8(1) right to choose 
the manner and timing of their death by way of assisted suicide;  
• Does not prevent individuals in any of the groups, including Groups A and B (i.e. 
those who are vulnerable), from dying by suicide without assistance; 
• Does not prevent individuals in any of the groups, including Groups A and B, 
travelling to permissive jurisdictions such as Switzerland to die by suicide with 
assistance;  
• Does not, in fact, prevent individuals in any of the groups from dying by suicide 
with assistance in the UK.  
The ban, thus, ‘condemn[s] ... [individuals who would die by suicide with assistance if it 
were permitted] to a life bereft of pleasure or quality’ while not necessarily securing its 
objective of protecting individuals who may be vulnerable to undue influence.380  
Lord Sumption considered that ‘The real question [at this stage of the proportionality test] 
... is how much risk to the vulnerable we are prepared to accept in this area in order to 
facilitate suicide by the invulnerable.’381 Given the real impact of the present ban, there is 
a strong argument that a less extensive ban (i.e. one which reflects practical implementation 
of the law as a result of the exercise of the CPS’s discretion) with attendant safeguards 
aimed at ensuring that individuals are not acting under undue influence (which, as noted 
above, is a requirement familiar to medicine generally) will pose a lesser risk than the 
existing blanket ban. Certainly, the balancing act is not as one-sided as the majority’s 
reasons in Nicklinson and the judgments of the High Court and the Court of Appeal in 
Conway suggest.  
 
379 Nicklinson (n 7) [168] (Lord Mance).  
380 Nicklinson (n 7) [336] (Lord Kerr).  
381 ibid [229] (Lord Sumption) (emphasis added).  
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As discussed above, the ban is not stopping people taking their lives with assistance both 
in England and Wales and internationally. And, in the absence of a system which requires 
inquiries into the individual’s motivations for seeking assistance to die by suicide before they 
take their own lives, there is no way of knowing, beyond inferences made during an ex post 
facto assessment, if any of those individuals were acting as a result of undue influence.  
Further, given the absence of a central database (and the fact that suicide conclusions are 
not regularly publicly reported), it is not possible to ascertain how many of the 6,507 people 
who died by suicide in 2018 (the latest available data from the Office for National Statistics) 
took their lives as a result of terminal illness or unbearable suffering and would have availed 
themselves of assistance if it were permitted instead of being compelled to take their lives 
by means which may be extremely traumatic for them and their loved ones and by no 
means guaranteed to be effective. It is unrealistic to assume, however, that terminal illness 
and/or unbearable suffering was not a motivating factor in at least some of the almost 
6,500 cases of suicide in 2018. The cases of Pretty, Purdy, Nicklinson, Conway and Omid T 
provide irrefutable evidence of the fact that there are individuals in the UK who have a 
terminal illness or are otherwise suffering unbearably as a result of a life-limiting or similar 
condition and would, if they could, avail themselves of assisted suicide if it were permitted. 
There is also evidence of people suiciding prematurely to avoid a prolonged, painful or 
undignified death.382 Further, in the absence of a system which requires an ex ante facto 
inquiry into the individual’s reasons, there is no way of knowing if any of those individuals 
who took their lives by suicide in 2018 did so as a result of undue influence.  
Separate chapters have also revealed that the ban forces some individuals to take their lives 
prematurely (in violation of Article 2 of the ECHR) and subjects some individuals to ill-
treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR. When one examines what the ban achieves 
vis-à-vis the catastrophic impact it has on individuals who would seek assistance if 
permitted, the contention that the blanket ban is proportionate to its objectives loses much, 
if not all, of its force. The ban does not stop people from dying by suicide with assistance. 
Rather, it forces individuals overseas or puts them and their loved ones in an exceedingly 
difficult situation domestically given that they must secure a means of bringing about their 
death (generally by way of unlawfully procuring pentobarbital or other similar barbiturate) 
and then their ‘assister’ is left to face potential prosecution under s 2 of the Suicide Act 
1961 (which, while exceedingly rare, is nevertheless a risk). Similar difficulties confront 
 
382 See, in this respect, Chapters Two and Three.  
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those individuals who would die by suicide with assistance if it were permitted but, as a 
result of the ban, take their own lives without assistance. This often involves use  of 
methods that pose tremendous risk of (potentially further) catastrophic injury if 
unsuccessful in bringing about the individual’s death (for instance, hypoxic brain injury as 
a result of near hanging).383 And, in some cases, the individual is compelled to take their 
life sooner than they would choose to before they lose the ability to do so unaided. That 
is dealing only with those individuals who, despite the ban, nevertheless attempt to bring 
about their death by suicide. The ban also has the effect of forcing individuals such as Ms 
Petty, Ms Purdy, Mr Nicklinson and Mr Conway, to live in conditions which they consider 
inimical to their dignity and autonomy and which, in some cases, constitutes ill-treatment 
contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR.384 The ban also significantly curtails conversations 
between patients and their doctors regarding their end-of-life care. And that, in turn, has 
a deleterious impact on patients.  
There is, then, a very strong argument that the blanket ban fails to strike a fair balance 
‘between, on the one hand, the rights of those who wish to, but who are physically 
incapable of, bringing their lives to an end [or, indeed, those who can suicide but would 
prefer to do so assisted, in a controlled and safe manner] and, on the other, the interests 
of the community as a whole.’385 Insofar as the argument is that the blanket ban strikes the 
appropriate balance given that against the rights of those seeking assistance is the ‘sanctity 
of life’ of others, it is questionable whether the sanctity of life is protected or enhanced by 
a ban which precludes those individuals who freely wish but are physically unable to bring 
their lives to an end. Arguably, to force such individuals to ‘continue to endure the misery 
that is their lot is not to champion the sanctity of life; it is to coerce them to endure 
unspeakable suffering.’386 Further, if the sanctity of life cannot justify a ban on suicide by 
the able-bodied (which was decriminalised by the Suicide Act 1961), ‘it is difficult to see 
how it can justify prohibiting a physically incapable person from seeking assistance to bring 
about the end of their life.’387 And, that is to say nothing of the treatment of sanctity of life 
concerns elsewhere in medical law, which has been discussed at length above.  
 
383 The most common means of suicide is hanging, suffocation and strangulation (all grouped together) with 
poisoning the second most common: Office for National Statistics, ‘Suicides in the UK’ (n 118).  
384 See, Chapter Three. 
385 Nicklinson (n 7) [357] (Lord Kerr).  
386 ibid [358] (Lord Kerr).  
387 Nicklinson (n 7) [358] (Lord Kerr).  
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The preceding analysis leads to the conclusion that the blanket ban is neither necessary 
nor proportionate as was, in fact, recognised by Lord Kerr in Nicklinson.388 The absence of 
a ‘guaranteed-to-function’ alternative does not alter the fact that the ban fails to achieve its 
objectives in the manner required to be justifiable under Article 8(2) of the ECHR not 
least since the present ban is not itself guaranteed-to-function. Even if that requirement 
was legally valid, as the ensuing chapter reveals, the evidence from permissive jurisdictions 
clearly demonstrates that, insofar as ‘guaranteed-to-function’ is taken to mean that the risks 
which the ban is said to protect against do not materialise, there are ‘guaranteed-to-
function’ alternatives to the current blanket ban. And those alternatives meet both the 
third and fourth requirements of the domestic proportionality test: they are less restrictive 
and do not significantly compromise the legitimate aims, and they strike a fairer balance 
between the competing rights.  
4. Rectifying the incompatibility  
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that the current blanket ban on assisted suicide is 
incompatible with Article 8 of the ECHR. It is not the least restrictive means possible of 
achieving any of the aims espoused by the various domestic courts and it fails to strike a 
fair balance between the competing interests. As for what is necessary to rectify the 
incompatibility, there is presently a de facto system in which benevolent assistance of a loved 
one who is terminally ill, elderly or suffering intolerably as a result of a life-limiting 
condition is, if not permitted, then condoned given the CPS’s practice of not prosecuting 
such cases of assistance. Such a system is not, however, practicable for a number of 
reasons. As discussed above, such an ad hoc system which is based on an ex post facto 
assessment of the evidence fails to protect individuals who are acting as a result of undue 
influence. Further, there is no guidance as to what form of assistance is permitted and who 
is eligible. The sentencing reasons in Desai suggest that conduct which constitutes 
euthanasia could, and indeed, should be permitted in some instances. Yet, Mr Desai was 
successfully prosecuted. Likewise, Mr Gazeley was convicted of manslaughter based on 
diminished responsibility after smothering his terminally ill wife, notwithstanding her 
repeated requests for assistance in dying.389 A de jure system regulating assistance will best 
comply with the requirements of Article 8 of the ECHR and secure the objectives of the 
present ban. The question is what such a system should look like.  
 
388 ibid at [358] (Lord Kerr).  
389 Gazeley (n 136).  
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Based on the current practice of the CPS, certain individuals should be able to receive 
assistance from someone close to them (i.e. individuals who are not acting in a professional 
capacity) to travel to a permissive jurisdiction such as Switzerland to die by assisted suicide. 
In such cases, individuals like Omid T and Daniel James would be able to travel to those 
countries without fear that their loved ones may face prosecution for assisting them (or, 
alternatively, encouraging them) to die by suicide. The question, then, is who should be able 
to receive such assistance. Allowing individuals with terminal conditions to be able to 
receive such assistance would not compromise the objective of protecting the sanctity of 
life since, as discussed above, sanctity of life concerns regularly give way to self-
determination and autonomy, as well as quality of life considerations, in cases involving 
terminally ill individuals. Likewise, individuals receiving life-sustaining treatment (but who 
are not terminally ill) also ought to be permitted to receive assistance to travel overseas 
since, consistent with authorities such as Re B,390 the self-determination and autonomy of 
those individuals takes precedence over sanctity of life considerations. Finally, qualitative 
considerations, together with the sentencing remarks in Desai, suggest that elderly 
individuals who are suffering intolerably as a result of infirmity or other geriatric 
syndromes should also be permitted assistance in travelling to permissive jurisdictions. But 
that only addresses relatively minor ‘assistance’ and ignores the practicalities of terminally 
ill individuals or those receiving life-sustaining treatment getting overseas, as well as 
financial constraints. The same considerations, in particular the importance of self-
determination and autonomy and assessments of a person’s quality of life, favour a system 
in which doctors are permitted to prescribe lethal doses of medication such as 
pentobarbital, which a capacitous patient can take themselves. Consistent with CPS policy 
and existing medical practice, individuals who are terminally ill or whose quality of life is 
deleteriously affected by a life-limiting or similar condition (for instance, a person in a 
similar situation as Tony Nicklinson, Daniel James or Omid T) should be permitted access 
to assistance if compatibility with Article 8 of the ECHR is to be secured. But individuals 
like Daniel James and/or Tony Nicklinson cannot take the ‘final step’ (i.e. ingestion of the 
medication) for an act to constitute what is traditionally understood to be ‘suicide’.  
If the definition of suicide distilled in Chapter Six is correct, the medical system has a long 
history of assisting patients to die by suicide through the withdrawal of life-sustaining 
 
390 Re B (n 33).  
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treatment.391 If that definition is correct, then permitting doctors to administer lethal doses 
of medication to individuals such as Tony Nicklinson who have the capacity to consent to 
such treatment and who are not acting under undue influence is not so far removed from 
the realms of their existing ‘treatment’ practices as to render the ban on that form of 
conduct compatible with Article 8 of the ECHR. The same considerations with respect to 
sanctity of life concerns apply equally to these patients; as Lord Kerr put it in Nicklinson 
they are ‘condemned to a life bereft of pleasure or quality’.392 Arguably, their conditions, 
particularly for an individual like Tony Nicklinson who suffered from locked-in syndrome 
and thus had little to no control over his day-to-day existence, exemplify the benefit of a 
system in which they can openly discuss their end-of-life care with their treating 
practitioner, insofar as such a system wrests control away from doctors and returns it to 
patients. When considered in that light, and bearing in mind that doctors can and do 
withdraw treatment from and/or provide palliative sedation to patients who are incapable 
of providing their consent, the claim that permitting a doctor to administer a lethal dose 
of medication to a capacitous patient who is not acting under undue influence would pose 
a threat to the doctor/patient relationship loses much of its force. If the current system is 
to be amended to enable euthanasia, which, it is submitted, is necessary in order to comply 
with Article 8 of the ECHR, it would require an amendment to the offence of murder, for 
instance to include an exception for the provision of assistance to individuals where 
specified criteria is met, such as occurred in Canada following Carter.393 
Beyond the terminally ill, elderly and/or individuals suffering from life-limiting or similar 
conditions however, the argument that a ban on assisted suicide is necessary to protect the 
doctor/patient relationship gains some traction. Outside of the end-of-life context, any act 
which results in a patient’s death – whether it is done with or without the intention of 
bringing about their death – will fall foul of not just the doctor’s professional and/or 
ethical obligations but also English criminal law. If a doctor takes steps to intentionally 
bring about a patient’s death outside of the recognised, therapeutic, spheres outlined 
above, they may be charged with murder and if they unintentionally but negligently cause 
 
391 Palliative sedation refers to the administration of sedatives with the intention of reducing the level of 
consciousness of a terminally ill patient, in order to relieve refractory symptoms: Chapter One, section 2.  
392 Nicklinson (n 7) [336]. 
393 Criminal Code (RSC 1985, c.C-46), s 227(1) provides that ‘No medical practitioner or nurse practitioner 
commits culpable homicide if they provide a person with medical assistance in dying in accordance with 
section 241.2’ and s 241.2 sets out the eligibility for medical assistance in dying, which includes euthanasia. 
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or contribute to the patient’s death, they may be charged with manslaughter.394 There is, 
then, scope for the argument that a ban on assisted suicide of patients who are not 
terminally ill/suffering from a life-limiting illness or suffering intolerably as a result of 
infirmity and/or geriatric syndromes is both consistent with the approach taken elsewhere 
in medical law and is necessary to secure the doctor/patient relationship. Likewise, the 
balance between competing values such as self-determination and autonomy on the one 
hand and sanctity of life on the other is more finely balanced in a case involving an 
individual who is seeking assistance in dying by suicide as a result of suffering caused by a 
condition that is neither terminal nor life-limiting. Considering that the CPS does tend to 
prosecute cases of assisted suicide which involve individuals who are suffering from mental 
health issues (for example, Howe) or who are not terminally ill, elderly or otherwise 
suffering from life-limiting or similar conditions (for example, Gordon and the case of Ms 
Caller), there is no existing, less restrictive system in place in contrast to the situation 
involving individuals who are terminally ill, elderly or suffering as a result of life-limiting 
or similar conditions who receive benevolent assistance from friends or family. These 
factors, taken in isolation and cumulatively, tend to support the contention that the current 
iteration of the ban is proportionate to the objectives of protecting individuals vulnerable 
to undue influence, promoting the sanctity of life and protecting the doctor/patient 
relationship insofar as it applies to individuals who are not elderly, terminally ill or do not 
suffer from a life-limiting or similar condition. 
5. Conclusion    
When examining whether an interference is compatible with Article 8 of the ECHR, the 
first question (a jurisdictional fact of sorts) is whether the challenged measure (here, the 
blanket ban) interferes with a right protected by Article 8. There can be no doubt that a 
ban prohibiting a person from taking their life with assistance interferes with the 
recognised right to choose the manner and timing of their death (an aspect of the right to 
private life protected by Article 8(1)). The question, then, is whether the ban can be 
justified by reference to Article 8(2): namely, is the interference ‘in accordance with law’ 
and ‘necessary in a democratic society’? 
 
394 See, for instance, R v Cox (1992) 12 BLMR 38; R v Moor [2000] Crim LR 31 (Crown Ct). See, also, the trial 
and acquittal of Dr Howard Martin discussed in Moss v HM Coroner for the North and South Districts of Durham 
and Darlington [2008] 11 WLUK 764, [2008] EWHC 2940 (Admin). 
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It has been shown, by reference to the relevant (albeit scarce) domestic case law, that the 
question of whether the ban is in ‘accordance with law’ is perhaps more complicated than 
the authorities would suggest. Nevertheless, the Suicide Act 1961, together with the 2010 
CPS policy specific to s 2, has the certainty and foreseeability required to ensure that the 
ban is ‘in accordance with law.’ As for whether the ban is ‘necessary in a domestic society’, 
this requires that it pursues a legitimate aim and is proportionate to that aim. Protecting 
individuals from taking their lives as a result of undue influence is plainly a pressing aim. 
Greater doubt attends the question of whether the additional aims identified by the courts 
in the Conway litigation can be classified as legitimate. Either way, this chapter has 
demonstrated that a blanket ban is not proportionate to securing any of those objectives. 
Applying the domestic proportionality test, it is apparent that the ban is neither the least 
restrictive means available nor does it strike a fair balance between the competing interests. 
The analysis undertaken in this chapter is unique in its focus on the ban itself. The debate 
before the courts and in Parliament has, erroneously, focused on proposed alternatives to 
the ban and their ability to achieve the aims. In adopting that focus, the courts (excluding 
Lady Hale and Lord Kerr in Nicklinson) and Parliament have neglected to examine whether 
the present ban is actually successful in securing the aim(s) pursued. As this chapter has 
shown, the present system under s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 and, in particular, its reliance 
on ex post facto analysis, is neither the best means of securing its aims nor the least restrictive. 
The ban does not stop people taking their lives with assistance either domestically or 
overseas. The ban forces people to die by suicide with assistance overseas or unlawfully 
domestically, to take their lives prematurely and by means that are not guaranteed to be 
effective, or to live a life ‘bereft’ of ‘pleasure’ and inimical to the life they have erstwhile 
led. When the reality of what the ban actually ‘achieves’ is weighed against competing 
interests, and bearing in mind that the ban is not, in practice, blanket in its application, the 
claim that the ‘balance struck’ is fair is dubious to say the least. The conclusion reached by 
the only two Supreme Court justices to examine the question of s 2’s compatibility with 





JUSTIFYING THE BLANKET BAN ON ASSISTED SUICIDE: CONSIDERING THE 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter demonstrated the error in the requirement adopted by members of 
the Supreme Court in Nicklinson395 that in order for the blanket ban on assisted suicide to 
be incompatible with Article 8 of the ECHR, there had to be evidence of a ‘guaranteed-to-
function’ alternative. While, for the reasons given in that chapter, that is not a valid legal 
requirement in the context of an assessment of the ban’s compatibility with Article 8, the 
analysis in this chapter considers whether the less restrictive alternatives in permissive 
jurisdictions do in fact meet that threshold. More specifically, the empirical evidence from 
permissive jurisdictions is examined with a view to ascertaining whether the risks which 
the blanket ban is said to be necessary to protect against have materialised in jurisdictions 
that allow assisted dying. If they have not, then those permissive schemes arguably meet 
the ‘guaranteed-to-function’ requirement and, consequently, demonstrate that the current 
blanket ban in England and Wales is a disproportionate (and unjustified) interference with 
the right to choose the manner and timing of one’s death protected by Article 8 of the 
ECHR. As demonstrated in this chapter, the trial judgment in Carter contains an 
extraordinarily comprehensive analysis of the evidence regarding the impact of allowing 
assisted dying. Justice Smith considered at considerable length evidence from permissive 
jurisdictions and determined that that evidence did not support a blanket ban on assisted 
suicide. One would expect domestic courts considering the English ban to have, at the 
least, some regard to Justice Smith’s findings. Yet, the Divisional Court in Conway expressly 
rejected the trial judgment in Carter as being irrelevant to the question of the compatibility 
of the Suicide Act 1961 with the ECHR. This chapter, thus, commences with an analysis 
of the (de)merits of the Divisional High Court’s treatment of Carter. Having examined the 
errors in the High Court’s treatment of Carter – and, relatedly, having established the 
relevance of the judgment of Justice Smith to the question of the compatibility of the 
Suicide Act 1961 with the ECHR – the chapter proceeds to examine the key findings in 
Carter and considers what impact, if any, more recent empirical evidence has on those 
findings, in particular as they pertain to the three alleged legitimate aims of s 2 of the 
Suicide Act 1961 discussed at length in Chapter Four concerning Article 8 of the ECHR. 
 
395 And perpetuated in the subsequent decisions in Conway (n 7) and Conway (Court of Appeal) (n 7).  
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This, in turn, reveals that there is a ‘guaranteed-to-function’ alternative to the blanket ban 
in England and Wales.  
2. The applicability of Carter 
In June 2012, Madam Justice Lynn Smith – sitting in the Supreme Court of British 
Colombia (Canada) – delivered her judgment in the matter of Carter which concerned 
Canada’s blanket ban on assisted suicide. The trial before her Honour took place over 
more than 20 days between November 2011 and April 2012. The judgment, which spans 
over 1400 paragraphs, was, and remains, the most comprehensive assessment of the 
empirical evidence relating to assisted suicide. Akin to a meta-analysis, Justice Smith 
referenced the opinion evidence of 57 of the world’s leading experts in assisted dying. 
Unlike England and Wales, where first-hand evidence and the cross-examination thereof 
is the exception not the rule in judicial review proceedings,396 not only did the experts in 
Carter give evidence during the trial proceedings, but they were also subject to cross-
examination. This is in stark contrast to the proceedings that have been before the English 
courts concerning s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961. Indeed, Omid T’s application to have 
evidence heard and cross-examined was refused.397 There is a strong argument, then, that 
the evidence Justice Smith relied upon when making her findings was of a quality and 
robustness that far surpassed that which the English courts have considered in the judicial 
review proceedings involving s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961. Indeed, Lord Mance in Nicklinson 
expressly acknowledged the need for an equivalent exercise to that conducted in Carter 
(including, significantly, cross-examination of the expert witnesses) in order to reach a 
proper determination regarding the ban’s proportionality.398 Further, Lady Hale noted in 
Nicklinson that the decision of the Canadian Supreme Court in the Carter proceedings, 
which was at that stage forthcoming, would ‘be interesting’ in terms of how it approached 
the issue of the question of compatibility.399 
 
396 See, for instance, R (On the application of Bancoult) v The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
[2012] EWHC 2115 (Admin) [14].  
397 Omid T (n 85).  
398 See, for instance, Nicklinson (n 7) [182] (Lord Mance):  
[I]t would be impossible for this Court to arrive at any reliable conclusion about the validity of any 
risks involved in relaxing the absolute prohibition on assisting suicide, or (which is surely another 
side of the same coin) the nature or reliability of any safeguards which might accompany and make 
possible such a relaxation, without detailed examination of first-hand evidence, accompanied by 
cross-examination.  
399 Nicklinson (n 7) [320]. 
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For the reasons given below, Justice Smith’s judgment – an invaluable resource for any 
court considering the human rights implications of a ban on assisted suicide – was of 
particular worth to the English courts given the similarities between the two jurisdictions 
in terms of the relevant rights and the legal analysis applicable to same. Despite its utility, 
and notwithstanding the UK Supreme Court’s appreciation of the judgment and its interest 
in the outcome of the appeal to the Canadian Supreme Court (which unanimously 
confirmed the trial judge’s findings), subsequent, lower, English courts have refused to 
consider Justice Smith’s reasons and findings. Of particular relevance is the Divisional 
High Court’s statement in Conway that: 
We did not find the decision in Carter to be of assistance. It turned critically on 
provisions of the Canadian Charter (section 1 and section 7) which are in different 
terms from Article 8 of the ECHR and which engage a different analysis: see in 
particular [76]-[78]. It also turned critically on findings by the trial judge in the 
proceedings on evidence before her in relation to the effectiveness of safeguards 
for vulnerable people which the Supreme Court held could not be challenged on 
appeal: [108]-[121]. The evidence before us is different and we have made our own 
findings in the light of it ... Moreover, the decision in Carter was concerned with 
the category of people who face unbearable suffering, rather than the category 
which Mr Conway identifies of people who face death within six months.400 
The emphasised elements of this quote reflect three errors in the High Court’s reasoning. 
As the ensuing analysis will demonstrate, contrary to the claims of the High Court: 
1. The provisions of the Canadian Charter that were in issue in Carter are, in fact, 
materially similar to Article 8 of the ECHR and the analysis employed in respect 
of the Charter bears striking similarities to the proportionality assessment 
employed under the ECHR;  
2. Any difference in the evidence before the Divisional High Court vis-à-vis that 
before Justice Smith arose as a result of the comprehensiveness of the latter and 
the superficiality of the former. In fact, two of the experts whose evidence was 
before the Divisional High Court also gave evidence before Justice Smith, who 
also had the benefit of their cross-examination. Justice Smith had before her 
similar, if not identical, evidence to that which was before the High Court and 
 
400 Conway (n 7) [123] (underlined emphasis added).  
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could balance that evidence against the myriad of other sources, including cross-
examination, which were admitted into evidence in the Carter trial; 
3. The decision in Carter and the subsequent legislative amendments cover individuals 
whose suffering is unbearable and whose natural death is reasonably foreseeable 
and would, then, apply to an individual like Mr Conway.  
2.1 The rights and analyses in issue  
The proceedings in Carter centred on the rights enshrined in s 7 of the Canadian Charter 
which provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and 
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of 
fundamental justice’. Also relevant was s 1 which, in effect, qualifies s 7: ‘The Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject 
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society.’ At the centre of the proceedings in Conway was Article 8 which 
protects the right to, inter alia, private life. While, on a reading of the terms of the relevant 
rights, there are limited similarities between the rights in issue in Carter and those at the 
centre of the proceedings in Conway, closer inspection reveals significant parallels in the 
principles underpinning the rights enshrined in s 7 of the Canadian Charter and Article 8 
of the ECHR. The Supreme Court of Canada in Carter described the protections afforded 
by s 7 in the following terms:  
The right to life is engaged where the law or state action imposes death or an 
increased risk of death on a person, either directly or indirectly ... The rights to 
liberty and security of the person, which deal with concerns about autonomy and quality of life, 
are also engaged. An individual’s response to a grievous and irremediable medical 
condition is a matter critical to their dignity and autonomy.401 
The ECtHR has similarly held that autonomy is ‘an important principle’ underpinning the 
right to privacy enshrined in Article 8: 
The very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human freedom. Without in 
any way negating the principle of sanctity of life protected under the Convention, 
the Court considers that it is under Article 8 that notions of the quality of life take 
on significance.402  
 
401 Carter Supreme Court (n 1) [335] (emphasis added). 
402 Pretty v United Kingdom (n 7) [61], [65] (emphasis added). 
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In fact, the ECtHR observed in Pretty that while s 7 of the Canadian Charter is ‘framed in 
different terms’ to Article 8, ‘comparable concerns arose regarding the principle of 
personal autonomy in the sense of the right to make choices about one’s own body’.403  
Thus, while the rights in issue in Carter are ‘in different terms’ to those in Conway, there is 
considerable overlap between the rights at the centre of Carter and those upon which Noel 
Conway’s and Omid T’s challenges to s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 rested. Certainly, the 
difference in terms does not undermine the relevance of Carter to domestic proceedings 
concerning the Suicide Act 1961. The next issue is whether the analyses undertaken in 
respect of those rights are different. 
While similarities between the rights in issue are central to legitimising the placing of weight 
on the analysis and findings in Carter, the validity of that comparative exercise depends on 
there being sufficient overlap between the analyses undertaken with respect to each. The 
proportionality assessment encapsulated in Article 8(2) of the ECHR requires proof that:  
1. The legislative objective of the measure is sufficiently important to justify limiting 
a fundamental right;  
2. The measures designed to meet that objective are rationally connected to it;  
3. Those measures are no more than are necessary to achieve it; and, 
4. The measure strikes a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the 
interests of the community.404 
At each stage, the onus is borne by the State. The approach to ascertaining whether there 
has been a violation of s 7 under the Canadian Charter is somewhat different. The onus is 
on the applicant to demonstrate that they have been deprived of a s 7 right and that the 
deprivation is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. According to 
those principles – which bear a striking resemblance to the proportionality analysis under 
Article 8(2) of the ECHR – the challenged measure must not be:  
1. Arbitrary (i.e. there is no rational connection between the object of the law and the 
limit it imposes on the s 7 right); 
2. Overbroad (i.e. the law goes too far by denying the rights of some individuals in a 
way that bears no connection to the object);  
 
403 ibid [66].  
404 See, Aguilar (n 326) [45] (Lord Wilson JSC) and Bank Mellat (n 327) [72ff] (Lord Reed JSC).  
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3. Grossly disproportionate (i.e. the negative effects on the individual are completely 
out of sync with the object of the provision).405 
At no stage of the inquiry into the principles of fundamental justice do broader social 
interests come into play; the court is concerned solely with the rights and experiences of 
the applicant.  
If the applicant demonstrates that there has been a deprivation of a s 7 right which is not 
in accordance with one or more of the principles of fundamental justice, the onus then 
shifts to the State to prove, pursuant to s 1 of the Canadian Charter, that the deprivation 
is justified. It is at this stage that broader social interests may be relevant. As the following 
table demonstrates, the s 1 inquiry largely mirrors the proportionality assessment 
undertaken in an Article 8 dispute: 
ECHR (Art 8(2)) Canadian Charter (s 1406) 
The legislative objective is sufficiently 
important to justify limiting a fundamental 
right 
The law has a pressing and substantial 
object 
The measure which has been designed to 
meet the objective is rationally connected 
to it 
The means adopted are rationally 
connected to it 
The measure is no more than is necessary 
to accomplish the objective 
The measure is minimally impairing of the 
right in question  
The measure strikes a fair balance between 
the rights of the individual and the 
interests of the community  
There is proportionality between the 
deleterious and salutary effects of the law  
 
The preceding reveals that the onus on an applicant alleging a violation of s 7 of the 
Canadian Charter is heavier than that on an applicant alleging a violation of Article 8 of 
the ECHR, given the two-stage nature of the former inquiry. While an applicant alleging a 
violation of Article 8 of the ECHR discharges their legal burden by demonstrating that the 
relevant provision interferes with a right (in the case of both Noel Conway and Omid T, 
that s 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 interferes with their Article 8 right to choose the manner 
and timing of their death), an applicant under s 7 of the Canadian Charter must 
demonstrate not only that the provision interferes with their s 7 right(s) but also that the 
 
405 Carter Supreme Court (n 1) [72], [83]-[90].  
406 See, for instance, ibid [94].  
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interference is not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice (i.e. it is 
arbitrary, overbroad and/or grossly disproportionate). If the applicant successfully 
demonstrates that the interference with their s 7 right(s) is not in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice, the onus shifts to the State to prove that the interference 
or deprivation of the applicant’s s 7 rights is justified pursuant to s 1 of the Canadian 
Charter. As the preceding demonstrates, there is considerable overlap between the 
proportionality assessment under Article 8(2) of the ECHR and the analysis of the State’s 
justification under s 1 of the Canadian Charter. There are also significant similarities in the 
principles of fundamental justice and the proportionality assessment under Article 8(2).  
Thus, contrary to the claim by the Divisional High Court in Conway, the rights and the 
analyses under Article 8 of the ECHR and s 7 (and s 1) of the Canadian Charter are 
extremely similar, if not analogous. But that was only one of three reasons given by the 
High Court for disregarding the Carter trial judgment. The second was the contention that 
the evidence was not materially similar to that before Justice Smith.  
2.2 The evidence before the courts 
The contention by the High Court that the evidence before it was ‘different’ to that before 
Justice Smith is perplexing. The High Court stated that the nature of the inquiry before 
the Court ‘does not require us to set out and analyse in full detail the expert and other 
evidence placed before us.’407 Readers are, then, left without reasons detailing how the 
evidence that the High Court described in its judgment was different to that before the 
trial judge in Carter. It is, thus, necessary to consider what evidence was before the High 
Court and whether it was, in fact, different to that before Justice Smith in Carter.  
2.2.1 The evidence before the Conway Divisional High Court  
According to the reasons of the Divisional High Court, the evidence before it comprised: 
• House of Lords Select Committee Report on the Joffe Bill;408 
• An expert report from Professor Penney Lewis on the comparative legal 
position; 
 
407 Conway (n 7) [76]. 
408 Select Committee on the Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill (n 19). 
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• British Medical Association Report on ‘End-of-life care and physician-assisted 
dying’;409 
• Surveys and consultations of members by the Royal College of Physicians (2014) 
and the Royal College of General Practitioners (2013); 
• A statement by the British Geriatrics Society (2015);410  
• A public statement by Scope, a charity for disabled people in response to the 
Falconer Bill;  
• A witness statement by Baroness Campbell on behalf of Not Dead Yet UK; 
• Expert medical reports on various topics including capacity and specific issues 
relating to Mr Conway’s condition including life expectancy and the efficacy of 
palliative care; 
• An expert report by Professor the Baroness Finlay.  
Aside from Professor Lewis’s comparative evidence and the evidence concerning 
Mr Conway’s medical condition, likely prognosis and palliative care, the remainder of the 
evidence confirmed that the relevant medical bodies opposed the introduction of assisted 
dying, primarily to protect vulnerable individuals and to protect the doctor/patient 
relationship and the disability advocacy groups opposed the introduction because of the 
risk of undue pressure on individuals with disabilities. Having outlined that evidence ([53]-
[75]), the High Court proceeded to note that ([76]):  
This is not a trial of an issue of clinical negligence or the like. The resolution of the 
claim for a declaration of incompatibility did not require there to be cross-
examination of any of the expert or other witnesses. The question at issue is 
whether Parliament has a proper basis for maintaining in place the prohibition 
against provision of assistance for suicide contained in section 2. This does not 
require us to set out and analyse in full detail the expert and other evidence placed 
before us. We refer to the evidence to the extent that it is necessary to do so to 
determine Mr Conway’s claim for a declaration of incompatibility. 
Given the High Court’s mischaracterisation of the ‘question at issue’, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that they adopted a perfunctory approach to the evidence. As discussed at 
 
409 BMA, ‘End-of-life care and physician-assisted dying’ (December 2014) 
<https://www.bma.org.uk/collective-voice/policy-and-research/ethics/end-of-life-care> accessed 31 July 
2019. 
410 British Geriatrics Society, ‘Physician Assisted Suicide’ (10 July 2015) <https://www.bgs.org.uk/policy-
and-media/physician-assisted-suicide> accessed 31 July 2019.   
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length in Chapter Four, in an Article 8 challenge such as that mounted by Noel Conway, 
one of the questions at issue is whether the State has a ‘proper basis’ for the interference 
(i.e. whether the interference has a legitimate aim). But that is only one aspect of the 
analysis. Another issue is whether the means adopted by the State are proportionate to that 
aim. And that issue requires a detailed examination of what the measure achieves and 
whether there is a less restrictive means available. As for the evidence that the Court did 
consider, given how UK-centric it was, it is unsurprising that the High Court described the 
evidence before it as different to that before Justice Smith. But that difference does not 
justify discounting the relevance of the trial judgment in Carter, particularly given the 
breadth and depth of the evidence before Justice Smith. If the evidence before the High 
Court was inconsistent with or otherwise contrary to that considered by Justice Smith in 
Carter, that would go some way in accounting for the former’s disregard for the latter. But 
the High Court did not consider Carter and thus cannot be said to have determined that 
the evidence before it was contrary to that in Carter. If the justices did, they failed to give 
reasons for it. Significantly, both Professors Lewis and Baroness Finlay gave evidence 
before Justice Smith, with the latter’s evidence and cross-examination being considered in 
considerable detail by the trial judge and the High Court failed to indicate how, if at all, the 
evidence of Baroness Finlay before them was different to that before Justice Smith.  
It is impossible from the (lack of) reasons (and, thus, the public record of the proceedings) 
to ascertain why the evidence before the Divisional High Court was sufficiently different 
to justify disregarding Justice Smith’s judgment. As stated above, Justice Smith had the 
benefit of evidence from over 50 experts, many of whom were cross-examined including, 
pertinently, Baroness Finlay, and whose judgment extends over 1400 paragraphs, many of 
which are dedicated to an examination of the evidence. If the evidence was different, it was 
because the Divisional High Court lacked the evidence that was before Justice Smith. As 
will be discussed below, it was certainly not the case that Justice Smith failed to have regard 
to evidence that was, if not the same, then materially similar to that before the Divisional 
High Court. Indeed, the following extracts from the opening paragraphs in Justice Smith’s 
judgment aptly demonstrate the similarities in the issues and evidence before her and the 
Divisional High Court: 
Medical practitioners disagree about the ethics of physician-assisted death.  There 
are respected practitioners who would support legal change. They state that 
providing physician-assisted death in defined cases, with safeguards, would be 
consistent with their ethical views. However, other practitioners and many 
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professional bodies, including the Canadian Medical Association, do not support 
physician-assisted death. 
Despite a strong societal consensus about the extremely high value of human life, 
public opinion is divided regarding physician-assisted death. The substantial 
majority of committees that have studied the question, in Canada and elsewhere, 
oppose physician-assisted death but a minority support it. 
The most commonly expressed reason for maintaining a distinction between 
currently accepted end-of-life practices and physician-assisted death is that any 
system of safeguards will not adequately protect vulnerable people. 
... 
The defendants identify a number of areas of risk for patients if physician-assisted 
death is permitted, for example relating to the patients’ ability to make well-
informed decisions and their freedom from coercion or undue influence, and to 
physicians’ ability to assess patients’ capacity and voluntariness. The evidence 
shows that risks exist, but that they can be very largely avoided through carefully-
designed, well-monitored safeguards.411 
This is precisely the nature of the evidence before the Divisional High Court in Conway. 
Insofar as the evidence before Justice Smith was ‘different’, that difference stemmed from 
the fact that the British Colombia Supreme Court had before it considerably more 
evidence, which does not preclude an examination of the judgment by the English courts 
examining the ban’s compatibility but, rather, bolsters the relevance and utility of the 
Canadian judgment. 
2.2.2 The ‘beneficiaries’ of the Carter decision 
The third and final issue with the Divisional High Court’s reasons for disregarding Carter 
is that the judgment ‘was concerned with the category of people who face unbearable 
suffering, rather than the category which Mr Conway identifies of people who face death 
within six months.’ This alleged difference can be disposed of swiftly, when regard is had 
to the characteristics of the applicants in Carter, the conclusions reached by Justice Smith 
and the amendments ultimately made to Canadian criminal law to permit medical assistance 
in dying.  
 
411 Carter (n 13) [6]-[8], [10].  
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There were several applicants in Carter including, notably, Gloria Taylor who, like Noel 
Conway, had a fatal neurodegenerative disease. Justice Smith considered the impact of 
Canada’s analogous ban on a wide group of individuals including those with disabilities 
whose deaths were not imminent but who nevertheless suffered unbearably as a result of 
an irremediable medical condition. While that was a broader focus than Mr Conway’s case 
which was confined to an individual who had a terminal illness with a prognosis of 6 
months or less, it is not clear how a broader focus which necessarily encompassed 
individuals like Mr Conway renders Carter of no assistance to the Divisional High Court. 
The Canadian Supreme Court, in confirming Justice Smith’s decision, issued a declaration 
that the relevant provisions giving rise to the ban: 
[W]ere void insofar as they prohibit physician-assisted death for a competent adult 
person who (1) clearly consents to the termination of life; and (2) has a grievous 
and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability) that 
causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the circumstances 
of his or her condition. ‘Irremediable’, it should be added, does not require the 
patient to undertake treatments that are not acceptable to the individual.412   
Ultimately, the Canadian Government introduced amendments to the Criminal Code to 
allow medical assistance in dying for adults who have a grievous and irremediable medical 
condition. The definition of grievous and irremediable medical condition requires, inter 
alia, that the individual’s ‘natural death has become reasonably foreseeable’.413 
While the decision in Carter was not confined to individuals who were terminally ill with a 
life expectancy of 6 months or less, Justice Smith determined that Canada’s analogous ban 
was overbroad and grossly disproportionate as it applied to individuals who, like Mr 
Conway, had a terminal neurodegenerative disease. The Divisional High Court failed to 
provide any reasons for why the broader category of people to which the Carter judgment 
applied supported its claim that the decision was of little assistance and in the absence of 
such reasons, it is clear that the decision’s broader focus bolstered, rather than undermined, 
its utility in other courts considering the human rights implications of domestic bans on 
assisted suicide.   
The preceding discussion of the rights, analysis and evidence at the centre of the Carter 
proceedings clearly demonstrates that, contrary to the Divisional High Court’s contention 
 
412 Carter Supreme Court (n 1) [127].  
413 Criminal Code (RSC 1985, c.C-46), s 241.2(2)(d).  
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in Conway, a decision that an analogous ban was incompatible with remarkably similar rights 
in respect of individuals with analogous conditions would have been of very significant 
assistance to the Court when considering the compatibility of s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 
with Article 8 of the ECHR. Having established the relevance of Carter, the ensuing 
sections will consider the findings of Justice Smith and the impact, if any, of subsequent 
research on those findings.  
3. The material findings in Carter 
As discussed in Chapter Four concerning Article 8 of the ECHR, the legitimate aims 
proffered by the Divisional High Court in Conway for the blanket ban were: 
1. Protecting individuals from undue influence (frequently referred to as ‘protecting 
vulnerable individuals’);  
2. Protecting the doctor/patient relationship; and, 
3. Protecting/maintaining the sanctity of life.  
Justice Smith addressed each of those concerns to varying extents414 and determined that: 
 [A] permissive regime with properly designed and administered safeguards was 
capable of protecting vulnerable people from abuse and error. While there are 
risks, to be sure, a carefully designed and managed system is capable of adequately 
addressing them.  
 [I]t was feasible for properly qualified and experienced physicians to reliably assess 
patient competence and voluntariness, and that coercion, undue influence, and 
ambivalence could all be reliably assessed as part of that process ... It would be 
possible for physicians to apply the informed consent standard [applied in other 
medical decision-making in Canada, including end-of-life decision-making] to 
patients who seek assistance in dying ... 
[T]here was no evidence from permissive jurisdictions that people [who may be 
considered vulnerable to undue pressure, such as people with disabilities] are at 
heightened risk of accessing physician-assisted dying ... [A]nd in some cases 
palliative care actually improved post-legalization ... [W]hile the evidence suggested 
that the law had both negative and positive impacts on physicians, it did support 
the conclusion that physicians were better able to provide overall end-of-life 
 
414 Carter (n 13) [314], [352], [1154].  
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treatment once assisted death was legalized ... Finally, [there was] no compelling 
evidence that a permissive regime in Canada would result in a ‘practical slippery 
slope’.415 
Each of those aspects of Justice Smith’s reasons will now be considered in greater detail, 
together with subsequent research from permissive jurisdictions.  
3.1 Protecting vulnerable individuals  
It is important to have a clear understanding of what is meant by ‘vulnerable individuals’. 
As was canvassed in Chapter Four, reference to ‘vulnerable individuals’ in the context of 
assisted dying refers to persons susceptible to undue influence. There is no characteristic 
that ipso facto renders a person ‘vulnerable’ to such influence; a person with a disability is 
no more likely to be vulnerable to undue influence than an individual who has a terminal 
illness, and there are any number of factors that can coalesce to leave a person vulnerable 
to undue influence. It is, then, misleading to suggest that individuals who access assisted 
suicide are, solely by virtue of their request for assistance, more vulnerable to undue 
influence than individuals who receive other forms of medical treatment, including end-
of-life care. Insofar as there are characteristics which may be associated with vulnerability 
to undue influence (for instance, socioeconomic status, age, private health insurance) 
Justice Smith determined that based on the evidence before her, which included evidence 
from Baroness Finlay, data from regulatory bodies in permissive jurisdictions, and 
additional studies by academics in those jurisdictions, ‘the predicted abuse and 
disproportionate impact on vulnerable populations has not materialised.’416 Further, 
‘although none of the [permissive] systems has achieved perfection, empirical researchers 
and practitioners who have experience in those systems are of the view that they work well 
in protecting patients from abuse while allowing competent patients to choose the timing 
of their deaths.’417 
While Justice Smith was cautious in her approach to the evidence from other permissive 
jurisdictions given the different demographic and cultural contexts and methods of health 
care delivery, she nevertheless noted the concerns of several experts regarding the 
reporting rates of physicians assisting in their patients’ deaths in certain permissive 
jurisdictions, especially Belgium and the Netherlands.418 There was evidence before the 
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trial judge of ‘low rate[s] of reporting’ in Belgium and the Netherlands. However, that data 
could not be considered in isolation from the context in which medical assistance in dying 
had arisen in both jurisdictions. Importantly, in both Belgium and the Netherlands, there 
was a practice of medically assisted dying prior to the introduction of legislation permitting 
same and there was evidence that ‘in some measure the impetus toward permissive 
legislation [in those jurisdictions] came from a desire to achieve better understanding, and 
regulation, of practices of assisted death that were already prevalent and embedded in the 
medical culture.’419 Further, a significant amount of unreported cases could be attributed 
to ‘mislabelling’ by physicians who do not consider death following the administration of 
pain relieving medication to be euthanasia.420 Indeed, in England and Wales, provided the 
patient’s death follows the appropriate administration of pain relief and there is no express 
intention to bring about the patient’s death, it would not be considered euthanasia and 
would be covered by the doctrine of double effect.421  
3.2 Protecting the doctor/patient relationship   
As with the State in Conway, the defendants in Carter ‘argue[d] that legalizing physician-
assisted death would negatively impact the physician-patient relationship.’422 It was argued 
that permitting medical assistance in dying would lead to a radical change in the concept 
of what a physician is.423 Having considered evidence from a number of practitioners and 
academics, again including Baroness Finlay, Justice Smith stated: 
My review of the evidence leads me to conclude, with respect to the impact on the 
doctor-patient relationship, that patients’ trust in their physicians, and physicians’ 
commitment to their patients’ well-being, would not necessarily change for the 
worse if the law permitted physician-assisted death in highly constrained 
circumstances. The risk of misconceptions and distrust may be counterbalanced 
by the possibility of enhanced trust arising from more open communications. In 
brief, it is likely that the relationship would change, but the net effect could prove 
to be neutral or for the good.424  
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3.3 Protecting the sanctity of life  
Consistent with the analysis of English law in Chapter One, Justice Smith noted that while 
‘[t]he sanctity of human life is a fundamentally important ethical principle, central to our 
society’, it ‘is a principle that is not absolute in our society ... and, while it is central to the 
value system of a number of religions, that does not settle its place in a secular society.’425 
In reaching that conclusion, Justice Smith considered the current state of law and practice 
in Canada concerning end-of-life care and observed that patients were not required to 
submit to medical treatment even where their refusal of or withdrawal from treatment 
would hasten their deaths, and doctors could legally administer medications even though 
they knew that the doses might hasten death, provided the intention was to ease the 
patient’s pain.426 
Justice Smith then considered evidence from ethicists, practitioners, professional bodies 
and public polls concerning the ‘ethical debate’ relating to end-of-life care and concluded 
that: 
In summary, there appears to be relatively strong societal consensus about the 
following:  (1) human life is of extremely high value, and society should never, or 
only in very exceptional circumstances, permit the intentional taking of human life; 
and (2) current end-of-life practices, including administering palliative sedation to 
relieve physical suffering and acting on patients’ or substituted decision-makers’ 
directions regarding withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, are 
ethically acceptable. 
As to physician-assisted death, weighing all of the evidence, I do not find that there 
is a clear societal consensus either way, in an individual case involving a competent, 
informed, voluntary adult patient who is grievously ill and suffering symptoms that 
cannot be alleviated.  However, there is a strong consensus that if physician-
assisted dying were ever to be ethical, it would be only be with respect to those 
patients, where clearly consistent with the patient’s wishes and best interests, and 
in order to relieve suffering.427 
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In sum, then, Justice Smith noted that, while fundamentally important, the principle of 
sanctity of life was not absolute and there was no societal consensus that medically assisted 
suicide would be contrary to the principle of sanctity of life.  
4. Subsequent data  
4.1 Protecting the vulnerable 
Justice Smith assessed the risk to individuals vulnerable to undue influence by reference to 
rates of compliance by doctors with the regulations in permissive jurisdictions and the 
characteristics of individuals accessing assistance in dying. As the trial judge recognised, 
differing cultural and medical contexts demands a cautious approach to extrapolating data 
from other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the experience in permissive jurisdictions is the best 
evidence available of the impact of introducing assisted dying and, where trends are 
apparent across varied samples, conclusions can be made more confidently. The question, 
then, is whether subsequent evidence from permissive jurisdictions alters the findings of 
Justice Smith.  
In April 2019, the Canadian Government published the fourth and final federal interim 
report concerning access to medical assistance in dying (thereafter, reporting will be in 
accordance new federal regulations). The report is based on information provided by 
provincial and territorial governments.428 Since the enactment of legislation permitting 
medical assistance in dying, 6,749 people have had medically assisted deaths.429 Rates of 
medically assisted death have increased each year since the introduction of the legislation 
in 2016, with the overwhelming majority of deaths occurring in hospital or the patient’s 
home (there was a near-even split between deaths in hospital and deaths at home in 
2018).430 In 2018, medically assisted deaths accounted for 1.12 per cent of the estimated 
total deaths in Canada.431 The overwhelming majority of people who received medical 
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assistance in dying were above the age of 65 years (79 per cent in the last reporting period), 
with the average age being 72 years.432 There was a near-equal division between women 
(49 per cent) and men (51 per cent) with the most common underlying medical 
circumstances of those receiving medical assistance being ‘cancer-related’ (64 per cent), 
‘circulatory/respiratory system’ (16 per cent) and ‘neurodegenerative’ (11 per cent).433  
The report also reveals that considerably more people make inquiries about medical 
assistance in dying than request it and an even smaller number of individuals ultimately 
receive medical assistance in dying. For instance, in Alberta there were 737 inquiries about 
medical assistance in dying, 407 requests and 252 medically assisted deaths. Interestingly, 
8 of the requests in Alberta were declined, 21 were withdrawn by the individual and 77 
individuals died before the assessment was completed. Similar patterns were observable in 
other provinces/regions.434 ‘Investigating instances of non-compliance with eligibility 
criteria is beyond the scope of the federal monitoring regime and is under the purview of 
local law enforcement’ and, as a result, there is no federal data concerning compliance by 
practitioners administering medical assistance in dying.435 It is, then, necessary to consider 
other jurisdictions which do collate data concerning compliance.  
The 2018 report by Oregon’s Health Authority on the State’s Death with Dignity Act 
provides a summary of information collected by the Authority about the patients who 
sought medical assistance in dying in 2018 and the physicians who provided that assistance. 
Before examining compliance, the characteristics of individuals accessing medical 
assistance in dying by suicide should be considered. Of the 249 people who received 
prescriptions under the Death with Dignity Act for the purposes of suicide, the 
overwhelming majority were aged 65 years or older (79.2 per cent) – the median age was 
74 years – and most had cancer (62.5 per cent).436 Notably, 97 per cent of individuals were 
white and well educated (43.7 per cent had at least a baccalaureate degree) and 99.3 per 
cent had some form of health care.437 It is also notable that the mean duration of the 
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doctor-patient relationship was 10 weeks.438 The data available from other US permissive 
states largely mirrors the evidence from Oregon.439 
As for compliance, during 2018, two physicians were referred to the Oregon Medical 
Board for failure to comply with the requirements of the Death with Dignity Act.440 Given 
that 103 physicians wrote 249 prescriptions during 2018, 98 per cent of doctors fully 
complied with the requirements. It is not apparent from the available records of the 
Oregon Medical Board whether those two physicians have been the subject of disciplinary 
proceedings.441  
The Dutch review system comprises five Regional Euthanasia Review Committees ‘that 
receive notifications on termination of life on request and assisted suicide on the basis of 
the due care criteria laid down in [the relevant legislation].’442 In 2018, the Committees 
received 6,126 notifications of euthanasia which represented 4 per cent of the total number 
of deaths in that year.443 The number of notifications in 2018 was less than the number in 
2017. ’444As with the data from Canada and Oregon, there was near-equal numbers of men 
and women, 86.6 per cent were aged in their sixties or older, and 90.6 per cent of cases 
involved patients with ‘incurable cancer, neurological conditions ... cardiovascular disease, 
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pulmonary disease … or a combination of [these] conditions.’445 Unlike Canada and 
Oregon, there is no life-expectancy eligibility requirement in the Netherlands; the 
individual must be suffering intolerably as a result of an incurable condition (see, Chapter 
One, Table 1). Consequently, of the 6,126 individuals who died by way of euthanasia, 144 
involved patients with ‘early-stage dementia’, 67 involved patients whose suffering was 
caused by a ‘psychiatric disorder’ and 205 involved unbearable suffering stemming from 
multiple geriatric syndromes (for instance, sight impairment, hearing impairment, 
osteoporosis).446  
Particularly noteworthy is the section of the Report on compliance with due care criteria. 
‘In 6 of the 6,126 notified cases [0.10 per cent of all notifications], the [Committees] found 
that the physician who performed euthanasia did not comply with all the due care 
criteria’.447 The Report describes these cases as follows: 
In two of these cases the committee found that the physician had not fulfilled the 
requirements regarding the patient’s suffering and no reasonable alternative; in one 
case the particular caution that is required in cases involving psychiatric patients 
had not been exercised; in one case consulting an independent physician was at 
issue and in two cases the committee found that the procedure to terminate the 
patient’s life had not been carried out with due medical care.448 
The Report discusses three of those cases in detail. The cases concerned a terminally-ill 
patient in his sixties with a malignant tumour, a woman in her seventies with psychiatric 
disorders who had been diagnosed with an aortic aneurysm and lung cancer who had 
refused treatment ‘because she was suffering unbearably without prospect of improvement 
due to her psychiatric disorders’ and a man in his fifties who had ‘suffered from psychiatric 
disorders for 30 years’ and whose treatment ‘had no significant effect on his suffering’.449 
Each of the three cases discussed were ‘non-straightforward notifications’, that is, cases 
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with complex facts involving, inter alia, reasonable disagreement between professionals as 
to the nature of the patient’s suffering and the availability of ‘reasonable alternatives’.450 
It is notable that in the 17 years since the introduction of the Dutch assisted dying 
legislation, only one case has proceeded to prosecution, in 2018, with the doctor involved 
ultimately being acquitted.451 The case was – unsurprisingly – complex. The patient, a 
woman in her seventies, was in the advanced stages of dementia and: 
Shortly before the dementia diagnosis, [she] had set out her wishes concerning 
euthanasia in an advance directive and discussed them with her general practitioner 
and her geriatrician both of whom confirmed that she was decisionally competent 
at the time.452  
The patient renewed this advance directive a year before her death and, again, her general 
practitioner considered her to be competent at that time. In both advance directives, the 
patient stated that she: 
[D]id not want to be placed in an institution for elderly people with dementia 
(dementia clause). She stated that she wanted to say goodbye to her loved ones at 
a sufficiently early stage, in a dignified manner, and that she did not want to 
experience the process that her mother had gone through in an institution.453  
The relevant terms of the directives provided: 
In the first ... that she wanted euthanasia when she was ‘still to some degree 
decisionally competent but no longer able to live at home with my husband’. In 
the second ... that she wanted to make use of the option of euthanasia ‘when I 
myself think the time is ripe’. The closing sentence read: ‘Trusting that, by the time 
the quality of my life has become so poor that ... euthanasia will be performed at 
my request.’454 
The patient was placed in a nursing home and while she frequently stated that she wanted 
to die, she would caveat those statements with ‘not now though.’ The patient’s husband 
requested that the physician - an elderly-care physician - perform euthanasia on his wife 
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on the basis of her advance directive(s). The physician observed the patient, spoke with 
her and determined that the patient was expressing a wish to die. The physician twice 
consulted physicians from a specialist network of euthanasia specialists who both 
confirmed that the patient was decisionally competent and suffering unbearably. The 
physician subsequently performed euthanasia on the patient, who ‘awoke when the 
thiopental was being injected and put up physical resistance.’455 Inquiries by the 
Committees revealed that the patient had attended upon her general practitioner prior to 
her admission to the nursing home, and was, according to her doctor, ‘no longer able to 
indicate what her wishes were concerning euthanasia.’ While the patient had made two 
advance directives stating that she wanted euthanasia, as the Committees recognised, ‘the 
dementia clause written [in the most recent advance directive] could be interpreted in more 
than one way.’ Given that ambiguity and the absence of an oral request from the patient, 
the Committees found that ‘the physician could not have concluded unequivocally that she 
had made a voluntary and well-considered request for euthanasia.’456 The Committees also 
determined that the manner in which the physician performed the patient’s euthanasia, 
which included the covert administration of sedatives and the restraining of the patient 
when she physically resisted the administration of medication, fell below the due care 
standard; the physician should have halted the procedure in order to reconsider the current 
situation. As noted above, the doctor was prosecuted and acquitted, with judges finding 
that the doctor had complied with the due care criteria.457  
This case was patently complex; it involved ambiguous advance directives and treatment 
of a patient with advanced dementia, an issue that is the subject of a growing body of 
research.458 The physician consulted other doctors, who confirmed her analysis and she 
acted in accordance with what she considered to be the patient’s wishes, in consultation 
with the patient’s husband. Indeed, the patient’s own general practitioner confirmed that 
she was decisionally competent when she made the advance directives. In an era in which 
people are living longer, and dementia and Alzheimer’s disease are the leading causes of 
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death,459 cases such as this will inevitably increase, in both permissive and restrictive 
jurisdictions. Legalisation allows regulators to examine such cases and to provide guidance 
to physicians and patients as to what is required in order for an advance directive to be 
sufficiently clear and in providing end-of-life care to patients with dementia. Indeed, in 
2018, the Euthanasia Code was published by the Dutch Regional Euthanasia Review 
Committees. The Code gives a ‘practical overview of how the [Committees] interpret the 
due care criteria’ including, relevantly, in the case of patients with dementia.460  
The Belgian Federal Control and Evaluation Commission receives registration forms 
which must be submitted by physicians who perform euthanasia (which covers assisted 
suicide) and makes an assessment as to whether the legal requirements have been complied 
with. The Commission publishes a biennial report to the Government outlining the data 
from the registration documents including compliance by physicians. The most recent 
report covers the 2016-2017 period during which there were 4,337 notifications and, as 
was the case in Canada, Oregon and the Netherlands, there was near-equality between 
males (50.9 per cent) and females (49.1 per cent) and the majority of patients were aged 60 
or above (85.7 per cent), with the leading medical conditions being cancer (64.1 per cent), 
polypathologies (16.4 per cent), respiratory/circulatory conditions (7.1 per cent), and 
neurological conditions (6.9 per cent).461 As with the Netherlands, there is no life-
expectancy requirement and intolerable suffering can arise from psychiatric conditions, 
with 1.8 per cent of all notifications based on ‘mental or behavioural disorders.’462 In 2014, 
Belgian law was amended to extend assisted dying to competent minors in certain 
circumstances, with three minors dying by ‘euthanasia’ in 2016-2017 (0.07 per cent of 
patients who died by euthanasia).463 The three children were aged 9, 11 and 17 and their 
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suffering emanated from a malignant tumour of the eye, brain and other parts of the central 
nervous system (i.e. glioblastomas), cystic fibrosis, and severe Duchenne muscular 
dystrophy.464 The Report further notes that, beyond the obligation to consult with 
independent doctor(s), in 62 per cent of cases there was engagement with the patient’s 
broader medical team (for instance, palliative care nurses and doctors, and psychologists), 
with this ‘multidisciplinary approach’ helping to ensure transparency in the decision-
making process.465 
As for compliance, the Report states that all notifications complied with the essential 
conditions and none were transmitted to the public prosecutor.466 Notifications were 
correctly completed and the legal requirements were satisfied in 76.3 per cent of cases. The 
Commission requested further information in 23.7 per cent of cases. In 6.9 per cent of 
those cases, the reason for requesting further information was to inform the physician of 
imperfections in their answers or in the procedures followed, but none called into question 
compliance with the legal conditions.467 In 16.8 per cent of the cases in which further 
information was requested, the additional information concerned documents that were 
incorrectly or insufficiently completed, with the majority of these oversights or errors 
concerning administrative or procedural details.468 Notably, the Commission reports an 
improvement in physicians’ compliance with the notification requirements since 2014.469 
4.2 Conclusions on the evidence concerning vulnerable individuals  
The recent data from Canada, Oregon, the Netherlands and Belgium is consistent with the 
evidence that was before Justice Smith in Carter. Insofar as there are factors that can be 
said to be objective evidence of vulnerability to undue influence, the overwhelming 
majority individuals seeking assistance in permissive jurisdictions are aged 60 years or older 
and have a terminal illness. Data from Oregon confirms that almost all individuals who 
died by assisted suicide had a form of health care and the overwhelming majority where 
white and had at least a baccalaureate degree. There is, then, no indication that individuals 
who may be vulnerable to undue influence are accessing assistance in dying. More 
presciently, however, is the data concerning compliance. Rates of non-compliance with 
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legal requirements including due care criteria, remain extremely low and, as the evidence 
from the Netherlands demonstrates, those cases in which issues arise are typically complex 
involving, inter alia, non-verbal communication, advance directives and questions about 
reasonable alternatives to euthanasia. These are not cases of flagrant disregard of the 
safeguards. Rather, they are cases in which reasonable physicians can and do disagree as to 
the proper approach in cases on the margins (or, to employ the nomenclature of the Dutch 
report: ‘non-straightforward cases’) and in which regulatory bodies and the courts disagree.  
An issue in any permissive scheme is the ‘risk’ of under-reporting of instances of assisted 
dying. It is impossible to distil the precise number of cases of assisted death to compare 
with the number of notifications to the relevant regulatory bodies in any given jurisdiction. 
The use of death certificates can, however, provide some insight into the rates of reporting. 
A 2018 study in Flanders, Belgium, confirmed previous findings of underreporting of 
euthanasia on death certificates.470 Consistent with the reasons of Justice Smith, the authors 
suggested that underreporting might arise as a result of, inter alia, ‘physicians consciously 
or unintentionally not recognising their cases of euthanasia as such’ and ‘because 
[physicians] do not consider it necessary to report it on the death certificate.’471 These – 
and other – reasons were accepted as valid by Justice Smith.472 Given the debate that 
attends the treatment and classification of palliative sedation, and the utilisation of legally 
dubious constructs such as the doctrine of double effect including in England and Wales, 
it is unsurprising that there are cases that could be classified as euthanasia which are not 
considered to be such by the doctors administering the treatment.473 Notably, a recent 
study of the drugs used by doctors in Belgium at the end of a patient’s life confirm that a 
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leading reason for failing to report euthanasia is the physician’s classification of the act as 
palliative sedation.474 
It is trite to say that under-reporting cases of euthanasia is problematic. However, rates of 
under-reporting must be considered in light of the fact that research has shown that 
doctors in England and Wales do intentionally take their patients’ lives even when 
euthanasia is not legal475 and a system that formalises that practice and provides safeguards 
and transparency is better able to protect individuals vulnerable to undue influence. This 
perspective was highlighted by Justice Smith476 and, given evidence that some doctors in 
England and Wales administer pain relief with the intention of hastening a patient’s death 
notwithstanding the criminal prohibitions on such conduct,477 the risk of under-reporting 
(bearing in mind the reasons for same) is far outweighed by the risk that unregulated 
conduct poses to patients. Indeed, research has confirmed that unreported cases of 
euthanasia in Belgium ‘are in general carried out with less care than reported ones.’478 Given 
that cases of unregulated euthanasia are occurring in England and Wales notwithstanding 
the ban on assisted suicide, and considering the evidence from permissive jurisdictions 
such as Oregon concerning the characteristics of people accessing assisted dying and the 
rates of compliance with legal safeguards, legalising those practices at the least in certain 
circumstances would provide greater protection to potentially vulnerable individuals.  
In sum, the recent empirical evidence from a number of permissive jurisdictions confirms 
the evidence that was before Justice Smith and the consistency in data across permissive 
jurisdictions supports the trial judge’s finding that a permissive scheme does not pose an 
unacceptable risk to individuals who may be vulnerable to undue influence. While none of 
the jurisdictions has achieved ‘perfection’ in reporting and compliance, the safeguards 
‘work well in protecting patients from abuse while allowing competent patients to choose 
the timing of their deaths.’479 It bears noting that ‘perfection’ is not the benchmark in terms 
of Article 8 of the ECHR. Rather, the empirical evidence confirms the findings in Chapter 
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Four that the blanket ban is more than is necessary to secure the legitimate aims and there 
is a less restrictive means of balancing the competing interests.   
4.3 Protecting the doctor/patient relationship  
As discussed in Chapter Four, there is evidence that allowing assisted dying can benefit 
the doctor/patient relationship by ensuring transparency and honesty in the relationship. 
The ensuing will consider that and other data in order to ascertain whether the findings of 
Justice Smith in respect of the doctor/patient relationship remain valid.  
On 21 March 2019, after a poll of members, the Royal College of Physicians altered its 
erstwhile objection to legalising assisted dying to a neutral stance. Of the 6,885 members 
who responded to the poll, 49.5 per cent responded ‘no’ to the question: ‘Do you support 
a change in the law to permit assisted dying?’, while 40.5 per cent responded ‘yes’ (with 
10.5 per cent undecided). In the absence of a supermajority, the neutral position was 
adopted. Relevantly, the percentage of members in favour of a change rose from 32.3 per 
cent in 2014, while the number against dropped from 57.5 per cent. The percentage of 
members prepared to participate in assisted dying rose from 21.4 to 24.6 per cent, while 
the percentage who would not dropped from 58.4 to 55.1 per cent.480 The change in the 
position of the Royal College of Physicians reflects broader societal support for assisted 
dying.481  
Victoria (Australia) very recently introduced assisted dying legislation, following an 
extensive consultation period that included a Parliamentary inquiry which recommended, 
inter alia, the legalisation of assisted dying for certain patients. The final report of the inquiry 
noted the arguments for and against legalising assisted dying in the context of the 
doctor/patient relationship and concluded that permitting assisted dying in certain 
circumstances with attendant safeguards would benefit the relationship.482 As the report 
noted, permitting assisted dying ‘would enable people to discuss their preferred end of life 
care with their general practitioner, who is best placed to assist in the process given their 
longstanding, trusted relationships with patients.’483 This conclusion reflects a significant 
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body of research into the impact of legalising assisted dying on the doctor/patient 
relationship.484 A qualitative thematic analysis of interviews with patients making explicit 
requests for euthanasia found that: 
[T]he nature and quality of the patient–physician relationship were crucial during 
decision-making. The patient’s request put a strain on the patient–physician 
relationship – cutting across the usual curative role. When physicians, patients and 
relatives established effective relationships, positive relational effects resulted, even 
if initial requests were declined. Effective relationships included mutual respect for 
autonomy, clear communication and collaboration. When patients were aware of 
the burden that providing EAS [euthanasia/assisted suicide] placed on the 
physician, this improved relationships.485 
This quote encapsulates the complexity of the doctor/patient relationship both generally 
and in the specific context of assisted dying. It demonstrates that while assisted dying does 
have an impact on the doctor/patient relationship, it is not necessarily negative. Effective 
relationships between all parties (including relatives) can lead to positive outcomes even if 
the request for assisted dying is denied. There is also evidence that effective engagement 
by doctors with a patient’s family can further improve the doctor/patient relationship and 
assisted dying can also improve a family’s experience of a loved one’s death.486 
The empirical data demonstrates that legalisation of assisted dying does not per se 
deleteriously affect the doctor/patient relationship. Rather, it will have a negative impact 
where the relationship is already defective: where there is a lack of ‘mutual respect for 
autonomy, clear communication and collaboration.’ Where, however, the relationship is 
one involving ‘mutual respect for autonomy, clear communication and collaboration’, 
assisted dying does not have a negative impact and may, in fact, have a positive impact on 
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the doctor/patient relationship. This evidence confirms the findings of Justice Smith in 
Carter set out above.  
4.4 Protecting sanctity of life  
As discussed at length in Chapters One and Four, while the sanctity of life is a principle of 
paramount importance in England and Wales, it is not absolute. It can and does give way 
to a patient’s autonomy and self-determination in cases involving withdrawal/refusal of 
life-sustaining treatment and it does not prevent doctors ceasing life-sustaining treatment 
of incapacitous patients. In 2018, the UK Supreme Court confirmed that where there is 
agreement between an incapacitous patient’s treating physicians and their family or loved 
ones that continuing life-sustaining treatment is not in the patient’s best interests, the 
treatment can be ceased without obtaining declaratory relief from the courts.487 Similarly, 
citing its decision in Pretty, the Grand Chamber in Lambert488 held that when considering 
whether continuing life-sustaining treatment is in the best interests of an incapacitous 
patient, questions concerning quality of life are relevant: 
The very essence of the Convention is respect for human dignity and human 
freedom. Without in any way negating the principle of sanctity of life protected 
under the Convention, the Court considers that it is under Article 8 that notions 
of the quality of life take on significance. In an era of growing medical 
sophistication combined with longer life expectancies, many people are concerned 
that they should not be forced to linger on in old age or in states of advanced 
physical or mental decrepitude which conflict with strongly held ideas of self and 
personal identity. 
The Court will take these considerations into account in examining whether the 
State complied with its positive obligations flowing from Article 2...489 
The decisions of Re Y and Lambert – both of which postdate Carter – confirm that 
autonomy and self-determination can take precedence over concerns regarding the sanctity 
of life. The conflicting weight of these principles was acknowledged by Lady Hale in 
Nicklinson, who observed that: 
Respect for the intrinsic value of all human life is probably the most important 
principle in Judaeo-Christian morality. It would surely justify an absolute refusal to 
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oblige any person to help another commit suicide. It would not so obviously justify 
prohibiting those who freely judged that, in the circumstances of a particular case, 
there was no moral impediment to their assisting suicide. Respect for individual 
autonomy and human dignity are also important moral principles. The very 
complexity of the moral argument, amply demonstrated in the material before this 
court, tells against relying upon this as the legitimate aim of the legislation.490  
Considering that sanctity of life concerns do not preclude capacitous patients from 
exercising their autonomy and self-determination to refuse, or withdraw their consent to, 
life-sustaining treatment, nor does it stop doctors from withdrawing life-sustaining 
treatment from incapacitous patients, the principle should not preclude capacitous 
individuals exercising control over the manner and timing of the death.  
Further, the empirical evidence considered above with respect to the individuals most 
likely to access assistance in dying and the rates of compliance in permissive jurisdictions, 
when considered in light of the de facto system of assisted dying which exists in England 
and Wales as a result of the exercise of the CPS’s discretion, demonstrates that permitting 
assisted dying does not violate the sanctity of life, at least insofar as that term is understood 
in the broader medical context.  
Finally, ‘slippery slope’ concerns are frequently cited in support of claims that legalising 
assisted dying will undermine the sanctity of life.491 In addressing this concern, it is 
imperative to have a clear understanding of what a ‘slippery slope’ argument is: 
Typically, ‘slippery slope’ arguments claim that endorsing some premise, doing 
some action or adopting some policy will lead to some definite outcome that is 
generally judged to be wrong or bad. The ‘slope’ is ‘slippery’ because there are 
claimed to be no plausible halting points between the initial commitment to a 
premise, action, or policy and the resultant bad outcome. The desire to avoid such 
projected future consequences provides adequate reasons for not taking the first 
step.492  
Applied to the potential legalisation of assisted dying, the slippery slope argument holds 
that allowing a specified group of individuals access to assistance in dying will, inevitably, 
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lead to an expansion of the eligibility criteria to include individuals who were not initially 
foreseen as having access. The only jurisdiction to expand the eligibility criteria initially 
specified in its permissive legislation is Belgium, which amended its assisted dying law to 
include competent minors in certain circumstances in 2014. Specifically, euthanasia in 
Belgium is legal for minors who are in a ‘medically futile condition of constant and 
unbearable physical suffering that cannot be alleviated and that will, within a short period of 
time, result in death, and results from a serious and incurable disorder caused by illness or 
accident’.493 While on its face, the 2014 amendment may be evidence of a slippery slope 
insofar as the eligibility criteria has been expanded beyond that which was initially 
contemplated, this ignores several important facts. Euthanasia in Belgium has, since its 
legalisation, been available to emancipated minors (children aged 15 years or older who are 
legally emancipated494) and, perhaps more significantly, the expansion to children in 
specific circumstances (subject to the consent of the child’s ‘legal representatives’) was the 
result of a democratic process, reflecting the wishes of the public and, thus, the expansion, 
was not judged as wrong or bad by a majority of Belgians.495 The expansion to certain 
children is not, then, evidence of a ‘slippery slope’. Further, the inclusion of competent 
children in the assisted dying system in Belgium is wholly consistent with the approach 
taken to treatment of competent children in England and Wales, where Gillick-competent 
children are afforded the opportunity to make decisions about their treatment, including 
where those decisions will lead to their death, subject to the consent of the child’s parents 
and/or a determination of the court.496 Finally, the expansion of the assisted dying regime 
to include capacitous minors in the Belgian system had been a matter of inquiry from the 
outset, as is the case in Canada (where the amending legislation expressly requires the 
federal Ministers of Health and Justice to consider expanding the scheme to include 
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requests by mature minors497) and Victoria (where the eligibility for ‘competent mature 
minors’ was considered).498 There is, then, no evidence of ‘slippery slopes’ in permissive 
jurisdictions. This is consistent with Justice Smith’s finding that the evidence from 
permissive jurisdictions ‘serve[d] to allay fears’ of a slippery slope.499 
5. Conclusion 
Justice Smith’s trial judgment in Carter is, and remains, a highwater mark when it comes to 
collating, analysing and applying the evidence relating to assisted dying in the context of 
human rights disputes. Nevertheless, the English courts have been quick to reject the utility 
of the judgment, citing apparent differences in the rights, analyses and evidence in issue. 
This chapter has demonstrated that, contrary to the claims of the English courts, the rights 
and analyses at the centre of the Carter proceedings overlap considerably with Article 8 of 
the ECHR and the proportionality assessment undertaken with respect to same. As for the 
evidence, it is inevitable that a decision which is over 10 times the length and which relied 
on evidence from over 50 leading experts including, crucially, their cross-examination, 
would cite different evidence to that relied upon by an English court hamstrung by the 
usual rule precluding cross-examination of witnesses in judicial review proceedings.500 
Nevertheless, when regard is had to the evidence before Justice Smith vis-à-vis that which 
was before the English courts considering s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 following Carter, it 
is clear that the evidence before Justice Smith was a far more detailed version of that which 
was before the English courts. Accordingly, the judgment in Carter is of significant utility 
to English courts considering the compatibility of s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 with the 
ECHR, especially Articles 2, 3 and 8. However, the trial judgment in Carter was delivered 
7 years ago, and caution must necessarily attend reliance upon data and conclusions that 
are dated.  
Having established the relevance and utility of Carter, this chapter examined the evidence 
before, and conclusions of, Justice Smith in respect of the three ‘legitimate aims’ of the 
blanket ban in England and Wales outlined in Chapter Four: protecting individuals 
vulnerable to undue influence; protecting the doctor/patient relationship; and, protecting 
the sanctity of life. In respect of each aim, Justice Smith determined that the evidence did 
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not support a blanket ban on assisted dying. Rather, a more fairly balanced approach was 
possible, in which certain individuals could access assistance in dying, while safeguards 
could minimise the risks. Given, however, the length of time that had passed since the 
delivery of Justice Smith’s judgment, it was necessary to consider what impact, if any, 
subsequent empirical evidence had had on the trial judge’s findings.  
An examination of data collated by regulatory bodies in permissive jurisdictions, in 
particular Belgium, the Netherlands, Oregon and Canada, together with the results of 
research conducted after Carter, confirmed the findings of the trial judge. In particular, in 
the jurisdictions surveyed (which reflected a cross section of assisted dying systems), 
individuals in their seventies, with terminal cancer continue to be the highest proportion 
of individuals to access assistance in dying. Further, rates of non-compliance with 
safeguards are consistently low across the jurisdictions surveyed, with cases of non-
compliance (where information is available) tending to involve complex cases where 
opinions can and do reasonably differ as to the appropriate course of action. It is notable, 
also, that there is evidence that some doctors in England and Wales administer increasingly 
high doses of pain relief with the intention of bringing about the patient’s death (i.e. 
euthanasia) and it is undeniable that individuals are assisted to die in England and Wales.501 
Legalising assisted dying would provide greater transparency in respect of such practices 
which, in turn, would minimise the risk to vulnerable individuals. As for the doctor/patient 
relationship, subsequent research has confirmed the findings of Justice Smith that while 
assisted dying inevitably impacts upon the doctor/patient relationship, it is not per se 
negative and can, in fact, be positive, by allowing patients to discuss their end-of-life care 
openly with their treating physicians. Finally, while of paramount importance, the principle 
of the sanctity of life can and does give way to other competing principles including self-
determination and autonomy in other end-of-life contexts (i.e. withdrawal and refusal of 
life-sustaining treatment) and legalising assisted dying in specific circumstances so as to 
enable individuals to exercise their autonomy and self-determination is completely 
compatible with, and does not undermine, the existing approach to sanctity of life concerns 
in end-of-life care. There is also no evidence of slippery slopes materialising in permissive 
jurisdictions.  
The findings of Justice Smith, together with subsequent data available from permissive 
jurisdictions, not only confirm the conclusion reached in the preceding chapter that the 
 
501 Seale (2006) and (2009) (n 376).  
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blanket ban on assisted suicide in England and Wales is incompatible with Article 8 of the 
ECHR, but also demonstrate that permissive schemes do not lead to the risks which the 
blanket ban is said to be necessary to protect against. In those circumstances, and recalling 
that a ‘guaranteed-to-function’ alternative is not a valid legal requirement before a measure 
can be found to violate Article 8 of the ECHR, the evidence strongly suggests that there is 
an alternative which does not pose the risks prophesised by the State and which is, then, 
‘guaranteed-to-function’. Certainly, such schemes achieve a better balance between the 
competing rights and will better protect individuals vulnerable to undue influence, than 
the current de facto system in England and Wales of permitting benevolent assistance of 
loved ones who are terminally ill or elderly or are suffering intolerably as a result of a 





DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF END-OF-LIFE PRACTICES: DISCRIMINATION 
UNDER ARTICLE 14 OF THE ECHR?  
1. Introduction 
As the preceding chapters have shown, there is a strong argument that the blanket ban on 
assisted suicide in England and Wales is incompatible with the rights in the ECHR to: life 
(Article 2); freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3); and, 
private life (Article 8). Having considered those substantive rights, it remains to be 
determined whether the blanket ban on assisted suicide is discriminatory, in violation of 
Article 14. This is an argument that has been litigated before both the domestic courts and 
the ECtHR but none of those courts concluded that the ban violated any of the substantive 
rights in the ECHR. More recently, Paul Lamb (who was a party to the Nicklinson 
proceedings) has written to the Justice Secretary arguing that the ban is discriminatory.502 
In light of the conclusions reached in earlier chapters, this chapter will consider whether 
the ban is, in fact, discriminatory. In so doing, this chapter will examine not only whether 
the ban has a disproportionate impact on some individuals as a result of their medical 
condition/physical disability, but also whether the ban fails to treat like cases alike. The 
latter examination turns on what acts constitute ‘suicide’ for the purposes of the Suicide 
Act 1961. If it is the case that certain permissible end-of-life practices such as the 
withdrawal/refusal of life-sustaining treatment constitute ‘suicide’ as that term is employed 
in s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961, the law fails to treat like cases alike, since the ban is only 
applied to some forms of assisted suicide.  
2. Discrimination 
2.1. General principles  
Article 14 of the ECHR provides: 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status. 
 
502 Leigh Day, ‘Paul Lamb to bring new legal case for the right to die’ (7 May 2019) 
<https://www.leighday.co.uk/News/2019/May-2019/Paul-Lamb-to-bring-new-legal-case-for-the-right-
to> accessed 11 June 2019.  
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Article 14 has no standalone effect; it ‘complements the other substantive provisions of 
the Convention and the Protocols thereto.’503 While the application of Article 14 does not 
‘presuppose a breach of the [substantive] provisions ... there can be no room for its 
application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of them.’504 The 
preceding chapters have established that the blanket ban on assisted suicide engages the 
right to life (Article 2), the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment (Article 3) and the right to private life (Article 8), and Article 14 thus applies. 
Under Article 14: 
[A] difference in treatment between persons in analogous or relevantly similar 
positions is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification, that is 
if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not a reasonable relationship of 
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.505  
The State has a margin of appreciation in ‘assessing whether and to what extent differences 
in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment.’506 The ECtHR has also held 
that ‘a general policy or measure that has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a 
particular group may be considered discriminatory notwithstanding that it is not 
specifically aimed at that group.’507 Additionally, Article 14 requires that States ‘treat 
differently persons whose situations are significantly different.’508 The list of prohibited 
grounds of discrimination in Article 14 is not exhaustive and has been held to include a 
person’s disability and medical condition.509  
2.2. Disproportionately prejudicial effect   
In Pretty v United Kingdom, the ECtHR considered the applicant’s complaint that she had 
been discriminated against in the enjoyment of the right to choose the manner and timing 
of her death (as protected by Article 8) ‘in that the domestic law permit[ed] able-bodied 
persons to commit suicide yet prevent[ed] an incapacitated person from receiving 
assistance in committing suicide.’510 While the ECtHR framed Ms Pretty’s argument as one 
 
503 See, for instance, Molla Sali v Greece App no 20452/14 (ECtHR, 19 December 2008) [123].  
504 ibid.  
505 Molla Sali (n 503) [88].  
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507 D.H. v Czech Republic App no 57325/00 (ECtHR, 13 November 2007) [175].  
508 ibid. 
509 See, for instance, Stec and Ors v United Kingdom App nos 65731/01 and 65900/01 (ECtHR, 12 April 2006) 
[50]; I.B v Greece App no 552/10 (ECtHR, 3 October 2013) [73]; Glor v Switzerland App no 13444/04 (ECtHR, 
30 April 2009) [53]. See, also, Burnip v Birmingham City Council [2012] EWCA Civ 629 in which the Court of 
Appeal confirmed that disability was a prohibited basis of discrimination for the purposes of Article 14.  
510 Pretty v United Kingdom (n 7) [87].  
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based on a failure to treat materially different cases differently, this seems to 
misconceptualise Ms Pretty’s case. As the ECtHR noted, Ms Pretty’s argument was that 
‘She was prevented from exercising a right enjoyed by others who could end their lives 
without assistance because they were not prevented by any disability from doing so. She 
was therefore treated substantively differently and less favourably than those others.’511 It 
appears from both the House of Lords’ reasons and the judgment of the ECtHR that Ms 
Pretty’s case with respect to discrimination was, in fact, based on the contention that an 
objectively neutral law (i.e. one that applied to everyone) had a disproportionately 
prejudicial effect on individuals who wanted to die by suicide but were unable to do so 
because of their medical condition and/or physical disability and was, thus, discriminatory.  
The House of Lords rejected Ms Pretty’s Article 14 claim since ‘[t]he law confers no right 
to commit suicide’ and, consequently, the argument that the ban prevented the physically 
disabled, but not the able bodied, from exercising a right to commit suicide failed. Further, 
the ban prevented all individuals from accessing assistance in dying by suicide; there was 
no differential treatment. In contrast, Justice Smith in Carter held that the analogous ban 
in Canada was discriminatory because it had ‘a more burdensome effect on persons with 
physical disabilities than on others’ and the ban thus created a distinction based on physical 
disability.512 To use the nomenclature of Article 14 of the ECHR, Justice Smith determined 
that an apparently neutral law (a ban that applied to everyone) put persons having a 
physical disability at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons without a 
physical disability and that amounted to discrimination on the basis of a person’s disability.  
The same argument can be applied to s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 in the context of 
Article 14 of the ECHR. The ban, which is ostensibly neutral insofar as it applies to 
everyone, imposes a disproportionate burden on individuals like Ms Pretty who, due to 
their medical condition (a protected characteristic for the purposes of Article 14), are 
physically incapable of dying by suicide without assistance. People without medical 
conditions that compromise their physical ability are not similarly affected. The latter are 
able to take their own lives without assistance and can, thus, exercise their right to choose 
the manner and timing of their deaths in a way that individuals who are physically disabled 
cannot because of the ban. While the ban applies to both able bodied and physically 
disabled individuals, the: 
 
511 ibid [85] (emphasis added).  
512 Carter (n 13) [1077].  
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[M]eans of suicide available to non-disabled persons ... are much less onerous than 
self-imposed starvation and dehydration [being the means of suicide available to 
individuals like Tony Nicklinson], and it is only physically disabled persons who 
are restricted to that single, difficult course of action.513  
There is, then, a strong argument that the ban is discriminatory because it has a 
disproportionately prejudicial impact on individuals like Tony Nicklinson and Paul Lamb 
and Noel Conway who, because of their medical condition and/or physical disability, are 
unable to suicide without assistance. It is notable that the Supreme Court, in rejecting Mr 
Conway’s leave for appeal, observed that once he becomes dependent on continuous 
ventilation he could bring about his death by refusing to consent to its continued 
administration. As the Supreme Court said ‘withdrawal would usually lead to his death 
within a few minutes, although it can take a few hours or in rare cases days.’514 But, as 
Justice Smith held in Carter, the fact that the only means of suicide available to individuals 
like Mr Conway is the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment provides evidence of the 
differential treatment the ban imposes on such individuals and that difference is based on 
their medical condition and/or disability which is a prohibited basis of discrimination 
under Article 14.  
The same arguments are equally applicable to the prohibition on euthanasia. For 
individuals who are physically incapable of taking the final step necessary to suicide (for 
instance, swallowing a lethal dose of medication), permitting assisted suicide will not 
redress the disproportionately prejudicial effect that the offence of murder has on them. 
For such individuals to bring about their deaths they are restricted to self-imposed 
starvation and dehydration or the refusal of life-saving antibiotics in the event of an 
infection. Individuals without such disabilities are not similarly restricted.   
There is also evidence that the ban has a disproportionately adverse impact on individuals 
like Omid T who, as a result of their medical condition and likely deterioration and death, 
are forced to take their lives prematurely. Individuals who do not have a medical condition 
that will result in a deterioration to such a state that their quality of life is severely 
diminished or will cause a prolonged, painful and undignified death are not similarly 
compelled to take their lives prematurely. Likewise, for individuals like Diane Pretty, 
Omid T and Noel Conway, the criminalisation of assistance constitutes inhuman or 
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degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR. Again, the ban has a 
disproportionately adverse impact on those individuals who, because of their medical 
condition, would die by suicide with assistance but are precluded from lawfully doing so.  
There is, then, a strong argument that the blanket ban on assisted suicide in England and 
Wales is discriminatory as it has a disproportionately prejudicial effect on individuals who 
are physically incapable of dying by suicide without assistance. That argument is similarly 
applicable to the prohibition on euthanasia which has a disproportionately prejudicial 
effect on individuals like Tony Nicklinson who are physically incapable of suiciding (i.e. 
they cannot do the final act necessary to suicide, such as swallowing a lethal dose of 
medication). Insofar as this form of discrimination can be justified, it must have an 
‘objective and reasonable justification’. Discrimination will not meet that threshold ‘if it 
does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or if there is not a “reasonable relationship of 
proportionality” between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised’.515 The 
conclusions in Chapters Four and Five concerning the ban’s legitimate aim(s) and 
proportionately are germane and, as demonstrated in those chapters, the blanket ban on 
assisted suicide is not proportionate to the justifications proffered by the State. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, the same conclusion applies to the prohibition on euthanasia. 
A blanket prohibition in cases of individuals who are suffering intolerably as a result of a 
terminal or life-limiting condition or who are suffering as a result of geriatric syndromes is 
not proportionate to any of the aims proposed for the ban on assisted suicide. There is, 
then, a strong argument that the disproportionately adverse impact of the ban on assisted 
suicide and euthanasia on individuals like Diane Pretty, Tony Nicklinson, Noel Conway 
and Omid T on the basis of their medical condition and/or physical disability is unjustified. 
The ban on assisted suicide and euthanasia thus violates Article 14, taken in conjunction 
with Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the ECHR.  
There is, however, another basis upon which it could be argued that the ban on assisted 
suicide is discriminatory: the failure to treat like cases alike. As the ensuing analysis reveals, 
the meaning of ‘suicide’ for the purposes of the Suicide Act 1961 and, in particular, the 
legal principles of intention and causation applicable to same, cover certain instances of 
withdrawal/refusal of life-sustaining treatment. While English law permits those forms of 
assisted suicide, it prohibits absolutely other forms of assisted suicide and the basis for that 
differential treatment is the individual’s medical condition. If the individual is terminally ill 
 
515 See, for instance, Fabris v France (2013) 57 EHRR 19 [56].  
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and receiving life-sustaining treatment, they can die by suicide with assistance by refusing 
or seeking the withdrawal of that treatment. If the individual is not receiving life-sustaining 
treatment, they cannot avail themselves of an assisted death. For the same reasons given 
in Chapters Four and Five and above, the justification(s) for this discrimination (insofar as 
it can be justified) are neither objective nor reasonable; insofar as they are legitimate, a 
blanket ban is disproportionate and the differential treatment is discriminatory.  
3. The legal definition of ‘suicide’ in England and Wales  
Suicide has been the subject of legal, philosophical, medical, sociological and religious 
debate for millennia and ‘The subject ... is now in pretty much the same state as when it 
began.’516 Common amongst these disparate fields of study is the absence of an agreed 
definition of suicide. Of the innumerable definitions presently pervading the academic and 
medical literature, Margaret Battin has observed that: 
It can be argued that terminological differences often serve to mark views about 
the morality of self-killing in various circumstances or for various reasons and that 
the wide range of terms used in cases of voluntary, knowing causation of one’s 
own death serves this purpose...517 
Definitions serve many and varied purposes and ‘a definition for the purposes of law may 
and sometimes should differ from one for scientific, ethical or other purposes.’518 Thus, 
for example, what constitutes suicide in the medical field may not constitute suicide for 
the purposes of the Suicide Act 1961. A potential explanation for the absence of a 
definition of ‘suicide’ in the Suicide Act 1961 (and, indeed, the lack of an examination of 
what suicide means for the purposes of the Act by either the courts or Parliament) is the 
assumption that ‘suicide’ has a ‘plain’ or ‘ordinary’ meaning.519 Such an assumption, 
however, ignores the fact that there is no single, uniform (and uncontroversial) 
understanding of ‘suicide’ such as would justify the title ‘plain’ or ‘ordinary’ meaning. 
Indeed, ‘the word [suicide] ... is peculiar’; the Latin word, suicidium, from which the 
English ‘suicide’ derives, is not ‘classical Latin’ and ‘could only have meant “the killing of 
 
516 Glanville Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (Faber & Faber Limited 1958), 224. 
517 Margaret P Battin (ed), The Ethics of Suicide: Historical Sources (OUP 2015), 7-8 (emphasis added). 
518 Michael D Bayles, ‘Definitions in law’ in James Fetzer, David Shatz and George Schlesinger (eds), 
Definitions and Definability: Philosophical Perspectives (Springer 1991), 253.  
519 This being the ‘cardinal rule’ of statutory interpretation: Daniel Greenberg (ed) Craies on Legislation (11th 
edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2017), ch 17.  
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a pig”’.520 More importantly, it ignores the fact that, as the ensuing discussion will 
demonstrate, there is a common law definition of suicide. 
3.1.  The common law prohibition on suicide 
‘Contexts are crucial’ when distilling legal meaning and the prohibition on assisted suicide 
is rooted in the common law’s criminalisation of suicide.521  While ‘no exact date exists for 
the creation of the first antisuicide legal norms ... [f]airly certain, however, is the fact that 
suicide was not considered to be a felony until the fourteenth century.’522 Thereafter, 
suicide was classified as ‘felo de se’, the punishments for which included the forfeiture of 
property, the denial of a Christian burial, burying at a crossroads, and the driving of a stake 
through the body.523 As to the origins of the phrase ‘felo de se’, ‘felo’ referred to ‘a class of 
crimes involving a breach of trust between a person and his lord’ and ‘felo-de-se or felon 
of self was derived from felo when self-murder came to be viewed as a felony.’524 The 
reclassification of suicide as a felony (i.e. felo de se) is frequently attributed to a desire to 
render the royal coffers the recipient of the suicide’s goods as opposed to the suicide’s 
lord: ‘every felon forfeited his goods to the King, [thus] it only had to be decided that 
suicide was a felony to divert forfeiture from the suicide’s immediate lord to the royal 
coffers.’525 A finding, then, that a deceased was guilty of felo de se had significant legal and 
ecclesiastical consequences for the deceased and their family. 
As to the substance of the offence, felo de se was said to constitute self-murder, thus 
incorporating the mens rea requirement for murder.526 Writing in the 18th century, 
Blackstone observed that the law: 
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  [R]anked felo de se [which he described as self-murder] among the highest crimes, 
making it a particularly peculiar species of felony, a felony committed on one’s self 
... A felo de se therefore is he that deliberately puts an end to his own life, or commits 
any unlawful malicious act, the consequence of which is his own death...527 
Similarly, Hale’s ‘The History of the Pleas of the Crown’ (first published in 1736) provided 
that ‘felo de se or suicide is, where a man of age of discretion, and compos mentis, voluntarily 
kills himself by stabbing, poison, or any other way.’528 And, in 1866, Plunkett’s ‘Australian 
Magistrate’ provided as a statement of offence for suicide that the deceased ‘did unlawfully 
take a certain quantity of a certain deadly poison [or destructive things] called –, with intent 
then and thereby feloniously to kill and murder himself.’529 By at least the 18th century, 
then, there was a common law definition of suicide (or, rather, felo de se) which required 
that the deceased brought about their death while of sound mind and with the intent of 
bringing about that consequence.  
Assisting or encouraging another to die by suicide (including by way of suicide pacts) was 
also unlawful. The state of the law was put in the following terms in the 1823 decision of 
Rex v Dyson: 
If a man encourages another to murder himself and is present abetting him while 
he does so, such person is guilty of murder as a principal. If two encourage each 
other to murder themselves together, and one does so, but the other fails in the 
attempt upon himself, he is a principal in the murder of the other. But if it be 
uncertain whether the deceased really killed himself or whether he came to his 
death by accident before the moment when he meant to destroy himself, it will not 
be murder in either.530 
Those encouraging and/or assisting were, then, guilty of the murder of the person who 
had suicided and individuals who survived a suicide pact were either guilty of: 
• Murder in the second degree (if each member of the pact was responsible for 
taking his/her own life) and attempted murder of themselves; or,  
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• Murder as a principal in the first degree (if the survivor killed the other person) 
and attempted murder of themselves.531 
While the law relating to suicide remained relatively unchanged between the 16th and 17th 
centuries, from the late 18th century significant amendments were made to the various laws 
penalising suicide. Specifically, the Right to Burial Act (1823) and the Internments (felo de 
se) Act (1882) formally recognised the right to a religious burial for a person who had died 
by suicide and the Abolition of Forfeiture Acts (1870) abolished forfeiture for penal 
offences (including felo de se).532 These amendments, which ameliorated (somewhat) the 
ecclesiastical and legal consequences of a finding of felo de se, arose out of ‘social, political, 
and cultural changes’ (including, importantly, changes to inheritance laws533) which led to 
the secularisation of suicide and the associated cessation of the punishment of suicide by 
coroners and their juries.534 One of the primary ways in which this ‘palliation’ of the 
criminalisation of suicide was achieved was through the increasing number of non compos 
mentis findings by the coroner or their jury.535 A person who was determined to be non 
compos mentis when they died could not be said to have formed the requisite intention and 
could thus not be found to have died by felo de se. Thus, ‘By the end of the eighteenth 
century, a suicide was rarely pronounced sane.’536  
Notwithstanding these legal changes, ‘suicide was still considered felo-de-se’ in England 
and Wales and attempted suicide continued to be an offence until suicide was 
decriminalised by the Suicide Act in 1961.537 Despite the decriminalisation of suicide, 
assisting and/or encouraging suicide remained (and remains) an offence. Indeed, when the 
Suicide Act was being read in the House of Lords, debate surrounded the potential 
illogicality of criminalising the aiding and abetting (as the offence was then phrased) of an 
act which, by virtue of that Act, was no longer itself an offence.538 Nevertheless, s 2 of the 
Suicide Act 1961 passed reading, thus criminalising the aiding, abetting, counselling or 
procuring of another’s suicide. While pursuant to s 2(1) ‘complicity in another’s suicide or 
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attempted suicide [is] still an offence’, it no longer constitutes murder; rather, it is a distinct 
indictable offence punishable by a maximum of 14 years’ imprisonment.539 Significantly, 
for instant purposes, Parliament did not consider it necessary to define ‘suicide’ for the 
purposes of s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 and, unless expressly stated otherwise, Parliament 
must be presumed to have intended for the phrase to bear the same meaning throughout 
the Act.540 ‘Suicide’ as used in s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 must, then, have the same 
meaning as ‘suicide’ in s 1 which decriminalised the act. The definition of suicide for the 
purposes of s 2 is, then, the same as that which pertained while suicide was an offence 
under the common law and which, it is submitted, persists in large part in respect of suicide 
conclusions in the coronial context.  
The question of whether a death was by way of suicide has, at least since the advent of the 
offence of felo de se, been a matter for the coroner. The office of coroner was established 
in 1194 and, consistent with the practice today ‘The coroner was primarily responsible for 
making inquiries into all cases in which death was due to a cause other than a natural one, 
notably cases in which a question of criminal responsibility occurred (e.g. suicides, 
homicides and other types of violent death).’541 
The decriminalisation of suicide and the criminalisation of the offence of assisted suicide 
in s 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 did not alter that position; coroners remain mandated to 
investigate a death where, inter alia, there is reason to suspect that ‘the deceased died a 
violent or unnatural death’ (which includes suicide).542 A material fact in any trial under 
s 2(1) of the Suicide Act 1961 will be whether the individual died by suicide (leaving aside 
for now the fact that the offence in s 2(1) covers attempted suicide) and, in the absence of 
any indication by Parliament that ‘suicide’ for the purposes of the Suicide Act 1961 has a 
meaning distinct from that employed in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (‘CJA’) (for 
instance, by providing a definition in either Act), ‘suicide’ must have the same meaning 
both in the coronial context and under s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961. Were it otherwise, a 
person may be found guilty of an offence under the Suicide Act in circumstances where 
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the deceased was not found to have died by suicide by a coroner/jury. There is nothing to 
suggest that Parliament intended the potential for such a legal absurdity.543 
Indeed, Parliament has taken steps to avoid precisely that situation by requiring coroners 
to suspend an investigation into a person’s death where a prosecuting authority so requests 
because a person may be charged with a ‘homicide offence’ (which includes assisting or 
encouraging suicide under s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961) or where the coroner becomes 
aware that a person has been charged with such an offence in respect of the deceased.544 
If ‘suicide’ had a distinct meaning under the Suicide Act 1961 to that employed by the CJA, 
there would be no need to suspend an investigation given that the coroner’s finding would 
have no impact on the criminal proceedings. If, as is submitted, suicide does have the same 
meaning in both Acts, it is of course necessary that an inquest be suspended where 
proceedings may or have been brought under the Suicide Act 1961 to avoid the absurd 
situation in which a person is convicted of an offence under the Suicide Act while the 
deceased is found not to have died by suicide by the coroner or vice versa. This 
interrelationship between coronial proceedings involving suicide and proceedings under 
s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 is confirmed by the decision of Ex Parte Luca.545 That case 
concerned the applicability of the common law year and a day rule in coronial proceedings 
concerning suicide. Having determined that the rule, which applied when suicide was a 
crime, must still apply where a person was charged under s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961, the 
Court agreed with the submission that, while ‘suicide’ may have ceased to be a crime, it 
remained a creature which the common law recognised, including the year and a day rule. 
The Court also accepted the submission that ‘A verdict of suicide ... should not be recorded 
now that suicide is no longer criminal when it could not have been recorded when it was.’ 
The significance of the decision to the instant inquiry rests in the Court’s examination of 
the common law rules applicable to criminal proceedings under the Suicide Act 1961 in 
deciding what rules were applicable in coronial proceedings involving a potential suicide. 
If ‘suicide’ meant different things for the purposes of the Suicide Act vis-à-vis the CJA, 
common law rules applicable to the former would not be applicable to coronial 
proceedings and the High Court reached the opposite conclusion thereby confirming the 
ongoing interplay between criminal and coronial proceedings involving suicide.  
 
543 See, for instance, Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v DCC Holdings (UK) Limited 
[2011] 1 WLR 44, [2010] UKSC 58.  
544 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, Schedule 1, ss 1(2) and 2(2).  
545 R v Inner West London Coroner; Ex parte Luca [1989] QB 249.  
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Given this overlap between the coronial jurisprudence and the Suicide Act 1961, and 
considering the wealth of case law regarding the meaning of suicide in the former, in 
contrast with the lack of analogous case law under the Suicide Act 1961, the ensuing 
section will examine how (if at all) the coronial jurisprudence has developed the common 
law definition of suicide proffered by Blackstone (‘self-murder’) and Hale (‘voluntarily 
kill[ing] [one]self’) with a view to distilling the present definition of ‘suicide’ for the 
purposes of the Suicide Act 1961 (and, incidentally, the CJA).   
3.2. ‘Suicide’ and the CJA: the meaning of ‘suicide’ 
The CJA and the Coroners (Inquest) Rules 2013 (‘the Rules’) (which deal with, inter alia, 
the reaching of conclusions546 of suicide by coroners and/or their juries) do not define 
‘suicide’. Case law concerning conclusions of suicide reveal that there are two elements 
which must be proven to the requisite standard of proof for a conclusion of suicide to be 
returned: 
1. That the deceased intended their own death; and, 
2. That they did an act with that intention which caused their death.547  
As was the case at the time of Blackstone and Hale, intention remains the central aspect 
of a suicide conclusion. Thus, in Ex Parte Thomas the Court of Appeal held that ‘in order 
to arrive at a verdict of suicide there must be evidence that the deceased intended the 
consequences of the act.’548 Similarly, in Ex Parte Walker, Leggatt J observed that the ‘facts 
[must] point irresistibly to the existence of a suicidal intent’ to support a suicide 
conclusion.549 Consistent with this case law, a Guidance document (which, though not 
legally binding, is nonetheless insightful550) produced by the Chief Coroner provides that: 
[C]oroners should make express reference in each case of possible suicide to the 
two elements which need to be proved: (i) [the deceased] took his/her own life; 
 
546 Since the enactment of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 ‘verdicts’ have been replaced with ‘conclusions’ 
(although courts still frequently use ‘verdict’). 
547 See, for instance, R (On the application of Lagos) v HM Coroner for the City of London [2013] 3 WLUK 332, 
[2013] EWHC 423 (Admin).  
548 R v Cardiff City Coroner; Ex parte Thomas [1970] 1 WLR 1475, 1478. See, also, Re Davis [1968] 1 QB 72 in 
which Sellers LJ opined that ‘[s]uicide is not to be presumed. It must be affirmatively proved to justify the 
finding. Suicide requires an intention’ (82) (emphasis added). 
549 R v Northamptonshire Coroner; Ex parte Walker (1989) 153 JP 289.  
550 R (On the application of Maughan) v Her Majesty’s Senior Coroner for Oxfordshire [2019] 1 All ER 561, [2018] 
EWHC 1955 (Admin). 
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and (ii) [the deceased] intended to do so (or, put together, ‘he/she intentionally 
took his/her own life’) ... Suicide must never be presumed...551 
Likewise, the seminal text on coronial law and practice – Jervis on Coroners – provides that 
a conclusion of suicide ‘must always be based upon some evidence that the deceased 
intended to take his own life.’552 Courts have also consistently reiterated that suicide cannot 
be presumed but, rather, must be ‘strictly proved’. Debate attends the standard of proof 
that applies to conclusions of suicide. The Divisional High Court in the recent decision of 
Maughan553 considered this issue at length and determined that the standard of proof is the 
civil standard, namely the balance of probabilities. This finding was confirmed by the Court 
of Appeal.554 Contrary case law including, for instance, Lagos555 which found that the 
standard was the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt, was held to be erroneous. 
There is much force in the Divisional High Court’s reasons in Maughan. In particular, as 
the Court emphasised, since coroners no longer play a role in the criminal justice system,556 
and given the differences in the nature and purpose of coronial proceedings compared 
with criminal and civil proceedings, especially the lack of parties in the former, their 
inquisitorial nature and the fact that ‘[t]he function of an inquest is to seek out and record 
as many of the facts concerning the death as public interest requires’557 without determining 
culpability/liability, there is ‘no justification in principle for ... requiring proof to any higher 
standard than the balance of probabilities.’ This conclusion derives further support from 
 
551 Chief Coroner, ‘Guidance No. 17: Conclusions: Short-Form and Narrative’ (2013) [62] 
<https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/guidance-no-17-conclusions.pdf> accessed 
30 July 2019 (citations omitted and emphasis added). 
552 Paul Matthew, Jervis on Coroners (13th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014), 13-67.  
553 Maughan (n 550). 
554 Maughan v Her Majesty’s Senior Coroner for Oxfordshire [2019] EWCA Civ 809, [2019] 3 All ER 567 
 [747].  
555 Lagos (n 547).  
556 Maughan (n 550) [34]: 
 Until 1977, it was the duty of a coroner's jury in any case where they found that the deceased had 
died through murder, manslaughter or infanticide, to state in the verdict the name of the person or 
persons considered to have committed the offence or to have been accessories to it. In such a case 
the record of the verdict (then known as the ‘inquisition’) would have the same effect as a bill of 
indictment committing the person or persons named to trial at what were originally the Courts of 
Assize and later the Crown Court. This power to commit originated before there were police forces 
or a fully established judicial system in England and Wales. It resembled, and was functionally 
equivalent to, that of the Grand Jury in criminal cases. The power was abolished by the Criminal 
Law Act 1977, section 56 , which provided: 
‘At a coroner's inquest touching the death of a person who came by his death by murder, 
manslaughter or infanticide, the purpose of the proceedings shall not include the finding 
of any person guilty of the murder, manslaughter or infanticide; and accordingly a 
coroner’s inquisition shall in no case charge a person with any of those offences.’ 
557 R v South London Coroner; Ex parte Thompson (1982) 126 SJ 625 (Lord Lane LCJ) cited in Maughan (n 550) 
[37].  
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the fact that in ‘civil proceedings the standard of proof of criminal conduct remains the 
ordinary civil standard’ and especially since suicide is no longer an offence.558    
The preceding analysis of the coronial case law reveals that there is a common law 
definition of ‘suicide’ which applies to the CJA (and the Rules) and which involves the 
doing of an act for the purposes of bringing about one’s death with the intention of 
bringing about that consequence. Such a definition is consistent with that expounded by 
Blackstone and Hale in the 18th century with respect to the common law offence of suicide 
(i.e. felo de se). Consistent with the presumption against the implied repeal of the common 
law, had Parliament intended for a different meaning to be given to ‘suicide’ as it appears 
in the Suicide Act 1961, the term would have been defined in that Act (whether at the time 
of enactment or as part of subsequent amendments, including when s 2(1) was amended 
in 2009). This is because ‘[s]tatutes are not presumed to make any alteration in the common 
law further or otherwise than the Act does expressly declare’.559As Lord Steyn observed in 
Pierson: 
For at least a century it has been ‘thought to be in the highest degree improbable 
that Parliament would depart from the general system of law without expressing 
its intention with irresistible clearness…’ The idea is even older. In 1855 Sir John 
Romilly observed that ‘…the general words of the Act are not to be so construed 
as to alter the previous policy of the law, unless no sense or meaning can be applied 
to those words consistently with the intention of preserving the existing policy 
untouched…’560 
The absence of any definition of ‘suicide’ in the Suicide Act 1961 indicates that Parliament 
did not intend to depart from or alter the common law meaning. That the standard of 
proof in coronial proceedings involving a potential suicide is the civil standard does not 
alter the fact that ‘suicide’ for the purposes of both coronial proceedings and proceedings 
 
558 Maughan (n 550) [40].  
559 Arthur v Bokenham (1708) 11 Mod. 148, cited in Daniel Greenberg (ed), Craies on Legislation: A Practitioners 
Guide to the Nature, Process, Effect and Interpretation of Legislation (10th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016) 14.1.7. 
Similarly:  
It is thought to be in the highest degree improbable that Parliament would depart from the general 
system of law without expressing its intention with irresistible clearness, and [to] give any such 
effect to general words merely because this would be their widest, usual, natural or literal meaning 
would be to place upon them a construction other than that which Parliament must be supposed 
to have intended. 
(Peter Benson Maxwell, On the Interpretation of Statutes (12th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 1969), 116). 
560 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Pierson [1998] AC 539, 587, [1997] UKHL 37 (citations 
omitted).  
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under the Suicide Act 1961 has a common law meaning. Applying a lower evidentiary 
threshold in coronial proceedings to that applied in criminal proceedings under s 2 of the 
Suicide Act 1961 does not alter the interrelationship between the two jurisdictions. Both 
employ the same definition of ‘suicide’, it is simply the case that the existence of the 
elements of that definition must be proved to different standards depending on the 
jurisdiction, which is entirely consistent with the different function of each jurisdiction. 
In sum, there is a common law definition of ‘suicide’ which applies to both the CJA and 
the Suicide Act 1961; ‘suicide’ as used in those Acts means the doing of an act for the 
purposes of bringing about one’s death and with the intention of bringing about that 
consequence. It is necessary to examine the content of that definition to determine what 
assisted dying practices properly fall within the remit of the Suicide Act 1961. More 
specifically, it is necessary to ascertain the: 
• Nature of the intention required to be demonstrated on the part of the suicide; 
and, 
• Degree of causation required (if any) between the act done by the suicide and their 
death. 
Only once an examination of those issues has been completed will it be possible to 
determine which assisted dying practices are covered by the Suicide Act 1961. This, in turn, 
will facilitate an examination of whether the ban is discriminatory in violation of Article 14 
of the ECHR. For the reasons given above, in particular the commonality of the meaning 
of ‘suicide’ between the coronial and criminal jurisdictions and the dearth of relevant case 
law examining what is meant by ‘suicide’ under the Suicide Act 1961, the appropriate 
starting point for an examination of these issues is the relevant coronial case law.  
2.2.1. Suicide and intention  
The law distinguishes between acting with intent and intentionally acting; the latter pertains 
to the act itself (for instance, stepping in front of a moving train) whereas the former 
concerns the outcome of the act (for instance, serious bodily injury or death).561 It is 
possible, then, to act intentionally without intending the consequences. For instance, a 
person stepping in front of a moving train to save a child only to be killed, or a person 
 
561 See, for instance, Glenys Williams, Intention and Causation in Medical Non-Killing: The Impact of Criminal Law 
Concepts on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide (Routledge-Cavendish 2007), 22-23; R A Duff, Intention, Agency and 
Criminal Liability (Wiley-Blackwell 1990); R A Duff, ‘Intention, Responsibility and Double Effect’ (1982) 32 
The Philosophical Quarterly 126.  
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running across tracks to reach a different platform who is struck by a passing train. While 
they were both acting intentionally, neither could not be said to have acted with intent (at 
least insofar as their deaths are concerned). As will be discussed, these hypothetical 
scenarios also illustrate the fact that it is acting with intent (that is, intending the 
consequences of the act) which is the chief focus of the definition of ‘suicide’.  
The various conceptualisations of intent contained in the relevant coronial jurisprudence 
consistently equate ‘intention’ with acting with intent:  
• ‘the deceased intended his own death; and ... he did an act with that intention’;562 
• ‘the deceased intended the consequences of the act’;563 
• the ‘deceased intended to take his own life’.564 
These formulations suggest a requirement of direct intention (i.e. acting with the purpose 
of bringing about one’s death) to support a conclusion of suicide. Unless there is evidence 
that the deceased acted for the purpose of bringing about their death, a suicide conclusion 
will not be open to the coroner/jury. But, s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 is a criminal offence 
and, recalling that ‘contexts are crucial’ when distilling meaning, it is necessary to examine 
whether intention for the purpose of ‘suicide’ in s 2 only encompasses direct intention or 
extends to foreseeable consequences as is the case in criminal law more generally.  
3.2.1.1. Criminal law conceptualisations of intention in England and Wales 
Notwithstanding the oft-cited claim that ‘intent’ is ‘an ordinary English word’,565 courts 
have repeatedly examined the content and scope of ‘intention’, primarily in respect of the 
mens rea of murder. In the seminal decision of Woollin, the House of Lords confirmed that 
intention includes both direct intention and oblique/indirect intention.566 While debate 
continues as to whether Woollin applies only to murder cases, the prevailing view is that it 
applies to criminal law more generally.567 Whereas direct intention refers to the purpose of 
 
562 Lagos (n 547) [35].  
563 Thomas (n 548), 1478. 
564 Matthew (n 552), 13-67. 
565 R v Moloney [1985] AC 905. See, also, Judicial Colleges, ‘Crown Court Compendium: Part I Jury and Trial 
Management and Summing Up’ (June 2018), 8-1 <https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/crown-court-compendium-pt1-jury-and-trial-management-and-summing-up-
june-2018-1.pdf> accessed 31 July 2019.  
566 R v Woollin [1998] 4 All ER 103. 
567 See, for instance, Findlay Stark, ‘It’s only words: On meaning and mens rea’ (2013) 72 Cambridge Law 
Journal 155; Gerard Coffey, ‘Codifying the meaning of “intention” in criminal law’ (2009) 73 Journal of Criminal 
Law 394; Itzhak Kugler, Direct and Oblique Intention in the Criminal Law: An Inquiry into Degrees of Blameworthiness 
(Routledge 2002); Glanville Williams, ‘Oblique Intention’ (1987) 46 Cambridge Law Journal 417. For arguments 
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the defendant’s behaviour, indirect intention incorporates the issue of foresight and may 
(but not must) be found if the jury is satisfied that ‘the consequence was a virtual certainty 
(barring some unforeseen intervention) as a result of the defendant’s actions and that the 
defendant appreciated that such was the case.’568 Lord Kerr summarised the development, 
and present state, of the law on intention in the following terms: 
In a trilogy of cases, R v Moloney [1985] AC 905; R v Hancock [1986] AC 455; and R 
v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82 the House of Lords held that intention is not restricted 
to consequences that are wanted or desired, but includes consequences which a 
defendant might not want to ensue, but which the jury find (a) are the virtually 
certain result of the defendant’s actions (barring some unforeseen intervention); 
and (b) are consequences which the defendant appreciated were virtually certain to 
occur. Before such an oblique intention could form the basis of a jury’s verdict, of 
course, precise directions to this effect would have to be given.569  
Consistent with Lord Kerr’s conceptualisation, the Law Commission described the current 
state of intention in criminal law as follows: 
At common law, someone must be taken to have intended something if they acted 
in order to bring it about. In that respect, ‘intention’ is partly defined by the 
common law. However, in unusual cases, typically murder cases, that definition 
has proven to be too narrow. It excludes from murder those cases that should be 
murder given [the defendant’s] especially high level of culpability. 
Accordingly, the following rule has been developed at common law. The jury may 
– but not must – find that the defendant (‘D’) intended the result if D thought it 
would be a certain consequence (barring some extraordinary intervention) of his 
or her actions, whether he or she desired it or not.570 
 
against generalising Woollin (n 566) see, for instance, Victor Tadros, ‘The system of the criminal law’ (2002) 
22 Legal Studies 448.  
568 R v Allen [2005] EWCA Crim 1344; Crown Court Compendium (n 565), [6].  
569 R v Gnango [2012] 1 AC 827, [2011] UKSC 59 [125]. 
570 Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (Law Com No 304, 28 November 2006), 3.12-
13 (emphasis in original). 
Pursuant to s 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967: 
A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence,— 
(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his 
actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those 
actions; but 
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It is, then, possible to be found to have acted with intent without having desired the 
consequences. As Glanville Williams observed, ‘Judges reject the proposition that the legal 
concept of intention in relation to the consequences of action necessarily involves desire 
of the consequence.’571 For example, in Hyam the accused was convicted of the murder of 
two children who died because of a fire which started after she poured petrol through the 
letterbox of their house and set it alight. The accused wanted to scare the woman who 
lived there (her former lover’s new partner) but did not intend to harm anyone. Regardless, 
she was found guilty of murder based on indirect intention.572 It must be noted that indirect 
intention is an ‘extremely rare’ occurrence and the construct was: 
  [D]esigned to help the prosecution fill a gap in the rare circumstances in which a 
defendant does an act which caused death without the purpose of killing or causing 
serious injury, but in circumstances where death or serious bodily harm had been 
a virtual certainty ... as a result of the defendant’s action and the defendant had 
appreciated that such was the case.573  
Thus, in Moloney, the House of Lords allowed the appeal and substituted a verdict of 
manslaughter on the basis that the evidence, which was to the effect that the appellant, 
who was heavily inebriated, did not know he was aiming the gun at his step-father, could 
not have appreciated that the virtually certain consequence of his conduct was that his 
step-father would be shot and either killed or very seriously injured.574  
The descriptions of intention in the coronial case law extracted above suggest that indirect 
intention is not sufficient to found a suicide conclusion; what is required is evidence of 
direct intention, that is, evidence that the deceased did an act for the purposes of bring 
about their death. This is hardly surprising. If indirect intention was sufficient to support 
a conclusion of suicide, a person fleeing from a violent attack who leaps from a window 
on the fourth floor and subsequently dies could be said to have had the requisite intention 
(i.e. indirect intention) for a suicide verdict. Yet, their purpose (i.e. direct intention) was 
the antithesis of death; they were actively trying to avoid it. Similarly, the good Samaritan 
who runs onto train tracks to help someone and is struck and killed by a passing train, the 
 
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the 
evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the 
circumstances. 
571 Williams (n 516), 417.  
572 Hyam v DPP [1975] AC 55.  
573 R v MD [2004] EWCA Crim 1391 at [29]. 
574 R v Moloney (n 565). 
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impending presence of which had been made known to waiting passengers, certainly did 
not act with the purpose of bringing about their death, though they may be said to have 
had indirect intention given the virtual certainty of being struck by the oncoming train.  
The principle of indirect intention plainly does not fit with the common law definition of 
suicide as an act done for the purpose of bringing about one’s death (and which brings about 
their death). It should also be borne in mind that, following the decriminalisation of suicide 
in 1961, there is no ascribing of guilt when considering whether a person has died by 
suicide575 and the common law definition ought to reflect this. As such, the lacuna in those 
‘extremely rare’ criminal cases which indirect intention is designed to potentially fill do not 
arise in the context of suicide. There is no compelling justification for stretching the mens 
rea of the common law definition of suicide beyond direct intention.  
Case law concerning suicide conclusions confirms that intention may be inferred from the 
evidence, but it is an inference of direct intention to bring about death (as opposed to death 
being a virtually certain consequence). As the Court in Hopper noted: 
It must not be taken that ... the Lord Chief Justice was ruling out verdicts of suicide 
in any case where there was an absence of positive evidence of intent or where the 
only evidence of intent and deliberation is to be inferred from the circumstances. 
It was conceded by counsel that if a man is found dead in his car with as pipe 
connecting the exhaust of the car into the interior of the car, it would be perfectly 
proper for a coroner to conclude that there was no possible explanation other than 
suicide...576 
Consistent with this observation, the Court in John577 held that ‘Where the act causing death 
was clearly deliberate the possibility of accident may be excluded and the circumstances 
may give rise to an irresistible inference of suicide even in the absence of a suicide note or 
a compelling antecedent history.’578 While this may suggest that a virtually certain 
consequence of death would be enough to meet the mens rea of suicide, the statement must 
be considered in light of the trial judge’s self-direction (with which the Court took no issue) 
 
575 Beyond the offence under s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 which has its own specific mens rea: the defendant’s 
act was intended to encourage or assist suicide or an attempt at suicide. Arguably, indirect intention would 
be sufficient to meet this element of a s 2 offence though this analysis is beyond the scope of the current 
inquiry. 
576 R v Her Majesty's Coroner for Essex; Ex parte Hopper (Queen’s Bench, 13 May 1988). 
577 R v HM Coroner for Newbury; Ex parte John (1992) 156 JP 456. 
578 ibid 
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that ‘I have to be satisfied that the deceased knew the probable consequence of his act and 
that he did that act voluntarily and that he intended such consequences to follow.’579 Plainly, the 
‘irresistible inference’ is that of direct intention, as opposed to virtually certain 
consequences, not least since in criminal law proceedings evidence of indirect intention 
does not inexorably lead to a finding that the defendant had the requisite mens rea. Rather, 
it is evidence from which the jury can infer intention. To suggest, then, that evidence of 
indirect intention could lead to an ‘irresistible inference’ of suicide in coronial proceedings 
would represent a fundamental alteration to (and expansion of) the criminal law 
conceptualisation of intention and, in the absence of reasons confirming such a reading, 
the judgment in John must be taken to be referring to direct intention and an ‘irresistible 
inference’ thereof.  
The direct intention to bring about death was inferred in Glover in which the deceased 
knowingly ingested 25 Distalgesic tablets (12 times the normal dose) within a short 
timeframe580 and in John where the deceased died because of hanging.581 In both cases, 
there was no direct evidence of suicidal intent (for example, a note or expressions of 
suicidal ideation in the immediate lead up to their deaths). In both cases, the intention that 
was inferred was the purpose of bringing about their death (i.e. direct intention). Both of 
the deceased persons were found to have done an act (ingesting a significant amount of 
Distalgesic tablets and hanging themselves) for the purpose of bringing about their death 
based on all of the evidence, even though there was no direct evidence of intention.  
In contrast, in Sreedharan582 the deceased had previously attempted suicide, had expressed 
suicidal ideation, was under a great deal of pressure and took an overdose of drugs 
prescribed to him by his GP in circumstances where it was accepted that the deceased 
likely knew the consequence could be fatal. While, ostensibly, such facts supported a 
suicide conclusion, the conclusion reached by the jury was unlawful killing based on the 
deceased’s doctor’s gross negligence in prescribing the relevant medication (the doctor, 
who had treated the deceased for some time, had provided the prescription at the request 
of the deceased’s mother without examining the deceased). Significantly, a suicide 
conclusion was not left to the jury. As Sreedharan demonstrates, the evidence may 
 
579 John (n 577) (emphasis added).  
580 R v HM Coroner for Devon; Ex parte Glover (1985) 149 JP 208.  
581 John (n 577). 
582 Sreedharan v HM Coroner for the County of Greater Manchester (Manchester City District) [2013] 3 WLUK 663, 
[2013] EWCA Civ 181. 
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conclusively demonstrate that the deceased did an act or acts which caused their death but 
if there is insufficient evidence that the deceased did that act for the purpose of bringing 
about their death, a suicide conclusion is highly unlikely. If the mens rea of a suicide 
conclusion could be met by evidence of indirect intention, it is likely that a conclusion of 
suicide would at the least have been left to the jury in Sreedharan. Lagos is also illuminating 
in this respect.583 The deceased, who had a history of depression (with suicidal ideation) 
and anxiety, climbed onto a barrier which, given its height, would have ‘taken some effort’ 
and was subsequently found on the concrete floor below (a distance of some 30 to 40 
feet).584 While the evidence ‘indicated that she impelled herself from the bar and fell 
backwards, resulting in her death’, a conclusion of suicide was not left to the jury as it was 
considered that ‘an accident could not be ruled out.’ Thus, it is not enough that the 
deceased did the act which directly ‘caused’ their death (for example, taking an overdose 
of prescription medication or impelling herself 30 to 40 feet onto concrete) and that it 
could be inferred from the evidence that death was a virtually certain consequence of that 
act and that was appreciated by the deceased (i.e. indirect intention). Sreedharan and Lagos 
demonstrate that the evidence must support a finding of direct intention for a conclusion 
of suicide to be open.  
That the common law definition of suicide incorporates direct intention alone is reflected 
in Stroud’s definition of ‘suicide’ which provides that ‘To “commit suicide” is for a person 
voluntarily to do an act ... for the purpose of destroying his own life, being conscious of that 
probable consequence, and having at the time sufficient mind to will the destruction of 
life.’585 This definition also highlights the fact that, as discussed above, the intention aspect 
of suicide is concerned with acting with intent, as opposed to acting intentionally. That is 
not to say that acting intentionally is an irrelevant consideration; as Stroud’s definition 
demonstrates, the deceased must have been found to have been acting intentionally (or 
‘voluntarily’). Indeed, as the Court of Appeal opined in Thomas ‘[s]uicide is voluntarily 
doing an act for the purpose of destroying one’s own life while one is conscious of what 
one is doing’.586 Where the evidence is insufficient to support a conclusion that the 
deceased acted intentionally, the coroner or jury should enter an open conclusion or, if the 
 
583 Lagos (n 547). See, also, the consistent outcome in R v City of London Coroner, Ex parte Barber [1975] 1 WLR 
1310. But, it should be noted that following Maughan (n 550), Lagos is not authoritative, at least insofar as the 
standard of proof is concerned.  
584 Lagos (n 547).  
585 Daniel Greenberg (ed), Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of words and Phrases (9th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2016), 
‘Suicide’ (emphasis added). 
586 Thomas (n 548), 1478. 
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evidence permits, a conclusion of accidental death.587 Thus, while the repeated references 
to intention in the context of suicide conclusions pertain to acting with intent (which refers 
to direct intention alone), to return a conclusion of suicide, the coroner or the jury must 
also be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the deceased also acted intentionally.  
A related issue that requires (brief) consideration is the extent to which the deceased must 
have been ‘competent’ to justify a conclusion of suicide.  
3.2.1.2. Suicide, intention and competence 
The significance of a finding that the suicide was non compos mentis was largely lost upon the 
decriminalisation of suicide in 1961. Nonetheless, the ‘trend’ of buffering a suicide verdict 
by reference to the deceased’s state of mind has persisted. While the latest iteration of the 
Rules omitted the optional phrase ‘whilst the balance of his mind was disturbed’ from the 
proposed form for a suicide conclusion, that has not precluded coroners/juries from 
returning a short-form conclusion of ‘suicide whilst the balance of [his/her] mind was 
disturbed’ (provided there is evidence to that effect).588 As to the origins of the phrase 
‘whilst the balance of his mind was disturbed’: 
A Departmental Committee on Coroners (1936) recommended ... that the verdict 
of felo de se be abolished, and that there should be no reference in the verdict to 
the deceased’s state of mind, but that the verdict should simply be that the deceased 
died by his own hand. But pending any such reform it became the common 
practice to adopt the form of words ... ‘while the balance of his mind was 
disturbed’.589 
Importantly, a finding that the deceased died by suicide ‘whilst the balance of his [or her] 
mind was disturbed’ does not ‘negative the intention to take his or her own life’.590 That is 
because ‘The verdict of suicide in an inquest is not specifically related to the deceased’s 
 
587 Barber (n 583), 1313 (Lord Widgery CJ): ‘Suicide must be proved by evidence, and if it is not proved by 
evidence, it is the duty of the coroner not to find suicide, but to find an open verdict.’ Similarly, in Hopper (n 
576) Parker LJ held that a verdict of suicide could not be returned because the coroner could not adequately 
have ‘excluded the possibility that the death had been caused by some unexplained accident.’ 
588 Matthew (n 552), 13-71. Although the Chief Coroner’s Guidance suggests that ‘there is usually no longer 
any need to add the words “whilst the balance of his mind was disturbed”’ (Chief Coroner’s Guidance 
(n 551), [63]). 
589 J W Cecil Turner, Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law (18th edn, Cambridge University Press 1962), 176. 
590 Matthew (n 552), 13-71.  
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state of mind, but purely to the evidence that he or she intended to kill himself or herself, 
and this verdict will stand irrespective of the state of his mind.’591 
Thus, the fact that the deceased had been diagnosed with a mental illness which may have 
increased the potential for their suicide prior to their death does not ipso facto preclude the 
coroner or jury from returning a conclusion of suicide, provided the evidence is sufficient 
to prove on the balance of probabilities that the deceased had the requisite intention at the 
relevant time.592  
3.2.1.3. Suicide and intention: conclusions  
An examination of the relevant jurisprudence reveals that intention remains ‘the essential 
ingredient’593 of the common law definition of ‘suicide’. Coronial case law confirms that 
only evidence of direct intention will meet the mens rea element of suicide; there is no scope 
for indirect intention in respect of the definition of ‘suicide’. Thus, to constitute ‘suicide’ 
either for the purposes of a suicide conclusion under the CJA or to reach a verdict in 
respect of an allegation of assisting or encouraging suicide under s 2 of the Suicide Act 
1961, the coroner or jury must be satisfied to the requisite standard of proof that the 
deceased acted to bring about their death and did so with the purpose of causing their 
death (direct intention).  
Having considered the scope of intention, the next section will examine the role (if any) 
causation plays in the definition of suicide for the purposes of the Suicide Act 1961.   
3.2.2. Suicide and causation  
Much of the debate (in the legal sphere and elsewhere) regarding what acts constitute 
‘suicide’ has turned on the question of causation. Indeed, one of the four factors Lord 
Bingham cited in Bland as reason for why withdrawal of treatment did not constitute 
suicide was that ‘it was not the discontinuance of artificial feeding but the patient’s 
condition and its underlying cause which caused his death.’594 But, is a patient who refuses 
life-sustaining treatment knowing that without it they will die and who does so with the 
intention of bringing about their death, any different to a person who, acting with the 
 
591 Sir Montague Levine and James Pyke, Levine on Coroners’ Courts (Sweet & Maxwell 2009), 35-07 (emphasis 
added).  
592 Thus, verdicts of suicide were returned in the following cases notwithstanding the fact that the deceased 
had been diagnosed as schizophrenic: R (On the application of Scott) v HM Coroner for Inner West London [2001] 
2 WLUK 320, [2001] EWHC Admin 105; R (On the application of the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis) v 
Coroner Southern District of Greater London [2003] 6 WLUK 782, [2003] EWHC 1829 (Admin).  
593 Levine and Pyke (n 591), 30-26.  
594 Bland (n 31), 814.  
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requisite intention, places themselves in the path of an oncoming train? In both cases, the 
individual acts so as to put themselves in the face of near-certain death. In both cases, have 
they not done an act causative of death? The ensuing discussion examines these questions 
with a view to distilling the ‘causation’ required for a finding of ‘suicide’ as that term is 
used both in the Suicide Act 1961 and the CJA.   
3.2.2.1. Causation in suicide conclusions  
As outlined above, in addition to the requisite mens rea, the common law definition of 
suicide also encompasses an actus reus: the doing of an act which causes death. In contrast 
with criminal jurisprudence which, as will be discussed below, (artificially) delineates 
between acts and omissions in the context of withdrawal/refusal of life-sustaining 
treatment, there is nothing in the relevant coronial case law to suggest that an ‘act’ in the 
context of the actus reus of suicide should not be accorded its ordinary meaning. Per the 
Oxford English Dictionary, ‘act’ includes to ‘bring about’, ‘to put in motion’ and to 
‘produce an effect’595 which plainly encompasses the giving of instructions to withdraw 
treatment, a refusal of treatment. Indeed, on this definition, an advance directive 
authorising palliative sedation could constitute an ‘act’. In each instance, the individual is 
taking action – an express instruction or the refusal of consent – to bring about/produce 
an outcome/effect, or to put in motion a chain of events that will lead to the intended 
outcome, namely the withdrawal/non-administration of life-sustaining treatment or the 
administration of palliative sedation. Given that a doctor cannot administer treatment 
without the informed consent of a (capacitous) patient, a request to withdraw treatment 
or the refusal of consent thereto will inexorably lead to the treatment’s withdrawal or non-
administration. If the doctor does not comply, they will be guilty of trespass to the 
person.596 In terms of palliative sedation, the doctor treating the patient (who is likely to 
be incapacitous at the time of its administration) is obliged to act in the patient’s best 
interests. Relevant to an assessment of those interests will be the previously expressed 
wishes of the patient, including their advance directive. A decision not to administer 
palliative sedation despite an advance directive would, then, occur only in very rare 
circumstances in which such treatment is contrary to the patient’s best interests. An 
advance directive could, thus, also satisfy the actus reus requirement of suicide. The ensuing 
analysis will consider the way in which coronial jurisprudence has articulated the causative 
 
595 Oxford English Dictionary Online (OUP 2019), ‘Act’ 
<https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/1889?rskey=Gk7oSu&result=5#eid> accessed 31 July 2019.  
596 See, Re B (n 33). 
 192 
relationship that must exist between the relevant ‘act’ and the person’s death for the act to 
satisfy the actus reus of suicide.  
Judicial enunciations of the actus reus of a suicide conclusion have variously required that 
the deceased: 
• did ‘an act for the purpose of destroying one’s own life’;597 
• committed ‘an act of self-destruction;’598 
• ‘wilfully and intentionally destroys himself’;599 
• ‘took his own life’;600 
• ‘killed himself’;601 
• ‘has taken his own life’;602 
• ‘did an act ... which caused his death.’603  
These formulations indicate that the deceased’s act must cause their death for the actus reus 
element to be met. As will be discussed, the coronial case law concerning causation in the 
context of suicide conclusions largely mirrors the approach taken to causation in the 
criminal law context. There is a spectrum or chain of causation, ranging from a traditional 
‘but for’ conceptualisation (i.e. but for the deceased’s act, death would not have occurred) 
to a broader, ‘common sense’ approach which considers the centrality of the deceased’s 
act to the outcome (i.e. the ‘significant’/’substantial’ and ‘operating’ cause). 
Notwithstanding those similarities, given the nature of coronial proceedings, it is possible 
(indeed, likely) that factors which may be considered too remote in the chain of causation 
to support a finding of culpability in criminal proceedings, may well be central to a coronial 
conclusion.  
An inquest:  
[I]s a fact-finding investigation and not a method of apportioning guilt. The 
procedure and rules of evidence which are suitable for one are unsuitable for the 
 
597 Thomas (n 548), 1478. 
598 Clift v Schwarbe (1846) 3 CB 437 at [472]. See, also, Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 
360. 
599 Advocate-General of Bengal v Ranee Surnomoyee [1864] UKPC 14. 
600 Chief Coroner’s Guidance (n 551), [44].  
601 R v HM Coroner for Derby and South Derbyshire; Ex parte Hart (2000) 164 JP 429 [65].  
602 Chambers v HM Coroner for Preston and West Lancashire [2015] 1 WLUK 166, [2015] EWHC 31 (Admin) 
[18].  
603 Lagos (n 547) [35] (emphasis added).  
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other. In an inquest it should never be forgotten that there are no parties, there is 
no indictment, there is no prosecution, there is no defence, there is no trial, simply 
an attempt to establish the facts. It is an inquisitorial process, a process of 
investigation quite unlike a trial where the prosecutor accuses and the accused 
defends, the judge holding the balance or the ring, whichever metaphor one 
chooses to use.604 
A distinction is drawn between the medical cause of death and by what means (formerly 
‘how’) the deceased met their death. The question of how/by what means has been 
described as a ‘question directed to the immediate physical means of death’.605 As the Chief 
Coroner’s Guidance provides: 
[T]he coroner (or the jury if there is one) must, in addition to finding the ‘medical 
cause of death’ ...make two key decisions: (1) findings of fact as to ‘how’ the 
deceased came by his or her death ... and (2) the conclusion as to the death ... These 
two decisions are separate but they must be closely related.606 
It is possible for several circumstances to have coalesced to lead to the medical cause of 
death, with each being directly relevant to the coronial conclusion.607 This is particularly so 
in the context of deaths which raise issues under Article 2 of the ECHR (generally, when 
the deceased was under the control of the State, for instance the death of a prisoner). In 
Article 2 inquests ‘the Coroner [is] required to examine not merely how [the deceased] met 
his death in the sense of the immediate cause of death, but also the circumstances in which 
he came by his death, in the sense of factors that may have contributed to his death.’608 
That is not to say, however, that non-Article 2 inquests are limited to an examination of 
the ‘last chain of causation’; rather, it is ‘for the coroner to decide on the particular facts 
of a case at what point “the chain of causation becomes too remote to form part of his 
 
604 Thompson (n 557) (cited with approval in McKerr v Armagh Coroner [1990] 1 All ER 865, 868).  
605 Lagos (n 547) [15].  
606 Chief Coroner’s Guidance (n 551) [17].  
607 See, for instance, R (Longfield Care Homes) v HM Coroner for Blackburn [2004] EWHC 2467 (Admin). 
608 R (on the application of Pounder) v HM Coroner for the North and South Districts of Durham and Darlington [2009] 
3 All ER 150, [2009] EWHC 76 (Admin) [22] (emphasis added).  
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investigation.”’609 Indeed ‘[i]t has long been recognised that the scope of inquiry at an 
inquest can extend wider than is strictly required for the production of the verdict’.610  
The obligation to explore the means by which the deceased met their death – including, in 
Article 2 inquests, the circumstances surrounding the death – and the absence of any 
obligation to find criminal or civil liability has the potential to significantly broaden the 
causative chain relevant to a suicide conclusion beyond that which would apply in the case 
of, for instance, a medical negligence claim or a murder trial.611 As coroners (and juries) 
have an obligation to record ‘as many of the facts concerning the death as [the] public 
interest requires’ an inquest considering a suicide conclusion will consider a number of 
links in the chain of causation including those which would perhaps be deemed too remote 
to satisfy the actus reus in a murder trial (i.e. an act which merely ‘sets the scene’612 and is, 
thus, not an ‘operating’ or ‘substantial’ cause such as would lead to a finding a guilt).613  
Thus, in Sreedharan (discussed above in respect of intention), while the evidence at least 
ostensibly supported a suicide conclusion, suicide was not left to the jury. Instead, the jury 
reached the conclusion of unlawful killing based on the deceased’s doctor’s gross 
negligence in prescribing the relevant medication. Leaving aside duty of care 
considerations, it is unlikely that the doctor’s prescription of the relevant medication would 
be sufficient to meet the ‘significant and operating cause’ test of causation in criminal law, 
not least since Mr Sreedharan knowingly taking too many tablets (assuming such an act 
could properly be said to be a free, voluntary, deliberate informed act) would likely 
constitute a novus actus interveniens such as to break the chain of causation between the 
doctor’s prescribing of the tablets and Mr Sreedharan’s death.614 Thus, even where the 
deceased did the act which directly ‘caused’ their death (for example, taking an overdose 
of prescription medication) a suicide conclusion may not be left to the jury because, inter 
 
609 R (On the application of Butler) v HM Coroner for the Black Country District [2010] EWHC 43 (Admin) [62] citing 
the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) decision in R v Inner West London Coroner; Ex parte Dallaglio [1994] 4 All 
ER 139. 
610 Lagos (n 547), [50]. 
611 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 5(3). See, also, McDonnell v HM Assistant Coroner for West London [2016] 
12 WLUK 123, [2016] EWHC 3078 (Admin) citing R (Hurst) v Inner North London Coroner [2007] 2 AC 189 
[7]-[8] 
612 See, for instance, R v Smith [1959] 2 WLR. 623, [1959] 2 QB 35, 43.  
613 Thompson (n 557).  
614 See, for instance, cases in which a person has provided a syringe loaded with narcotics to another who 
has injected themselves and subsequently died from a drug overdose such as R v Kennedy (No 2) [2007] 3 
WLR 612, [2007] UKHL 38.  
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alia, the broad approach to causation, when coupled with the lack of evidence of intention, 
supports a different conclusion entirely (as in, for example, Sreedharan).  
The preceding demonstrates the following in terms of the actus reus of suicide in the 
coronial context: 
• Given that an inquest is a fact-finding exercise and not a method of apportioning 
guilt, there is no justification for applying in the coronial context the artificial 
distinction between acts and omissions developed in Bland to avoid doctors being 
culpable of murder following the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment at a 
patient’s request or based on the patient’s best interests. As such, ‘act’ has its 
ordinary meaning, namely the taking of action to bring about a result, which would 
include the withdrawal of consent to life-sustaining treatment or, potentially, an 
advanced directive for palliative sedation;   
• Causation is broader than a simple ‘but for’ analysis and, given the nature of 
inquests, requires an examination of the immediate cause of death, the 
circumstances in which the deceased came by their death and, in inquests which 
raise concerns under Article 2 of the ECHR, an examination of the factors that 
may have contributed to their death;  
• While there is considerable overlap between the concepts of causation in the 
coronial context compared with criminal law proceedings, the fact-finding focus 
of an inquest means that, in some instances, a broader approach to causation will 
be taken such that an act will be found to have played a causal role in a person’s 
death in circumstances where it may not constitute a ‘substantial’ and ‘operating’ 
cause in criminal proceedings.  
Recalling that s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 is a criminal offence, and bearing in mind the 
different focus of a coronial inquest in contrast to a criminal trial, it is necessary to examine 
the approach to causation in criminal law proceedings.  
3.2.2.2. Criminal law conceptualisations of causation  
The offence of assisting or encouraging suicide in s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 is a ‘conduct 
crime’; it requires only that the accused did an act ‘capable of encouraging or assisting the 
suicide’ (or attempted suicide) of another with the requisite intention. So long as the act is 
‘capable’ of encouraging or assisting (and the requisite mens rea is demonstrated), the 
offence will be made out; there is no need to prove that the accused’s acts actually 
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encouraged or assisted another’s suicide (or attempt thereat). Causation, therefore, is 
irrelevant for the purposes of the offence of assisting or encouraging suicide. The conduct 
of the accused, however, is significantly different to the conduct of the deceased, the latter 
of which is the focus of this chapter. The common law definition of suicide reflects the 
fact that, were suicide still an offence, it would be a ‘result crime’: it requires proof that the 
deceased did an act for the purpose of bringing about their death and that act did in fact 
bring about their death. That suicide has a causative aspect is unsurprising given its 
historical relationship with murder, the latter of which is perhaps the common law’s most 
well-known result crime.  
3.2.2.2.1. Acts versus omissions   
In considering the criminal law’s approach to causation, it is necessary to address the 
distinction between acts and omissions as it has a direct bearing on the actus reus of suicide. 
A sharp distinction is drawn between acts and omissions and that distinction is deeply 
embedded within the criminal law.615 Yet, debate has surrounded, and continues to attend, 
the classification of acts and omissions, with academics proposing a range of potentials 
from a focus on bodily movements, to an examination of control.616 A considerable 
amount of attention has been directed to the act/omission distinction in respect of medical 
treatment (in particular, withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment). Outside of that context, 
the courts have tended to characterise omissions as the failure to act. For instance, people 
have been found guilty of manslaughter because of a failure (i.e. an omission) to obtain 
medical assistance for a person in respect of whom they had assumed a duty of care.617 In 
contrast, in the medical treatment context, the concept of omissions has been stretched 
such that, following the seminal decision of the House of Lords in Bland, doctors are taken 
not to have acted (i.e. they are said to have omitted to act) when they actively withdraw a 
patient’s life-sustaining treatment.618 In such circumstances, doctors are said to be omitting 
to treat the patient and, where death ensues, it is said to arise as a result of the patient’s 
underlying illness or condition.619 
 
615 See, for instance, Tracey Elliott and David Omerod, ‘Acts and omissions – A distinction without a 
difference?’ (2008) 39 Cambrian Law Review 40, 41.  
616 See, for instance, ibid, 41-42.  
617 See, for instance, R v Evans (Gemma) [2009] 1 WLR 1999, [2009] EWCA Crim 650. 
618 Bland (n 31). 
619 See, for instance, Bland (n 31), 866 and Royal College of Physicians, ‘Clinically-assisted nutrition and 
hydration (CANH) and adults who lack the capacity to consent: Guidance for decision-making in England 
and Wales’ (2018), 43 <https://www.bma.org.uk/advice/employment/ethics/mental-capacity/clinically-
assisted-nutrition-and-hydration/clinically-assisted-nutrition-and-hydration-canh-guidance> accessed 31 
July 2019. 
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The counterintuitive nature of this approach to omissions is most apparent when one 
considers its practical application to situations such as the withdrawal of artificial 
ventilation. While the steps taken by the doctor will vary based on how dependent the 
individual is on ventilation, the doctor responsible for withdrawal will need to do a number 
of things: 
• If the patient is highly dependent on ventilation, they will become very breathless 
or distressed within minutes of it being stopped. As a result, the treating doctor 
will need to administer medication (typically opioids and benzodiazepines) 
designed to alleviate this distress (typically in the form of sedation) prior to the 
withdrawal of the ventilation; 
• Even if the patient is not highly dependent on ventilation but, nevertheless, 
requires it to survive, there will come a point at which the withdrawal of that 
ventilation will cause breathlessness and/or distress which the doctor will need to 
pre-empt through the administration of appropriate medication;  
• The doctor will need to physically withdraw ventilation. What this entails will differ 
depending on the nature of the ventilation but there is no question that it will 
require an act or acts on the part of the doctor.620 
Plainly, withdrawal of ventilation requires several acts on the part of the doctor. 
Nevertheless, following Bland, the behaviour of a doctor who administers medication to 
ameliorate distress and suffering and actively withdraws the patient’s ventilation is said to 
be an ‘omission’.  
Similar conceptual difficulties arise in the context of the withdrawal of artificial nutrition 
and hydration. In cases where such treatment621 is the only life-sustaining treatment the 
patient is receiving and the patient is not terminally ill (i.e. where the patient is in a 
persistent vegetative state or a minimally conscious state as a result of a catastrophic brain 
injury), its removal will cause the patient’s death, typically through multi-organ failure 
stemming from starvation/dehydration or bronchopneumonia. As that decline could be 
accompanied with pain and discomfort for the patient, doctors overseeing the withdrawal 
of artificial nutrition and hydration administer medication to ameliorate distress and 
 
620 See, for instance, Association for Palliative Medicine of Great Britain and Ireland, ‘Withdrawal of assisted 
ventilation at the request of a patient with motor neurone disease: Guidance for professionals’ (2015) 
<https://apmonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/APM-Guidance-on-Withdrawal-of-Assisted-
Ventilation-Consultation-1st-May-2015.pdf> accessed 31 July 2019. 
621 It is well established in medical law in England and Wales that artificial nutrition and hydration constitutes 
treatment (see, for instance, Bland (n 31)).  
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pain.622 In both the instances of withdrawal of treatment just described, the treating 
physicians are doing things including actively administering medication to ameliorate the 
consequences of their acts (i.e. the withdrawal of artificial ventilation, nutrition and/or 
hydration) which are themselves intimately connected to the patient’s cause of death.  
The tenuousness of the distinction between acts and omissions in the medical treatment 
context is perhaps best exemplified when one considers the alleged difference between the 
‘malicious’ interloper and the beneficent doctor described by Lord Goff in Bland: 
 [T]he doctor’s conduct is to be differentiated from that of, for example, an 
interloper who maliciously switches off a life support machine because, although 
the interloper may perform exactly the same act as the doctor who discontinues 
life support, his doing so constitutes interference with the life-prolonging 
treatment then being administered by the doctor. Accordingly, whereas the doctor, 
in discontinuing life support, is simply allowing his patient to die of his pre-existing 
condition, the interloper is actively intervening to stop the doctor from prolonging 
the patient’s life, and such conduct cannot possibly be categorised as an 
omission.623 
 
There does not appear to be any difference in the act undertaken by the interloper 
compared with the doctor. Indeed, as Lord Goff recognised, they ‘perform exactly the 
same act’ (emphasis added). In both instances, the individual withdrawing the treatment is 
said to be allowing the patient’s underlying condition to ‘run its course’ (noting, of course, 
that death after withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration quite often results from 
starvation/dehydration as opposed to the underlying clinical condition of the patient). It 
appears that the differential classification of their treatment as an act (for the interloper) 
as opposed to an omission (for the doctor), stems from their different intentions: whereas 
the interloper’s purpose is to bring about the patient’s death,624 the doctor’s intention is to 
comply with the patient’s request or, where the patient is in a persistent vegetative or 
minimally conscious state, to withdraw treatment that is no longer in their best interests. 
But, while intention can affect the legal consequences of an act, it cannot transform what 
 
622 See, for instance, Jenny Kitzinger and Celia Kitzinger, ‘Deaths after feeding-tube withdrawal from patients 
in vegetative and minimally conscious states: A qualitative study of family experience’ (2018) 32 Palliative 
Medicine 1180.  
623 Bland (n 31), 866.  
624 Of course, there is a strong argument that a doctor who withdraws life-sustaining treatment has indirect 
intention of the patient’s death insofar as it is a virtually certain consequences. But if the doctor’s conduct is 
classified as an omission, the actus reus for murder is absent and the presence of the requisite mens rea is 
inconsequential.   
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is plainly an act into an omission: an act is an act whether the individual undertook it with 
malicious intent or benevolently. Whether that act should carry liability is an entirely 
separate question. There is nothing in Lord Goff’s reasons to suggest that were the 
interloper’s intention to withdraw treatment which they did not consider to be in their 
loved one’s best interests (i.e. a purely benevolent intention), that would convert the act of 
withdrawing the life-sustaining treatment into an omission (at best, it would transform the 
conduct into a ‘mercy killing’ which, under current English law, is still murder). If 
withdrawal constitutes an act regardless of the interloper’s intention, it should likewise 
constitute an act when undertaken by a doctor. While these shortcomings in Lord Goff’s 
reasons strongly point against their application to the situation of concern in this chapter, 
if the reasons do apply they provide direct support for the contention that a patient who 
requests the withdrawal of, or refuses, life-sustaining treatment does an act since in such 
circumstances, the patient is in an analogous position to that of the interloper; the patient’s 
request or refusal ‘constitutes interference with the life-prolonging treatment then being 
administered by the doctor. Accordingly ... the [patient] is actively intervening to stop the 
doctor from prolonging [their] life.’ It is also arguable that a patient who requests palliative 
sedation in an advance directive is similarly acting as they are likewise intervening in the 
doctor’s prolongation of their life.  
Having observed the inherent limitations of the act/omission distinction in the context of 
life-sustaining treatment, there is a further, perhaps more persuasive reason for its non-
application to a patient’s decision to cease, or their refusal of, life-sustaining treatment or 
their request for palliative sedation. In these cases, there is no question of culpability or 
liability on the part of the patient; the purpose is not to ascribe blame for a particular act 
(or, for that matter, omission). There is, then, no obvious need to perpetuate the tenuous 
distinction between acts and omissions in the context of medical treatment and a patient’s 
request for the withdrawal/refusal of life-sustaining treatment and an advance directive for 
palliative sedation should be considered an act for the purposes of the common law 
definition of suicide.  
The act of requesting the removal of life-sustaining treatment, refusing such treatment and 
an advance directive for palliative sedation is sufficient to satisfy the actus reus of suicide 
even though the doctor is the individual who does (or does not do) the act that, as will be 
discussed below, is a substantial and operating cause of the patient’s death. This is because, 
as referred to above, a doctor is compelled to act upon a capacitous patient’s instruction 
to withdraw life-sustaining treatment and cannot administer treatment to a capacitous 
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patient who has refused it, even if the doctor considers such treatment to be in the patient’s 
best interests.625 The doctor’s conduct is, then, a relatively certain consequence of the 
patient’s instruction.626 While culpability is not relevant for instant purposes, if it were, the 
doctor would arguably be an innocent agent and the patient would be the principal 
perpetrator, provided the doctor did not have the requisite mens rea and was simply acting, 
as required by law (conscientious objection aside), in accordance with the patient’s express 
wishes.627 Given that criminal law already accommodates the potential that a doctor who 
does an act that will likely lead to death can do it without the intention to cause death (i.e. 
the doctrine of double effect),628 it is not a stretch to assume that a doctor acting upon the 
instructions of a capacitous patient which will likely lead to their death can do so without 
the attendant mens rea such that they are acting as innocent agents for the patient, who is 
the principal and to whom the act (and its legal consequences) are attributed. 
Accordingly, insofar as the common law definition of suicide requires that the deceased 
did an act for the purposes of bringing about their death, an express request to end, or the 
refusal of further, life-sustaining treatment will satisfy the actus reus requirement as will an 
advance directive for palliative sedation. Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly 
acknowledged this fact in the reasons rejecting Noel Conway’s appeal, wherein the Court 
stated that ‘Mr Conway could bring about his own death in another way, by refusing 
consent to the continuation of his NIV [non-invasive ventilation].’629 Of course, a further, 
critical, question remains as to whether that act is causative of the patient’s death. But, 
insofar as the immediate concern is whether a patient in these cases can be said to be doing 
an act, it is clear that they are. As noted above, the conduct of the patient in such instances 
parallels that of Lord Goff’s interloper who intervenes to prevent the doctor from 
continuing to prolong their life. And, as Lord Goff expressly acknowledged, there can be 
no question that in such instances, the interloper/patient is acting.  
Having established, then, that a patient’s request to withdraw/refusal of life-sustaining 
treatment and an advance directive for palliative sedation constitutes an act for the 
purposes of ascertaining whether the actus reus of suicide has been met in the criminal law 
 
625 Re B (n 33). 
626 It is no less certain than death following an overdose or, indeed, death following the impelling of oneself 
off a three-storey building.  
627 See, for instance, Re Michael (1840) 9 C & P 356.  
628 See, for instance, Nicklinson (n 7) [18] (Lord Neuberger): ‘a doctor commits no offence when treating a 
patient in a way which hastens death, if the purpose of the treatment is to relieve pain and suffering (the so-
called “double effect”)’. 
629 Conway (Supreme Court) (n 8) [3]  
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context, the next question is whether such an act can be said to be have caused the patient’s 
death. That requires an examination of the criminal law’s approach to causation.  
3.2.2.3. Acts causative of death    
In the criminal law context, causation is a matter of common sense, not philosophical 
analysis.630 It is, for the most part, a question of fact for the jury, though it is decided in 
accordance with legal principles.631 The starting point is ‘but for’ or ‘factual’ causation, 
otherwise known as sine qua non. The test for factual/but for causation requires the jury to 
consider whether, but for the actions of the relevant individual, the relevant harm would 
have occurred in the same manner and at the same time that they did. A ‘simple approach’ 
to but for causation is to eliminate the individual’s conduct from the narrative and ask 
whether the result would have occurred anyway.632 If the answer is in the affirmative, the 
conduct of the individual did not factually cause the outcome. The focus is on the specific 
results at the specific time. The fact that a patient is terminally ill and likely to die from 
complications stemming from that illness (for instance, chronic infection or pneumonia) 
at an indeterminate point in the not-too-distant future does not absolve the individual who 
kills them by stabbing them. Thus, in Dyson,633 the victim was terminally ill with meningitis 
at the time the defendant injured him. Those injuries were found to have caused the 
victim’s death since he died sooner than he would have from the meningitis. Thus, but for 
the defendant’s actions, the victim would not have died at the time and in the manner that 
he did. 
The but for test is, however, only the starting point of the examination of causation in 
criminal proceedings.634 ‘There are many acts that are sine qua non of an event but are not 
either in law or common sense, the cause of it.’635 The individual’s conduct need not be 
the sole cause of the result. What is required is that the conduct in question was an 
‘operating’ and ‘substantial’ cause of the event.636 Much jurisprudence has been dedicated 
to ascertaining what ‘operating’ and ‘substantial’ means. To be ‘substantial’, the act in 
question must be more than a ‘de minimis or minimal’ cause.637 As for an ‘operating’ cause, 
the chain of causation between the act (or omission) and the event must not have been 
 
630 Kennedy (n 614) [15].  
631 R v Cheshire [1991] 1 WLR 844.  
632 David Omerod and Karl Laird (eds), Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (14th edn, Oxford University Press 
2015), 64. 
633 R v Dyson [1908] 2 KB 454 (CA). 
634 R v Hughes [2013] 2 AC 337, [2013] UKSC 5 [22].  
635 Omerod and Laird (n 632), 64. 
636 See, for instance, R v Malcherek [1981] 1 WLR 690; R v Mellor [1996] 2 WLUK 122.  
637 See, for instance, Hughes (n 634) [22].  
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broken by a novus actus interveniens such as a free, voluntary and informed act of a third party 
or, indeed, the victim.638 When examining whether an act of a third party or the victim has 
broken the chain of causation, the court (or, more specifically, the jury) asks whether, 
having regard to the whole of the individual’s character (including their religious beliefs639), 
the intervening act was ‘the natural result of what the alleged assailant said and did, in the 
sense that it was something that could reasonably have been foreseen as the consequences 
of what he was saying or doing’.640 Thus, a decision of a victim who is an adherent of the 
Jehovah’s Witness faith not to receive a life-saving blood transfusion did not constitute a 
novus actus interveniens as it was reasonably foreseeable that an individual such as the victim 
(i.e. a person of the same faith) would not accept a blood transfusion.641 Similarly, acts 
undertaken by victims to escape violence (for example, jumping out of a window, escaping 
from a moving car, or running into traffic to escape an assault) are not only reasonably 
foreseeable but they also cannot be said to be free, voluntary or informed such as to break 
the chain of causation.642 
Relevantly, for instant purposes, it is possible for an individual to be guilty of a person’s 
death even though the immediate cause of the victim’s death was suicide, provided their 
suicide was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s conduct. In the Court 
of Appeal decision of Wallace,643 the Court held that there was no legal impediment (as 
opposed to evidentiary limitations) to the defendant being found guilty of murder even 
though the victim’s cause of death was lawful euthanasia in Belgium.644 The victim had 
been grievously injured after the defendant threw sulphuric acid onto his face and body. 
At the first trial, the trial judge determined not to leave the charge of murder to the jury 
on the basis that the acts of the doctors in Belgium in euthanising the victim constituted a 
novus actus interveniens thus breaking the chain of causation. In contrast, the Court of Appeal 
determined that the question of murder could be left to the jury on the basis that they ‘may 
 
638 See, for instance, Kennedy (n 614); Cheshire (n 631); R v Roberts (1971) 56 Cr App R 95 (CA); R v Wallace  
(2018) 2 Cr App R 22, [2018] EWCA Crim 690.  
639 R v Blaue [1975] 1 WLR 1411. 
640 R v Roberts (n 638), 102.  
641 Blaue (n 639); Pitts (1842) C & M 284; R v Curley (1909) 2 Cr App R 96.  
642 See, for instance, Pitts (n 641); Curley (n 641); R v Roberts (n 638); R v Lewis [2010] 1 WLUK 410, 
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643 R v Wallace (n 638). 
644 Following the appeal, Berlinah Wallace was retried. While she was acquitted of murder, she was convicted 
of the offence of applying a corrosive fluid with intent contrary to section 29 of the Offences Against the 
Persons Act 1861 and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment: R v Berlinah Wallace (Crown Court Bristol, 
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conclude on the very special facts of this case, that there was nothing that could decently 
be described as voluntary either in the suffering or in the decision by [the victim] to end 
his life, given the truly terrible situation he was in’ as a result of the defendant’s acts.645 As 
the Court of Appeal observed:  
It would, as the prosecution say, seem an odd result, if a defendant who paralysed 
one victim but not another in identical circumstances (so the second could take 
their own life, but the first could only do so through the intervention of a third 
party) would be legally responsible for the death of the second victim but not the 
first. In the event we consider that the jury could conclude on the facts as they 
were here that the acts of [the victim] and the doctors were not sensibly divisible; 
that the doctors’ (lawful) conduct in carrying out with their hands what he could 
not carry out with his own was but one link in the chain of events instigated by the 
defendant and, notwithstanding the intervening act of [the victim] and/or the 
doctors, the defendant’s conduct could fairly be said to have made a significant 
contribution to [the victim’s] death...646  
The decision in Wallace serves to reinforce two important aspects of causation in English 
criminal law. The first is that, like causation in the coronial context, in the vast majority of 
cases there will be a chain of causation and the defendant’s conduct will be one of a number 
of ‘causes’. In such cases, the defendant’s culpability will depend, inter alia, on whether their 
acts (or ‘omissions’) were a substantial and operating cause of the victim’s death. The 
second is that a decision by the victim to bring about their death by suicide does not, ipso 
facto, break the chain of causation provided it can be demonstrated that the victim’s 
decision was not a novus actus interveniens and, relatedly, that the defendant’s conduct 
remained a substantial and operating cause of the victim’s death. 
The decision of Dear647 is illuminating in this respect. In that case, the defendant slashed 
the victim’s face with a Stanley knife. The victim refused to seek medical treatment and, 
with the assistance of another man, managed to stem the bleeding. Nevertheless, several 
days after the attack, the victim was found deceased in his apartment. The immediate cause 
of death was exsanguination, with the autopsy revealing that a major artery in the victim’s 
face had been cut. It was accepted that that injury had been inflicted by the defendant. A 
note was located in the victim’s flat which suggested that he intended suicide. It was, 
 
645 Wallace (n 638) [76].  
646 ibid [85]. (emphasis in original) 
647 R v Dear [1996] 3 WLUK 208, [1996] Crim LR 595.  
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however, not clear whether the victim had intentionally reopened his wounds or if the 
injury to the artery had inadvertently reopened (for instance, through an accidental bump). 
The defendant was convicted of the applicant’s murder. Significantly for instant purposes, 
the Court of Appeal confirmed that even if the victim had reopened his wounds with 
suicidal intent, ‘the jury were entitled to find that the defendant’s conduct made an 
operative and significant contribution to the death’.648   
Finally, several cases have confirmed that a decision by doctors to withdraw life-sustaining 
treatment of patients in persistent vegetative states where continued treatment is no longer 
in their best interests, may be the immediate cause of death but it does not break the chain 
of causation between the defendant’s acts and the victim’s death. In such cases, the 
defendant’s unlawful conduct remains a substantial and operating cause at the time of the 
patient’s death.649 It is only when it can properly be said that the defendant’s conduct is 
‘merely the setting in which another cause operates’ that the chain of causation may be 
said to have been broken (for instance, in the case of grossly negligent medical 
treatment).650   
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that causation in criminal law contexts is a fact-
based assessment, which goes beyond a ‘but for’ examination of the defendant’s unlawful 
conduct and considers whether it was an operating and substantial cause of the relevant 
harm. There is, then considerable overlap between the approaches to causation taken in 
the coronial proceedings compared with criminal proceedings. The key points to take from 
the discussion of the principles governing causation in criminal proceedings for the instant 
inquiry are: 
• While the starting point is the but for test, the defendant’s conduct need not be 
the sole cause of the relevant harm;  
• If the defendant’s conduct was an ‘operating’ and ‘substantial’ cause of the harm, 
it will satisfy the actus reus element of the offence;  
• To be a ‘substantial’ cause, the conduct must ‘play more than a minimal part’ in 
the relevant harm.651 To be an ‘operating’ cause, the chain of causation between 
 
648 ibid, 595-96.  
649 See, for instance, Malcherek (n 636).  
650 See, for instance, R v Smith [1959] 2 WLR 623; R v Jordan (1956) 40 Cr App R 152 (though the facts of 
this case have been repeatedly described as exceptional: Malcherek (n 636) 180).   
651 Wallace (n 638) [86(3)(a)].  
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the defendant’s conduct and the harm must not have been broken by a novus actus 
interveniens; 
• A victim’s decision to bring about their death by suicide may not constitute a novus 
actus interveniens if the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that the victim’s suicide 
was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s conduct.  
3.2.3. Summary  
The preceding sections have traced the origins and development of the common law 
definition of suicide for the purposes of ascertaining the meaning of ‘suicide’ as that term 
is used in the Suicide Act 1961. That examination has revealed that ‘suicide’ has a common 
law meaning which comprises two central elements: (1) the doing of an act (2) for the 
purposes of bringing about one’s death. Given the longstanding interrelationship between 
the coronial and criminal jurisdictions, jurisprudence from each has been examined in 
order to distil the nature and scope of those two elements. That examination has resulted 
in the distillation of two principles central to the content and scope of the definition of 
‘suicide’ for the purposes of the Suicide Act 1961. Those principles can be summarised as 
follows: 
1. Intention: only direct intention will satisfy the mens rea of suicide. Where the patient 
acts for the purpose of bringing about their death, that will be evidence of 
intention.   
2. Causation: the patient’s act need not be the sole cause of their death. Provided it 
is an ‘operating’ and ‘substantial’ cause, that will satisfy the causation requirement.  
3.3. ‘Suicide’ and withdrawal/refusal of treatment: a re-examination of the legal 
classification of assisted dying 
Presently, where death occurs following withdrawal/refusal of treatment or palliative 
sedation, in the absence of evidence suggesting that the death was ‘unnatural’ (such as 
gross negligence), the likely coronial conclusion (if there were to be an inquest which is 
unlikely652) would be ‘natural causes’. Historically, a death was considered ‘unnatural’ if it 
was attended by some form of violence. In the 1882 decision of Hull, the Court held that 
‘no doubt the main object of all such inquiries is to ascertain whether the death has been 
 
652 Given that the duty to investigate arises if the coroner has reason to suspect that: 
(a) the deceased died a violent or unnatural death, 
(b) the cause of death is unknown, or 
(c) the deceased died while in custody or otherwise in state detention. 
(Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 5(2)). 
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caused by any violence or criminal act.’653 Today, when dealing with deaths arising from 
withdrawal/refusal of treatment or palliative sedation the following applies: 
 [W]here death is due to an event which is itself a response to an underlying cause, 
that underlying cause must be considered. If it is not in itself unnatural, for example 
cancer, or a heart condition, and the response was a natural consequence of the 
disease (for example, the usual and appropriate treatment, properly administered), 
the fact that a recognised complication of the response led to death does not make 
the death unnatural.654 
While physician assisted suicide or euthanasia in response to a terminal or life-limiting 
illness could arguably be considered ‘an event which is itself a response to an underlying 
[natural] cause’ (in the same way that palliative sedation is such an event) and, if so, should 
lead to a conclusion of ‘natural causes’ rather than ‘suicide’, where the ‘event’ is an act 
undertaken by the deceased with the intention of bringing about their death and the act is a 
‘substantial’ and ‘operating’ cause of the deceased’s death, the deceased can be said to have 
died by suicide (as that term is used in the Suicide Act 1961), rather than death by natural 
causes.  
While such a contention may seem controversial by moral, ethical and/or philosophical 
standards, for the reasons outlined above, it makes more sense legally than the alternative 
act/omission distinction developed by the House of Lords in Bland (the validity of which 
troubled several Lords, especially Lord Mustill).655 A finding that withdrawal/refusal of 
treatment and palliative sedation can constitute suicide plainly raises significant issues in 
terms of the offence of assisting or encouraging suicide in s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 since 
a doctor who acts in accordance with a patient’s autonomous right to cease or not initiate 
life-sustaining treatment or, indeed, their advance directive with respect to palliative 
sedation – or provides advice with respect to same – could be guilty of the offence of 
assisting or encouraging suicide under s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961.656 Such an outcome, 
which is problematic for a variety of reasons, is undesirable. It does, however, reveal the 
 
653 R v Hull (1882) 9 QBD 689, 700. 
654 Matthew (n 552) 5-73.  
655 Bland (n 31), 866 (Lord Goff), 879, 881-82 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) and 886-87 (Lord Mustill). See, also, 
discussion of this issue by Lord Neuberger in Nicklinson (n 7) [18].  
656 In such cases, it is likely that the broader criminal law conceptualisation of intention – i.e. including 
oblique/indirect intention – would apply such that a doctor could be found to have the requisite mens rea of 
s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 if assisting or encouraging the patient’s suicide is a virtually certain consequence 
of their conduct. 
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inherent limitations of s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 which are, in turn, reflections of the 
differential treatment afforded to various end-of-life practices compared with assisted 
suicide. This chapter does not advocate a broadening of the meaning of suicide but, rather, 
emphasises the difficulties with the formulation of the current blanket ban, given the 
proper construction of ‘suicide’.  
Of course, not all instances of withdrawal/refusal of treatment and/or requests for 
palliative sedation will constitute suicide. For such acts to be properly classified as such, 
there must be evidence that the deceased: 
• Intended to take their life (i.e. acted with the purpose of bringing about their 
death); and, 
• Did an act that was a substantial and operating cause of their death.  
For the reasons given above, a capacitous patient’s instruction to withdraw life-sustaining 
treatment or the refusal of such treatment and an advance directive to administer palliative 
sedation constitutes an ‘act’. The key issues, as with any alleged instance of suicide whether 
in the coronial context or in criminal proceedings, are whether the deceased can be said to 
have intended to take their life and whether the act undertaken can properly be said to be 
a ‘substantial’ and ‘operating’ cause of their death.  
3.3.1. Intention  
It bears recalling that only direct intention will suffice. Where a patient requests that their 
life-sustaining treatment be ceased or refuses its administration for the purpose of bringing 
about their death, that will be evidence of direct intention. The fact that the patient does 
not desire to die and would prefer to live if they were able to rid themselves of their 
terminal or life-limiting condition does not alter the fact that their intention is to bring 
about their death and that is direct intention for instant purposes. Likewise, the fact that 
the patient wants to bring about their death because they are suffering immeasurably or 
because their deterioration and death is likely to be prolonged, painful or undignified, does 
not alter the fact that they intend to bring about their death. The patient in such 
circumstances is akin to the individual with motor neurone disease who is not presently 
dependent on ventilation and who, intending to bring about their death in order to avoid 
the inevitable decline, seeks the assistance of Dignitas in so doing. There is no doubt that 
the individual in the latter case intended to bring about their death, yet that intention may 
well have stemmed from the same concerns which led the patient with motor neurone 
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disease who was dependent on artificial ventilation to withdraw consent for that treatment 
or to refuse it. In both cases, the individual acts with the purpose of bringing about their 
death. In both cases the individual intends their death. Similarly, a patient who requests 
palliative sedation at a specific point of physical decline with the purpose of bringing about 
their death (whether, in fact, palliative sedation does achieve that outcome will be discussed 
below) has the requisite intention for suicide.  
In contrast, a terminally ill patient who instructs a doctor to withdraw life-sustaining 
treatment or refuses to commence it because the treatment is causing them considerable 
pain or distress acts with the purpose of halting that treatment only. They do not act with 
the purpose of bringing about their death through the ending of that treatment. Even if 
death is a virtually certain consequence, their act (i.e. instructions to cease or refusal to 
consent to treatment) was intended to avoid the pain/distress associated with it. Putting 
an end to the treatment (or not commencing it) is the means of reducing pain/suffering 
which is the intended end. This can be compared with the patient who is suffering 
(physically or otherwise) because of their condition or illness and the only way that is 
satisfactory to the patient of putting an end to that suffering is death. In that case, the patient 
acts for the purpose of bringing about their death. A crude example of the distinction 
between the two patients is the individual with a mental health condition. That patient may 
experience unpleasant side-effects as a result of the medication taken to ameliorate the 
symptoms of their condition. As a result, they cease their treatment or refuse medication. 
They do so for the purpose of ending/avoiding the adverse side-effects (‘Situation A’). If 
their untreated condition causes them unbearable suffering, they may do an act for the 
purpose of bringing about their death to put an end to their suffering (‘Situation B’). The 
patient who ends/refuses life-sustaining treatment because that treatment is causing them 
unbearable suffering, is analogous to the individual in Situation A. The patient who 
ends/refuses life-sustaining treatment in order to bring about death because it is in death 
that their suffering will end is analogous to the individual in Situation B. 
The distinction is also illustrated by the victim of a stabbing – a Jehovah’s Witness – who 
refuses a life-saving blood transfusion. Their refusal may lead to their death, but they did 
not refuse the transfusion for the purpose of bringing about their death. Were they to 
survive, they would not consider their act a ‘failure’. In contrast, a patient who seeks to 
end their suffering by bringing about their death would consider their continued existence 
a ‘failure’. Likewise, the patient who ends/refuses treatment because the treatment is 
 209 
causing them suffering would not consider their continued existence without treatment a 
‘failure’. 
Each of these instances presumes, of course, that the individual is compos mentis at the time 
the act leading to their death takes place. It is submitted that nothing changes if the patient 
is incapacitous at the time of their death but has made an advance directive specifying the 
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment if they are in a persistent vegetative or minimally 
conscious state. In this case, the individual has done an act (instructing their treating 
physicians to withdraw/not administer life-sustaining treatment) for the purpose of 
bringing about their death. They thus have the requisite intention. Questions of whether 
you can legitimately attribute past intention to a patient in a persistent vegetative or 
minimally conscious state are beyond the scope of the instant inquiry.  
Greater ambiguity attends advance directives concerning palliative sedation. Such 
treatment is provided to address a patient’s refractory symptoms when the patient’s death 
is likely within the coming hours or days. It entails keeping the patient in an unconscious 
state and is attended by the removal of artificial nutrition and hydration.657 There is debate 
as to whether palliative sedation causes death.658 It is administered when the terminally ill 
patient’s symptoms are not responding to existing treatment including pain relief and is 
intended to reduce suffering in the last hours/days of life by keeping a patient in a heavily 
sedated state so that they are (hopefully) unaware of the pain/distress.659 A person who 
requests palliative sedation in an advance directive is likely, then, to do so for the purpose 
of addressing refractory symptoms and not to bring about death. In that case, the requisite 
intent for suicide will be absent. That said, if the patient does request palliative sedation 
for the purpose of bringing about their death (leaving aside, for now, whether palliative 
sedation causes death), intent will be present.  
3.3.2. Causation 
As observed above, the physical aspect of suicide need not be the sole cause of death 
though it must be a ‘significant’ and ‘operating’ cause of death. It is, then, entirely possible 
to have multiple acts coalescing to lead to death and this will likely be the case in situations 
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658 See, for instance, Rob George and Claud Regnard ‘Lethal drugs or dangerous prescribers?’ (2007) 21 
Palliative Medicine 77. 
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involving withdrawal/refusal of treatment and palliative sedation. In such circumstances, 
the underlying condition/illness is undoubtedly a cause of death but so too is the decision 
either to cease life-sustaining treatment, to refuse such treatment or, potentially, to be 
terminally sedated. Were it not for those decisions (i.e. acts), the individual could have 
continued living, perhaps only for a short period but living nonetheless. Thus, in the same 
way that a terminally ill person who ingests a lethal dose of analgesic will be considered to 
have died by suicide (notwithstanding the fact that their terminal illness would, ultimately, 
have led to their death), a terminally ill person who withdraws/refuses treatment similarly 
brings about their death, just via a different means. A hastened death is still a death brought 
about by an act of the deceased. Indeed, the Supreme Court recognised this when they 
observed that Noel Conway could bring about his death once he became dependent on 
24-hour ventilation by refusing consent to the continuation of his ventilation.660 In refusing 
consent to the ongoing administration of ventilation, Noel Conway would be ‘bring[ing] 
about his own death’ which, however imminent as a result of complications arising from 
his condition, would not have occurred at that time and in that manner, were it not for his 
act. His act would, thus, satisfy the ‘but for’ test of causation and would be a ‘significant’ 
and ‘operating’ cause of his death. As discussed earlier, a person is guilty of murder if their 
unlawful act is a significant and operating cause of the victim’s death even if the victim has 
a terminal illness that would otherwise have been fatal at a later time.661 Unless it can be 
shown that the deceased would have died in the same manner and at the same time, 
regardless of the accused’s unlawful act, the but for test will be satisfied and, unless there 
is evidence to demonstrate that the accused’s conduct was not a significant and operating 
cause of the victim’s death, the actus reus of murder will be satisfied.662 The question, then, 
is whether the act of a patient who seeks the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, 
refuses to consent to its administration or a patient who provides an advance directive 
requesting palliative sedation can be said to be a ‘significant’ and ‘operating’ cause of death.  
Whether the patient’s act is a significant and operating cause is highly fact specific. If a 
patient is receiving life-sustaining treatment (such as artificial ventilation or artificial 
nutrition and hydration), their request for its removal or a refusal to consent to its 
administration will satisfy both the but for test (since, but for the patient’s act, their death 
would not have occurred at that time and in that manner) and the significant and operating 
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661 See, for instance, Dyson (n 633). 
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cause test since it cannot be said that the removal/non-administration of life-sustaining 
ventilation/nutrition and hydration is a negligible cause nor will it be too remote to the 
patient’s death. Beyond artificial ventilation/nutrition and hydration, whether a patient’s 
request to cease or refusal of consent to treatment can be said to be a ‘significant’ and 
‘operating’ cause of death will depend on the specific facts. It may be that the patient has 
advanced-stage kidney failure and is receiving daily dialysis which the patient decides to 
cease/refuses consent to its ongoing administration. In that instance, the patient’s act 
satisfies both the sine qua non and the significant and operating cause requirements since, 
but for the patient’s act, they would have continued receiving life-sustaining dialysis.  While 
they may well have suffered a fatal myocardial infarction or subdural haemorrhage while 
receiving treatment, their death following the ceasing of dialysis was caused by their act of 
requesting its cessation/refusing to consent to its continued administration. The same 
applies to a person who is tetraplegic/quadriplegic and is receiving antibiotics to address a 
urinary tract infection which, if left untreated, will likely lead to sepsis (urosepsis) and 
death. The decision to cease the administration of antibiotics or the refusal of consent 
thereto is both sine qua non and a significant and operating cause of their death. It is 
impossible to canvass all of the potential fact variations and, more importantly, such an 
exercise is unnecessary for instant purposes. The preceding discussion has demonstrated 
that a request to withdraw/refusal of consent to life-sustaining treatment may satisfy the 
causal element of the common law definition of suicide.  
As for palliative sedation, as noted above, significant doubt attends whether such 
treatment, when properly administered, causes death. It is generally accepted that good 
practice in respect of palliative sedation (or, as it is otherwise known, palliative/continuous 
deep sedation) involves the administration of small doses of opioids and sedatives, titrated 
according to the patient’s specific symptoms which, given the body’s ability to adjust to 
suitably small increases in dosage, should not hasten death.663 In most cases, then, palliative 
sedation should not cause death; it should be neither sine qua non the patient’s death nor a 
‘significant’ and ‘operating’ cause. Indeed, palliative sedation should be accompanied by 
the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration which may well be the legal cause of 
death. Insofar as the withdrawal of that treatment forms part of the palliative sedation, it 
 
663 See, for instance, Rob George and Claud Regnard (n 657), 77; Bassam Estfan, Fade Mahmoud, Philip 
Shaheen, Mellar Davis, Wael Lasheen, Nilo Rivera, Susan LeGrand, Ruth Lagman, Declan Walsh, Lisa 




may well be that the patient’s sedation is a legal cause of death. But, as the preceding 
summary demonstrates, it is far from clear whether palliative sedation can be said to cause 
death and, even if it can, as discussed above, the patient will likely lack the requisite 
intention when making their advance directive for a request for palliative sedation to 
constitute suicide. 
The preceding discussion of causation in the context of three forms of end-of-life 
treatment has demonstrated that, in some instances, the act of a patient will be the legal 
cause of their death. This is most likely in cases involving a request for the withdrawal 
of/refusal of consent to life-sustaining artificial ventilation or nutrition and hydration. In 
such cases, the patient’s request for withdrawal or refusal of consent will be sine qua non 
and a significant and operating cause of their death. In the case of palliative sedation, there 
is significant debate as to whether such ‘treatment’, when properly administered, causes 
death. It may be that death occurs as a result of the concomitant withdrawal of nutrition 
and hydration or, considering best practice dictates that palliative sedation be administered 
in the last hours/days of a patient’s life, it may be caused by complications stemming from 
the patient’s underlying illness/condition. It is, thus, not possible to reach any generalised 
conclusions regarding whether palliative sedation satisfies the causation element of the 
common law definition of suicide. There may be cases in which it does, whether because 
the doctor administers exceedingly high doses of opioids/benzodiazepines leading to 
significant respiratory depression and, ultimately, death, or because of the attendant 
withdrawal of nutrition/hydration. But even if the causation requirement is met, as 
discussed above, the patient is unlikely to have had the requisite intention to satisfy the 
definition of suicide.  
3.4. Assisted dying and suicide: some conclusions 
The preceding analysis has revealed that there is a common law definition of ‘suicide’ 
which applies both to the coronial jurisdiction and in criminal proceedings involving the 
Suicide Act 1961. Having examined the relevant coronial and criminal jurisprudence, it is 
apparent that that definition comprises the following elements: 
1. The direct intention to bring about one’s death (i.e. acting for the purpose of 
causing one’s death); and, 
2. An ‘act’ on the part of the deceased which was a significant and operating cause of 
death.  
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Relevant to the second element of the definition of ‘suicide’, the artificial act/omission 
distinction developed in Bland which characterises a doctor’s withdrawal/withholding of 
life-sustaining treatment as an omission does not apply to a patient’s decision to cease, or 
their refusal of consent to, life-sustaining treatment. In such cases, as well as in cases 
involving an advance directive to administer palliative sedation, the patient has acted.   
The elements of the common law definition of ‘suicide’ just outlined will be met when a 
patient requests the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment or refuses such treatment and 
does so for the purpose of bringing about their death. In such cases, the patient’s act (i.e. 
their request for withdrawal or their refusal of consent) will be both sine qua non and a 
significant and operating cause of their death since, but for their act, they would not have 
died in the manner that they did, at the time that they did. Further, in acting to bring about 
their death (as opposed to acting for the purpose of ending treatment that is causing them 
pain or distress), they had the requisite direct intent to satisfy the intention element of the 
common law definition of suicide. In contrast, in cases involving palliative sedation, the 
patient is unlikely to have had the requisite intention since palliative sedation is, when 
properly administered, used to ameliorate suffering/distress caused by a terminally ill 
patient’s refractory symptoms and is, then, not intended to bring about death. Further, 
there is significant debate as to whether palliative sedation, when properly administered 
(i.e. appropriately titrated), causes death. Of course, there may be instances in which 
palliative sedation is administered for the purpose of bringing about a patient’s death but, 
in general, an advance directive for palliative sedation will not satisfy the elements of the 
common law definition of suicide.  
While these conclusions raise significant issues in terms of the culpability of medical 
professionals and others, that does not alter the legal reality that certain conduct which is 
presently considered to be a lawful manifestation of a patient’s autonomy and self-
determination (and protected as such) may, in fact, constitute suicide for the purposes of 
the Suicide Act 1961 and in terms of suicide conclusions in the coronial context. This has 
profound implications for, inter alia, the validity of the justifications for the blanket ban on 
assisted suicide in England and Wales discussed in Chapter Four; if patients who seek 
withdrawal of/refuse consent to life-sustaining treatment are dying by suicide and are, in 
fact, being assisted in doing so (albeit unwittingly given the current understanding of the 
legal status of such acts) by medical practitioners, then the justifications given for not 
permitting other patients to do the same lose some or all of their force. These conclusions 
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also raise issues concerning the proper classification of other conduct in the coronial 
context (including, for instance, starvation and/or other forms of what has previously been 
considered ‘self-neglect’). More pressingly, however, are the implications of these findings 
for Article 14 of the ECHR.   
4.  Differential treatment of ‘suicide’: implications for Article 14 
As noted earlier, discrimination under Article 14 of the ECHR occurs when, inter alia, there 
is ‘a difference in treatment between persons in analogous or relevantly similar positions’ 
and there is ‘no objective and reasonable justification’.664 While the preceding distillation 
of the meaning of ‘suicide’ for the purposes of the Suicide Act 1961 has revealed that some 
end-of-life practices that are currently permitted by English law may, in fact, constitute 
‘suicide’, that does not itself confirm that individuals who engage in those end-of-life 
practices are in an ‘analogous’ or ‘relevantly similar position’ to those like Noel Conway 
who would seek assistance in dying by suicide if legally permitted to do so. In terms of 
what makes a situation ‘analogous’ or ‘relevantly similar’, it is not necessary for the 
positions to be identical.665  
The question, then, is whether Noel Conway at the time the Supreme Court dismissed his 
application for permission to appeal could be said to be in an analogous situation to Noel 
Conway who is dependent upon continuous ventilation? For the following reasons, the 
answer must be yes. As Lady Hale held in AL (Serbia): 
There are ... dangers in regarding differences between two people, which are 
inherent in a prohibited ground and cannot or should not be changed, as meaning 
that the situations are not analogous. For example, it would be no answer to a claim 
of sex discrimination to say that a man and a woman are not in an analogous 
situation because one can get pregnant and the other cannot. This is something 
that neither can be expected to change. If it is wrong to discriminate between them 
as individuals, it is wrong to focus on the personal characteristics which are 
inherent in their protected status to argue that their situations are not analogous...666 
Recalling that a person’s medical condition and disability are prohibited grounds for 
differential treatment under Article 14, and given that a person’s receipt (or not) of life-
 
664 Pretty v United Kingdom (n 7) [88].  
665 See, for instance, R (Carson) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] 1 AC 173, [2005] UKHL 37 
(Lady Hale).  
666 AL (Serbia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 1 WLR 1434, [2008] UKHL 42 [27].  
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sustaining treatment is inherent in those prohibited grounds and cannot be changed, it 
would be legally impermissible to suggest that the two versions of Mr Conway were not in 
analogous situations. This is all the more so when one considers the fact that the act of 
refusing continued ventilation would meet the criteria for ‘suicide’ just as would the act of 
ingesting a fatal dose of barbiturates. Both versions of Mr Conway are suffering intolerably, 
both have a terminal illness, both are competent, and both wish to exercise control over 
the manner and timing of their death, as is their right under Article 8 of the ECHR. They 
are in analogous situations, but the ban prohibits only one version of Mr Conway from 
exercising his right to control the manner and timing of his death through assisted suicide 
and there is no evidence that that is proportionate to the aims of protecting: individuals 
vulnerable to undue influence, the doctor/patient relationship, or the sanctity of life.667 
The same reasoning precludes a finding that Diane Pretty and Tony Nicklinson are not in 
analogous situations: their conditions cannot be changed and the differences between them 
are inherent in the prohibited ground of medical condition or disability. There is, then, a 
strong argument that English law fails to treat equally individuals who are in analogous or 
relevantly similar situations. Given the findings in Chapters Four and Five, the justification 
for the ban is neither objective nor reasonable and, in those circumstances, the ban on 
assisted suicide in s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 is discriminatory in violation of Article 14, 
taken in conjunction with Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the ECHR. 
This conclusion is directly at odds with the decision of the United States Supreme Court 
in Vacco.668 In that case, the Supreme Court examined whether the prohibition in New 
York on assisting suicide violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. In finding that the prohibition did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, 
the Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal’s finding that ‘New York law does not 
treat equally all competent persons who are in the final stages of fatal illness and wish to 
hasten their deaths’ because: 
[T]hose in the final stages of terminal illness who are on life-support systems are 
allowed to hasten their deaths by directing the removal off such systems; but those 
who are similarly situated, except for the previous attachment of life-sustaining 
 
667 See, Chapters Four and Five.  
668 Vacco (n 93). 
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equipment, are not allowed to hasten death by self-administering prescribed 
drugs.669 
The Court of Appeal, thus, determined that the two versions of Noel Conway referred to 
above were in analogous situations. Notably, the Court of Appeal concluded that ‘[t]he 
ending of life by [the withdrawal of life-support systems] is nothing more nor less than 
assisted suicide’670 and further held that this differential treatment was not rationally 
connected to any legitimate state interest.671 
Central to its decision to overturn the Court of Appeal’s judgment, was the Supreme 
Court’s rejection of the finding that ending or refusing life-sustaining treatment could 
constitute assisted suicide.672 According to the Supreme Court, the distinction between 
assisted suicide and refusing life-sustaining treatment ‘comport[ed] with fundamental legal 
principles of causation and intent.’673 But, as the preceding analysis has revealed, the legal 
principles of intention and causation in English criminal law that apply in cases of suicide 
(at least insofar as that term is employed in the Suicide Act 1961) can, and do, apply to 
certain instances of refusal of life-sustaining treatment. The Court of Appeal’s findings in 
Vacco thus provide support for the findings reached in this chapter regarding the meaning 
of suicide and the application of Article 14, read together with Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the 
ECHR.  
5. Conclusion  
This chapter has considered the potential discriminatory effect of the ban on assisted 
suicide in England and Wales. Drawing on the findings in previous chapters, there is a 
strong argument that the ban is discriminatory because it imposes a disproportionate 
burden on individuals who are physically unable to die by suicide without assistance and 
because it differentiates between analogous cases of suicide on the basis of a prohibited 
ground (medical condition and/or disability) and there is no reasonable or objective 
justification for that differential treatment. Central to the claim that the ban discriminates 
between analogous cases is the conclusion that, in certain instances, refusal of life-
sustaining treatment constitutes ‘suicide’ for the purposes of the Suicide Act 1961.  
 
669 ibid, 798.  
670 Vacco (n 93).  
671 ibid, 799.  
672 Vacco (n 93), 800.  
673 ibid, 801.  
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In the absence of a definition in the Suicide Act 1961, tracing the history of the offence of 
felo de se revealed that there is a common law definition of suicide which has existed since 
at least the 18th century. This definition has evolved primarily through coronial 
jurisprudence and, having regard to that case law, it is apparent that ‘suicide’ as that term 
is employed in both the Suicide Act 1961 and the coronial context means the doing of an 
act for the purposes of bringing about one’s death with the intention of bringing about 
that consequence. This, however, does not resolve the question of what acts constitute 
suicide for the purposes of s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961. To resolve that issue, it was 
necessary to determine the scope of the intention and causation elements of the definition. 
That examination revealed that, contrary to criminal law in England and Wales more 
generally, suicidal intention only encompasses direct intention. As for the causal aspect, 
what is required is that the act of the suicide was a significant and operating cause of death; 
it need not be sole causal factor. In sum, the common law definition of suicide comprises 
the following elements: 
1. The direct intention to bring about one’s death (i.e. acting for the purpose of 
causing one’s death); and, 
2. An ‘act’ on the part of the deceased which was a significant and operating cause of 
death. 
It is, then, entirely possible that certain instances of withdrawal/refusal of treatment 
and/or palliative sedation constitute suicide as that term is employed in the Suicide Act 
1961. Provided the individual does the act (for instance giving instructions regarding 
treatment) with the direct intention of bringing about their death, and that act is a 
significant and operating cause of their death, the individual will have died by suicide for 
the purposes of s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961.  
As canvassed in this chapter, the ban imposes a disproportionate burden on individuals 
like Diane Pretty and Noel Conway who cannot control the manner and timing of their 
deaths without assistance. This conclusion is equally applicable to the prohibition on 
euthanasia which restricts individuals who are physically incapable of suiciding to a ‘single, 
difficult course of action’ in order to bring about their deaths, namely self-starvation and 
dehydration or the refusal of life-saving treatment such as antibiotics. The prohibition on 
euthanasia thus has a disproportionately prejudicial effect on individuals on the basis of 
their physical disability and is discriminatory in violation of Article 14, read in conjunction 
with Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the ECHR. The Suicide Act 1961 also differentiates between 
 218 
analogous cases of suicide on the prohibited basis of an individual’s medical condition 
and/or disability, thus violating Article 14, read in conjunction with Articles 2, 3 and 8 of 
the ECHR.  
6. Rectifying the incompatibility  
In order to address the discriminatory effect of the Suicide Act 1961, the State will need 
to legislate for a permissive assisted dying system in line with that proposed in Chapters 
Two, Three and Four. While the primary focus of this chapter was the Suicide Act 1961, 
the conclusions reached with respect to the ban’s discriminatory effect are equally 
applicable to the prohibition on euthanasia. Consequently, if the State introduces a system 
which permits assisted suicide only, individuals who, as a result of their medical condition 
and/or physical disability, cannot suicide will continue to be disproportionately prejudiced 
by the prohibition on euthanasia in violation of Article 14 of the ECHR, read in 
conjunction with Articles 2, 3 and 8. Similarly, if the State restricts access to assisted dying 
by reference to an individual’s life expectancy, this would also fail to redress the violation 
of Article 14 of the ECHR, read in conjunction with Articles 2, 3 and 8, since the ban on 
assisted suicide and the prohibition on euthanasia would continue to have a 
disproportionately prejudicial effect on individuals whose deaths are not within the 
specified timeframe, like Omid T. Further, restricting access to assisted dying based on a 
person’s life expectancy would not remedy the law’s failure to treat like cases alike. As the 
research in this chapter revealed, certain instances of refusal/withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment constitute ‘suicide’ for the purposes of the Suicide Act 1961, yet those acts are 
not prohibited. As Chapters Four and Five revealed, there is no objective or reasonable 
justification for allowing those acts of suicide, regardless of the individual’s life expectancy, 
while prohibiting other forms of suicide because the individual’s death is not predicted to 
occur within a specific timeframe. Should the State introduce a system of assisted dying 
that is predicated upon the individual’s life expectancy, the law would continue to 
differentiate between analogous cases on the basis of individual’s medical condition in 
violation of Article 14, read in conjunction with Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the ECHR. In sum, 
then, consistent with the conclusions reached in respect of Articles 2, 3 and 8, the State 
will need to introduce an assisted dying system that permits both assisted suicide and 
euthanasia and is based on a person’s intolerable suffering stemming from a terminal or 
irremediable medical condition, rather than the individual’s life expectancy. Such a system 
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would not only remedy the incompatibilities with Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the ECHR, but it 





The overarching objective of this thesis was to analyse the human rights implications of 
the blanket ban on assisted suicide in England and Wales. This was achieved through an 
examination of the ban’s compatibility with the ECHR, specifically the right to life (Article 
2), the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3), the 
right to private life (Article 8) and the freedom to enjoy those substantive rights without 
discrimination (Article 14). The inclusion of Articles 2 and 3 took this analysis beyond the 
parameters established in the erstwhile domestic and ECtHR jurisprudence, and provided 
a more comprehensive analysis of the ban’s impact on the rights of individuals in England 
and Wales than has previously been undertaken in either the case law or the academic 
literature. Further, while the right to choose the manner and timing of one’s death (Article 
8, ECHR) has been the focus of judicial review proceedings before the English courts, 
including the Supreme Court, that jurisprudence was critically examined in this thesis with 
a view to ascertaining whether the conclusion that the ban was compatible with Article 8 
reached by both the High Court and the Court of Appeal in Noel Conway’s judicial review 
proceedings was legally correct.    
1. Overview of research findings  
While English law differentiates between assisted suicide and euthanasia on the one hand 
and other end-of-life practices like the refusal/withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment on 
the other, as the analysis undertaken in Chapters One, Four and Six revealed, there is 
considerable overlap between those practices in terms of the principles underpinning them 
and, significantly, the legal status of the practices. A capacitous patient’s autonomy, self-
determination and dignity provide the foundation for the absolute respect afforded to their 
refusal of, or decision to cease, life-sustaining treatment, even where that decision will 
inevitably lead to their death. In such cases, while the sanctity of life is an important factor, 
it is outweighed by the patient’s right to control what happens to their body, including 
whether it is kept alive. In stark contrast, a capacitous individual who has decided, in the 
exercise of their autonomy and self-determination, that their quality of life is significantly 
diminished as a result of a life-threatening or life-limiting medical condition, is prohibited 
from acting on that decision by ending their life with assistance. The same outcome may 
be sought in both cases – the ending of suffering which can only be achieved through the 
ending of life – and both individuals are exercising their rights to autonomy and self-
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determination. Yet, English law respects absolutely the right of one of them to refuse life-
sustaining treatment, while criminalising the other’s exercise of their right to choose the 
manner and timing of their death. Central to that differential treatment is the weight 
attributed to competing interests such as the sanctity of life. While such interests are 
relevant to Article 8 of the ECHR, which is a qualified right, competing interests have no 
relevance to the State’s general obligation to protect life in Article 2 and the State’s negative 
obligation not to subject individuals within its jurisdiction to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment in Article 3 of the ECHR.  
Chapter Two examined the compatibility of the ban with the right to life. While both the 
domestic courts and the ECtHR rejected Diane Pretty’s argument that the right to life 
necessarily incorporated – and protected – the inverse right to die, no court considering 
the Suicide Act 1961 has examined whether the ban violates the positive obligation to 
protect life. It is incontrovertible that Article 2 confers a general obligation on the State to 
protect life. Central to this obligation is a responsibility to establish a legal system which 
deters threats to life. Evidence from England and Wales, which was reflected in the 
findings of the Canadian courts in Carter, confirms that the ban on assisted suicide compels 
some individuals to take their lives prematurely, before their physical condition deteriorates 
to the point at which they can no longer suicide without assistance. Plainly, the ban 
interferes with the right to life of such individuals and, in enacting and maintaining the ban 
in the face of a number of proposed amendments to allow assisted suicide in certain 
circumstances, the State has failed to put in place a system that deters such threats to those 
individuals. Indeed, it has enacted a system that is itself a threat to life for some individuals. 
The ban thus violates the right to life of some individuals and that is sufficient to support 
a finding that the ban is incompatible with Article 2 of the ECHR. There is no scope for 
a consideration of the reasons for the ban – Article 2 does not invite a balancing exercise, 
at least when it comes to the State’s general obligation to protect.  
The same applies in respect of Article 3 of the ECHR, which contains an absolute 
prohibition on torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. As with her Article 2 claim, the 
House of Lords and the ECtHR rejected Ms Pretty’s claim that the ban violated Article 3 
of the ECHR on the basis that there was no ‘treatment’ which the State could be said to 
be responsible for. The harm, it was said, arose as a result of Ms Pretty’s medical condition 
and the State was in no way responsible for that. However, as discussed in Chapter Three, 
the State has an obligation not to subject individuals to treatment that causes suffering or 
exacerbates suffering that arises as a result of a medical condition. Through the Suicide 
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Act 1961, the State criminalises the provision of assistance to another who wishes to 
suicide. For some individuals who are thus precluded from lawfully accessing assistance in 
dying by suicide, the State can be said to have subjected them to treatment which, if not 
itself the source of suffering, exacerbates the suffering caused by the individual’s medical 
condition. This line of argument derives support from the reasoning of President Hale and 
Lord Kerr (with whom Lord Wilson agreed) in the Northern Ireland Abortion Case, in which 
both concluded that the criminalisation of abortion in the case of rape, incest and fatal 
foetal abnormality, constituted treatment on the part of the State. As President Hale 
observed, in those cases, it is the State that is subjecting the individual to the ‘agonising 
dilemma’ of unlawfully procuring an abortion, travelling to England to access an abortion 
or continuing with the pregnancy. The same applies to the State in the context of the 
blanket ban on assisted suicide. It is the State that is subjecting the individual to the 
agonising dilemma: do they take their lives prematurely, while they are still physically 
capable of doing so without assistance? Or do they access assistance unlawfully, thereby 
subjecting those who provide such assistance to the risk of prosecution? Alternatively, do 
they travel to a permissive jurisdiction, again before they are physically incapable of 
travelling without assistance, and do they go alone or do loved ones accompany them, 
thereby exposing themselves to the possibility of prosecution? Or, do they face a 
potentially prolonged, painful and/or undignified death?  
The analysis conducted in Chapter Three led to the conclusion that, in criminalising the 
provision of assistance and thereby forcing individuals like Noel Conway and Omid T to 
confront an ‘agonising dilemma’ ranging from a premature death to a protracted, painful 
and undignified death, the State has subjected such individuals to ‘treatment’ such as to 
engage Article 3 of the ECHR. As to whether that treatment reaches the minimum level 
of severity to constitute a violation of Article 3, it cannot reasonably be suggested that the 
treatment has been intentionally inflicted for the purpose of securing a particular aim, such 
as to constitute torture. There is, however, ample evidence that for Diane Pretty, Noel 
Conway and Omid T, and hundreds if not thousands more individuals like them, the ban 
– and, thus, the treatment – causes ‘either actual bodily injury or intense physical and 
mental suffering’ and ‘arouse[s] ... feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of 
humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance’.674 
In such cases, the blanket ban on assisted suicide constitutes inhuman or degrading 
 
674 Jalloh (n 198) [68]. See, also, Ilascu (n 211) [100]-[101].  
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treatment by the State in violation of its negative obligation under Article 3 of the ECHR 
not to inflict such treatment. The prohibition in Article 3 of the ECHR is absolute; the 
purpose of the treatment is irrelevant. Even if it was permissible to have regard to the 
reason for the infliction of the ill-treatment when considering whether the treatment 
violated Article 3, as the analysis undertaken in Chapters Four and Five revealed, a blanket 
ban on assisted suicide is disproportionate; a less restrictive measure would better balance 
the competing interests. Chapter Three also considered the possibility that the ban violated 
the State’s positive obligation to protect. Lord Kerr’s finding in the Northern Ireland Abortion 
Case that the risk that some girls and women would suffer harm in violation of Article 3 as 
a result of the ban on abortion was sufficient to engage the State’s positive obligation to 
protect them against that harm materialising was similarly applicable to the ban on assisted 
suicide. There was evidence that the ban would constitute inhuman or degrading treatment 
for some individuals in a ‘highly vulnerable class’ of people in England and Wales and the 
risk of that harm materialising was sufficient to engage the State’s positive obligation to 
protect. In failing to amend the Suicide Act 1961, the State violated its positive obligation 
under Article 3 of the ECHR. The same reasoning concerning the State’s negative and 
positive obligations under Article 3 was applicable to the common law offence of murder, 
insofar as it precludes voluntary active euthanasia.  
The focus of Chapter Four was the right to choose the manner and timing of one’s death, 
an aspect of the right to private life protected by Article 8 of the ECHR. Following the 
ECtHR’s finding in Pretty, it is clear that the blanket ban on assisted suicide interferes with 
the right of individuals like Noel Conway and Omid T to choose the manner and timing 
of their death. Central to the analysis undertaken in Chapter Four was accounting for the 
opposing outcomes reached by Lady Hale and Lord Kerr in Nicklinson and the High Court 
and Court of Appeal in Conway. The critical analysis of case law undertaken in this chapter 
revealed a fundamental error first made by then-President Neuberger in Nicklinson and 
perpetuated by the High Court and Court of Appeal in Conway, namely, that for a court to 
find that the ban was incompatible with Article 8 of the ECHR, the applicant challenging 
the ban had to provide evidence of a fully-formed, guaranteed-to-function alternative. 
Such a requirement is plainly erroneous; once an applicant has proven an interference by 
the State with their right to private life, the onus shifts to the State to prove that the 
interference is justified. It was incontrovertible that the ban interfered with Noel Conway’s 
right to choose the manner and timing of his death. The onus then shifted to the State to 
prove that the interference was justified. Requiring Mr Conway to prove a guaranteed-to-
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function alternative impermissibly shifted the onus back to him, and assumed a fact not 
found, namely that the ban was justified.  
Further, in placing the requirement on Mr Conway to prove that a system of assisted 
suicide would function appropriately, the High Court and the Court of Appeal failed to 
have regard to the fact that the current system is not itself guaranteed-to-function; 
hundreds of people have died with assistance both in England and Wales and in permissive 
jurisdictions overseas. Indeed, the statistics of prosecutions under s 2 of the Suicide Act 
1961, together with the sentencing remarks made in cases involving s 2 prosecutions, reveal 
that while there is a de jure ban on assisted suicide, there is a de facto system of permitted 
assisted suicide involving benevolent assistance of individuals with life-threatening or life-
limiting conditions or elderly loved ones. Such a de facto system not only provides clear 
evidence of a ‘guarantee-to-function’ alternative to the blanket ban, it also reiterates the 
invalidity of the requirement placed on Noel Conway to prove that a less restrictive system 
would function appropriately before a finding of incompatibility could be made; it cannot 
be a requirement that a system which is not itself ‘guaranteed-to-function’ can only be 
declared incompatible with the ECHR if there is an alternative that is ‘guaranteed-to-
function’.  
As to whether the ban is proportionate to the aims pursued, while doubt attends the 
validity of the additional aims identified by the High Court in Conway, they were 
nevertheless considered in Chapter Four. In reaching the conclusion that a blanket ban is 
disproportionate to the aims pursued, regard was had to the medical system in England 
and Wales; medical professionals working with terminally ill patients are required to ensure 
that decisions made by such patients do not arise as a result of undue influence. This 
familiarity, coupled with the fact that prosecutions under s 2 of the Suicide Act 1961 are 
highly unlikely in cases of benevolent assistance provided to individuals with life-
threatening or life-limiting conditions or elderly individuals, demonstrates that a less 
restrictive ban – one which reflects the de facto situation in England and Wales – strikes a 
better balance between the aim of protecting individuals vulnerable to undue influence and 
the rights of individuals like Noel Conway and Omid T than the blanket ban. Indeed, 
regulating a practice that is already taking place would provide better protection for 
individuals who were vulnerable to undue influence as such a system could ensure that 
appropriately qualified individuals, with experience in determining whether a patient is 
acting as a result of undue influence, provided the assistance. An appropriately regulated 
permissive system would better protect individuals vulnerable to undue influence than the 
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current system which entails an ex post facto assessment of vulnerability based on secondary 
sources and hearsay.  
As for the doctor/patient relationship, there is evidence that a system which enables 
patients to have frank conversations with their doctors about their end-of-life care 
improves, rather than undermines, the doctor/patient relationship. Further, while the law 
has drawn artificial distinctions between acts/omissions to avoid medical professionals 
being culpable for criminal offences when they withdraw life-sustaining treatment or 
administer increasing doses of pain relief, regardless of the legal classification of such 
conduct, doctors treating terminally ill patients, and patients who are in persistent 
vegetative states/minimally conscious states, are regularly involved in treatment which 
leads to, or at the least contributes to, the patient’s death. Doctors already play a pivotal 
role in patients’ deaths and it is difficult to see how extending the category of patients who 
can access such assistance would so deleteriously affect the doctor/patient relationship as 
to warrant a blanket ban. Indeed, several medical bodies have recently polled their members 
to ascertain their position on assisted suicide, with the Royal College of Physicians 
changing its official stance with respect to assisted suicide from against to neutral which is 
further evidence of the fact that a blanket ban on assisted suicide is not necessary to protect 
the doctor/patient relationship.  
As for the final aim, protecting the sanctity of life, English medical law recognises the 
importance of that principle but has repeatedly confirmed that a patient’s sanctity of life is 
not absolute; a capacitous patient can exercise their autonomy and self-determination and 
refuse life-sustaining treatment, and a doctor must respect that decision, even if they do 
not agree with it. Likewise, an incapacitous patient cannot be kept alive simply for life’s 
sake; ongoing treatment must be in their best interests and where it is not, it must be 
ceased, even when that will lead to death. It is difficult to see how a ban, which precludes 
capacitous individuals from exercising their autonomy and self-determination to avoid a 
potentially prolonged, painful and undignified death, protects the sanctity of life, unless 
that concept is given a meaning different to that employed elsewhere in medical law, 
namely the protection of life at all costs, regardless of the patient’s best interests. Again, it 
is notable that the de facto situation in England and Wales reflects the approach taken 
elsewhere in medical law, namely that benevolent assistance of an individual who has a 
terminal, or life-limiting condition, or who is elderly and has limited quality of life, is 
permitted. This plainly reflects a balancing of the competing interests in favour of the 
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individual’s autonomy, self-determination and dignity. The blanket ban is, then, 
disproportionate to the aim of protecting the sanctity of life.  
As discussed above, the requirement that the applicant challenging the ban’s compatibility 
with Article 8 of the ECHR prove that there is a viable, guaranteed-to-function, alternative, 
is legally dubious to say the least. However, as the research conducted in Chapter Five 
revealed, even if it were permissible to place such a requirement on applicants, the 
permissive systems in an increasing number of countries and States in America are all 
evidence of ‘guaranteed-to-function’ alternatives. ‘Guaranteed-to-function’ cannot be 
taken to mean completely without risk; any system based on human judgement is fallible. 
Rather, guaranteed-to-function, at least in terms of Article 8 of the ECHR, must refer to a 
system that sufficiently meets the concerns raised by the State. Chapter Five used the 
findings of Justice Smith in Carter as the foundation for an examination of whether 
permissive schemes pose an unacceptable risk to individuals vulnerable to undue influence, 
to the doctor/patient relationship and to the sanctity of life. Those findings were then 
considered in light of subsequent data collected by the regulatory bodies in several 
permissive jurisdictions. That analysis revealed that while no permissive system is faultless, 
rates of non-compliance with the legislative requirements are low, with many cases of 
further investigation by the regulatory bodies involving complex cases where opinions 
were varied as to the appropriate course of action. Certainly, there is no evidence of a 
‘slippery slope’, or of a risk of vulnerable individuals being pressured into accessing assisted 
suicide. The majority of individuals accessing assistance in dying in permissive jurisdictions 
are elderly with terminal cancer. In those jurisdictions that collate further demographic 
data, the results reveal that the majority of persons who die with assistance are educated, 
have private health insurance and are receiving palliative care. Insofar as it is possible to 
objectively gauge a person’s vulnerability to undue influence, such individuals are not likely 
to be considered at risk. Further, there was no evidence of deterioration in the 
doctor/patient relationship, indeed, there was frequently an improvement, with patients 
preferring a system in which they can have honest and frank conversations about their end 
of life care. And, finally, as to the sanctity of life, jurisdictions that allow assisted dying 
adopt an approach to the principle similar to that which exists elsewhere in English medical 
law, namely, that while it is of considerable importance, it can and does give way to other 
considerations such as the patient’s autonomy, self-determination and dignity. Further, 
there is no evidence of slippery slopes in permissive jurisdictions.  
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Having determined that the blanket ban is incompatible with the right to life (Article 2, 
ECHR), the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or degrading conduct (Article 3) 
and the right to private life (Article 8), Chapter Six considered whether the ban was 
discriminatory. There are two potential bases for a finding that the ban is discriminatory. 
The first is that it imposes a disproportionate burden on individuals who are physically 
unable to die by suicide without assistance, and the second is that it differentiates between 
analogous cases of suicide on the basis of a prohibited ground (medical condition and/or 
disability) and there is no reasonable or objective justification for that differential 
treatment. As for the first basis, while the ban applies to both able bodied and physically 
disabled individuals, the means of suicide available to able bodied individuals are much less 
onerous than those available to individuals who, because of physical disability, can only 
bring about their death by self-starvation and dehydration. And, it is only physically 
disabled persons who are restricted to that single, difficult course of action. While there 
may be no ‘right to suicide’ in domestic law, there is a right to choose the manner and 
timing of one’s death and the blanket ban on assisted suicide imposes a disproportionate 
burden on individuals who, as a result of their physical disability, are unable to exercise 
that right. Similarly, the ban compels some individuals to take their lives prematurely, on 
the basis of their medical condition and future deterioration and subjects some individuals 
who do not take their lives prematurely to inhuman or degrading treatment or, at the least, 
exacerbates their suffering such as to reach the minimum level of severity under Article 3 
of the ECHR. The ban, thus, places a disproportionate burden on individuals who, as a 
result of their medical condition, will be physically unable to die by suicide without 
assistance. Accordingly, the ban on assisted suicide is discriminatory in violation of Article 
14, read in conjunction with Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the ECHR.  
The same line of reasoning applies to the prohibition on euthanasia. Individuals who, as a 
result of their medical condition and/or physical disability, cannot suicide (even with 
assistance) are disproportionately prejudiced by the prohibition on euthanasia and are 
restricted to the ‘single, difficult course of action’ of self-starvation and dehydration or the 
refusal of life-saving treatment, such as antibiotics, in order to bring about their deaths. 
Individuals without physical disabilities are not so restricted and the prohibition on 
euthanasia is, thus, discriminatory as it has a disproportionately prejudicial effect on 
individuals on the basis of their medical condition and/or physical disability in violation 
of Article 14, read in conjunction with Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the ECHR.  
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As for the second basis of discrimination, Chapter Six examined whether the ban 
discriminates between analogous cases. This turned on the meaning of ‘suicide’ for the 
purposes of Suicide Act 1961. If ‘suicide’ covers instances of end-of-life practices which 
are lawful, such as the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, then the ban discriminates 
between analogous cases. Through critical examination of coronial and criminal case law, 
a common law definition of suicide was distilled. ‘Suicide’ as that term is used in the Suicide 
Act 1961 comprises the following elements: 
1. The direct intention to bring about one’s death (i.e. acting for the purpose of 
causing one’s death); and, 
2. An ‘act’ on the part of the deceased which was a significant and operating cause of 
death.  
There are, then, instances of withdrawal/refusal of life-sustaining treatment which legally 
constitute ‘suicide’ and involve assistance from doctors but which are not, in practice, 
prohibited by the ban. While English law permits those forms of assisted suicide, it 
prohibits absolutely other forms of assisted suicide and the basis for that differential 
treatment is the individual’s medical condition. If the individual is terminally ill and 
receiving life-sustaining treatment, they can die by suicide with assistance by refusing or 
seeking the withdrawal of that treatment. If the individual is not receiving life-sustaining 
treatment, they cannot avail themselves of an assisted death. The justifications for this 
differential treatment are the same as those given for the interference with Article 8 of the 
ECHR. For reasons given in Chapters Four and Five, the justification(s) for the failure to 
treat like cases alike are neither objective nor reasonable; insofar as they are legitimate, a 
blanket ban is disproportionate and the differential treatment is discriminatory in violation 
of Article 14, read in conjunction with Article 8 of the ECHR.  
2. Rectifying the incompatibility  
The research conducted in Chapters Two to Six revealed that the ban is incompatible with 
the right to life (Article 2, ECHR), the right to freedom from torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment (Article 3, ECHR), the right to private life (Article 8, ECHR) and the 
right to enjoy those substantive rights free from discrimination (Article 14, ECHR read in 
conjunction with Articles 2, 3 and 8). The power to make a declaration of incompatibility 
pursuant to s 4 of the HRA 1998 is discretionary – the courts are not compelled to make 
such a declaration. However, as both Lady Hale and Lord Kerr observed in Nicklinson, 
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there is little to be gained and much to lose in not issuing such a declaration as it is an 
especially useful method of communication with Parliament. Indeed, by signalling to 
Parliament that the Suicide Act 1961 violates not only the right to private life of individuals 
like Noel Conway and Omid T, but also the fundamental rights to life and freedom from 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, a declaration of incompatibility will 
undoubtedly affect any debate surrounding the amendment of the Suicide Act 1961. More 
significantly, perhaps, in a jurisdiction where a declaration of incompatibility does not 
affect the validity of the law, it is the best remedy for an individual who has had their rights 
violated. Such individuals deserve a declaration of incompatibility, considering the 
magnitude of the harm that is caused by the ban on assisted suicide. 
The question, then, is what Parliament must do to rectify the incompatibilities. Again, it 
must be noted that Parliament can choose to do nothing in the face of a declaration of 
incompatibility. However, should Parliament decide to act to remedy the violations, there 
are several options available. In the context of Article 2, Parliament could simply repeal 
the ban, thereby decriminalising assistance. That would take the pressure off individuals 
who would otherwise be forced to take their lives prematurely were the ban still in place. 
This is the situation in Scotland, where assisting suicide is not a criminal offence and 
Switzerland, where there is no legislation regulating the provision of assistance. Such an 
approach is, however, not ideal as it does not offer the transparency and accountability 
that a regulated system of assistance would. It is recommended, then, that Parliament either 
amend the Suicide Act 1961 to provide for forms of assisted suicide, or repeal the Act and 
introduce legislation akin to Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act or Victoria’s Voluntary 
Assisted Dying Act.  
As for the ban’s incompatibility with Article 3 of the ECHR, it is not enough for Parliament 
to introduce legislation permitting assisted suicide. The same line of reasoning that led to 
the conclusion that the ban constitutes treatment, arguably applies to the offence of 
murder, which criminalises euthanasia. If that is correct, then Parliament will need to adopt 
legislation akin to that which exists in Canada (in particular Part VIII of the Criminal Code) 
and Victoria, both of which permit euthanasia in specific circumstances. As to the eligibility 
criteria, as suffering is highly subjective, a life-expectancy requirement of 6 months or less 
(as exists in the permissive US states), will not resolve the incompatibility, as individuals 
whose life-expectancy is more than six months may nevertheless experience suffering that 
reaches the minimum level of severity. An approach such as that initially proposed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Carter, namely assisted dying for individuals who, as a result 
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of a ‘grievous and irremediable medical condition (including an illness, disease or disability) 
that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual’, provides an ideal model.  
As with the violation of Article 3 of the ECHR, the repeal of the Suicide Act 1961 and the 
introduction of legislation enabling assisted suicide would not be sufficient to address the 
incompatibility with Article 8 of the ECHR. The same reasoning that led to the conclusion 
that the blanket ban is disproportionate applies to the offence of murder, which criminalises 
euthanasia. For individuals like Tony Nicklinson who are physically incapable of doing the 
final act leading to their death (and, thus, cannot suicide), the prohibition on euthanasia 
violates their right to choose the manner and timing of their death. And, just as a blanket 
ban on assisted suicide is not necessary, so too is a blanket prohibition on euthanasia 
unnecessary. The same considerations regarding the medical profession’s familiarity with 
obtaining informed consent, free from undue influence, and its approach to other end-of-
life practices such as the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from both capacitous and 
incapacitous patients, demonstrates that a less restrictive ban on euthanasia would strike a 
better balance between the rights of individuals like Tony Nicklinson to bring about their 
death in the exercise of their autonomy and self-determination vis-à-vis the State’s interests 
in protecting vulnerable individuals, the doctor/patient relationship and the sanctity of life.   
By introducing a system of assisted dying that permits assisted suicide and voluntary active 
euthanasia for individuals who, as a result of a grievous and irremediable medical condition 
which causes suffering that is intolerable to the individual, Parliament would not only 
address the current violations of the rights to life (Article 2 of the ECHR), freedom from 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3 of the ECHR) and the right to choose 
the manner and timing of one’s death (Article 8 of the ECHR), but such a system would 
also remove the discriminatory effect of the ban and address the current incompatibility 
with Article 14, read together with Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the ECHR.  
Throughout this thesis, reference has been made to ‘individuals’ as opposed to ‘adults’. 
While the overwhelming majority of permissive jurisdictions restrict access to ‘adults’ 
(defined as individuals aged 18 years or older), there is no justification for limiting an 
assisted dying regime in England and Wales to ‘adults’. English law recognises the right of 
Gillick competent children to make decisions regarding their medical treatment, including 
the refusal of life-sustaining treatment, subject to parental consent and judicial oversight.675 
Accordingly, Gillick competent children should be permitted to access assistance in dying 
 
675 See, for instance, B (A Minor) (n 496). 
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if they are suffering intolerably as a result of a terminal or irremediable medical condition 
subject to the same conditions as those imposed on Gillick competent children in other 
medical situations (the (de)merits of such limitations are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation).  
3. Implications of this research  
The findings in this thesis fundamentally alter the narrative surrounding the blanket ban 
on assisted suicide in England and Wales and have implications for the ECtHR when 
examining state ban’s on assisted suicide. Contrary to the findings of the ECtHR in Pretty 
and the High Court and Court of Appeal in Conway, the ban is incompatible with Article 8 
of the ECHR. This finding alone has profound consequences for future challenges to the 
ban, two of which have been recently foreshadowed. But the research in this thesis 
broadened the inquiry beyond that previously conducted by either the domestic or ECtHR 
courts or in the academic literature. In so doing, this thesis has demonstrated that the ban 
also violates the fundamental rights to life and freedom from torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment. These findings redirect the focus onto the individuals affected by the 
ban, as opposed to society’s interest in regulating the way in which individuals die, and 
when that is the focus, it is patently clear that the ban causes immeasurable harm to a 
considerable number of individuals each year. Importantly, Article 3 confers an absolute 
right; it does not matter a whit what the purpose of the ban is. The fact that it causes one 
individual suffering that reaches the minimum level of severity is sufficient to ground a 
declaration of incompatibility. The fact that it causes hundreds of people such harm is 
ample justification for a repeal of the ban and the introduction of a system of assisted 
dying that permits both suicide and euthanasia for individuals who are suffering intolerably 
as a result of a grievous and irremediable medical condition. Similarly, the fact that Omid 
T was compelled to take his life prematurely is proof that the ban violated his right to life 
and confirms the finding that the ban is incompatible with Article 2 of the ECHR. When 
the focus is on the very real human cost of the ban, the justifications proffered by the State 
for maintaining it grow increasingly tenuous; it is not enough to make vague claims about 
protecting the vulnerable, or the doctor/patient relationship or the sanctity of life, when 
individuals are taking their lives or are suffering intolerably because of it. This is all the 
more so given the findings that the blanket ban is not proportionate to any of those aims.  
The outcomes of the research conducted in this thesis are directly relevant to the way in 
which future judicial review applications concerning the Suicide Act 1961 are argued and 
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to the nature and scope of any future amendments to that Act and to the common law 
offence of murder. Even more importantly, however, these findings recognise the human 
cost of the ban. The accounts and suffering of individuals affected by the ban are not only 
acknowledged, but they provide the foundation for the findings. ‘There’s nothing certain 
in a [person’s] life except this: That [they] must lose it.’676 When a person’s death promises 
to be prolonged, painful or undignified or when their quality of life is so diminished by 
intolerable suffering arising from a grievous and irremediable medical condition, any 
legislation prohibiting them from exercising control over how they experience their death 
must be carefully scrutinised and its legal veracity confirmed. Such was the purpose of this 
thesis and, having conducted a rigorous examination of the legality of the Suicide Act 1961, 
in the context of the ECHR, it is clear that the justifications proffered for preventing 
hundreds if not thousands of individuals from exercising control over the manner and 
timing of their death are seriously wanting and the blanket ban on assisted suicide is 
incompatible with Articles 2, 3, 8 and 14 (read together with each of those substantive 




676 Though this quote is frequently attributed to Aeschylus’s Agamemnon, doubt attends the validity of that 
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